S. Hrg. 98-174

# UNITED STATES-SOVIET RELATIONS

## HEARINGS
BEFORE THE
## COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS
## UNITED STATES SENATE
NINETY-EIGHTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION

JUNE 15 AND 16, 1983

PART 1

Printed for the use of the Committee on Foreign Relations

U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE
22-514 O WASHINGTON : 1983

S381-36

## COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS

CHARLES H. PERCY, Illinois, *Chairman*

HOWARD H. BAKER, Jr., Tennessee
JESSE HELMS, North Carolina
RICHARD G. LUGAR, Indiana
CHARLES McC. MATHIAS, Jr., Maryland
NANCY L. KASSEBAUM, Kansas
RUDY BOSCHWITZ, Minnesota
LARRY PRESSLER, South Dakota
FRANK H. MURKOWSKI, Alaska

CLAIBORNE PELL, Rhode Island
JOSEPH R. BIDEN, Jr., Delaware
JOHN GLENN, Ohio
PAUL S. SARBANES, Maryland
EDWARD ZORINSKY, Nebraska
PAUL E. TSONGAS, Massachusetts
ALAN CRANSTON, California
CHRISTOPHER J. DODD, Connecticut

EDWARD G. SANDERS, *Staff Director*
GERYLD B. CHRISTIANSON, *Minority Staff Director*

# CONTENTS

Hearing days: Page
- June 15, 1983 — 1
- June 16, 1983 — 43

Statement of—
- Harriman, Hon. W. Averell, former U.S. Ambassador to the Soviet Union (1943–46) — 44
- Harriman, Mrs. W. Averell — 53
- Shultz, Hon. George P., Secretary of State — 3
- Watson, Hon. Thomas J., Jr., former U.S. Ambassador to the Soviet Union (1979–81) — 50

Insertions for the record:
- Executive summary—reprinted from "The United States and the Soviet Union: Prospects for the Relationship," a staff report to the Committee on Foreign Relations — 18
- Letter to Senator Percy from President Reagan, dated May 12, 1983, regarding strategic modernization program and its relationship to our arms control proposals — 22
- Prepared statement of Hon. W. Averell Harriman — 47
- Ambassador Harriman's June 2, 1983, Moscow press statement — 50
- Excerpted statement of Hon. Warren Christopher, former Deputy Secretary of State, regarding a summit meeting between President Reagan and Soviet Premier Andropov — 56
- Senator Pressler's statement on the Threshold Test Ban and Peaceful Nuclear Explosion Treaties — 66
- Two treaties ready to go—reprinted from the Washington Post, May 28, 1983 — 67
- Excerpt from the nomination hearing of David F. Emery, May 17, 1983 — 68
- Scientists challenge claims of Soviet treaty violations—reprinted from Science, volume 220 — 71
- The State of United States-Soviet Relations—address by the Hon. George F. Kennan before the American Committee on East-West Accord, Washington, D.C., May 17, 1983 — 78
- Participants and conclusions of the United States-Soviet Trade Conference, Chicago, Ill., January 12, 1983 — 83
- Comments on the Scowcroft Commission report—submitted by Ambassador Thomas J. Watson — 88

# UNITED STATES-SOVIET RELATIONS

---

WEDNESDAY, JUNE 15, 1983

UNITED STATES SENATE,
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS,
*Washington, D.C.*

The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 10 a.m., in room SD-419, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Hon. Charles H. Percy (chairman of the committee) presiding.

Present: Senators Percy, Helms, Lugar, Kassebaum, Boschwitz, Pell, Glenn, Sarbanes, Tsongas, and Cranston.

The CHAIRMAN. This morning, we warmly welcome the Secretary of State and his colleagues for the opening of what I consider to be among the most important hearings that I have participated in in the years that I have been on the Senate Foreign Relations Committee.

It just so happens that they are one of the few sets of hearings we have delayed simply because at the time that Secretary Shultz was scheduled to appear before the committee, he was requested by the President to proceed to the Middle East, and at the Secretary's specific request, we have held over the hearings so he could personally testify. He said he had prepared his testimony. He wanted to deliver his testimony and felt very much like I did at Stanford years ago, when I was asked in the middle of the Vietnam war whether or not they should cancel the commencement address because of the potential disturbances, and I said, absolutely not.

And later, the President said, how were you so certain when we were so uncertain? And I said, well, I prepared the testimony, and I wanted to give it, and I have no place else to give that speech anyway, so I decided to go ahead, and it worked out all right, just as yours did the other day, Mr. Secretary.

It is appropriate that our lead-off witness this morning be Secretary of State George Shultz, whom we do greet as an old and warm friend, a highly respected Secretary of State from whom today we are asking for a very tall order.

The subject of these hearings, the United States and the Soviet Union, in an atomic and nuclear age, is one of the most important subjects presented to mankind and to history. How do these two so-called superpowers respond and react with the kind of power that they possess? How can we prevent miscalculation? How can we prevent what so many young people are so cynical about occurring in their lifetimes, the possibility of a nuclear war?

The committee understands that the Reagan administration does have a point of view on the Soviet Union, and it has made no secret of some of the concerns that it has in our relationship. The administration clearly understands that the Soviet Union is a powerful and a potentially dangerous adversary with whom it is necessary to compete vigorously to protect U.S. interests and the interests of the free world.

The committee would like to have Secretary of State Shultz explain the administration's strategy for dealing effectively with this challenge that we face.

The difference between a point of view and a strategy is a particularly important one in this particular case. The planet is not big enough to provide a quarantine ward for the other superpower. Our self-interest requires interaction with the Soviet Union on a broad spectrum of business. Let me just cite three examples.

First, men and women everywhere, beginning with our own citizens, look to us to make the world safer from the danger of nuclear weapons. Every place I go in the world, and every place in this country, that is the paramount issue. Everyone places the responsibility on the United States to find some way to make this world a safer world and free from the potential danger of nuclear weaponry.

Second, silence is the greatest enemy of human rights and individual dignity. The American people require us to be true to our heritage of speaking out and defending human rights, and certainly the administration has done that, and has an outstanding Assistant Secretary in that regard.

Third, containing Soviet expansionism requires that we find realistic and effective means to check it instance by instance, and that we contribute significantly to alleviating the poverty and social ills in which it thrives.

Mr. Secretary, the Soviet-American relationship is at best a highly competitive one. We start, after all, from different, entirely different values. But it has deteriorated in recent years to the point where people are frightened by the harsh rhetoric and by the lack of progress in reducing nuclear weapons.

So, our questions to you could be along these lines: How might the United States-Soviet relationship evolve in the 1980's, in your judgment? How much worse can it get? Can it be significantly improved? How much, and how best can the United States influence Soviet policy? How much, and how best can arms control agreements restrain the arms race and improve strategic stability between the United States and the U.S.S.R.?

We will have a series of distinguished witnesses. As witnesses tomorrow—we have invited some of our former Ambassadors to the Soviet Union who have dealt directly with them.

Several are out of the country, but fortunately Ambassador Averell Harriman will be with us tomorrow. Mrs. Harriman will also be testifying with Ambassador Harriman, as they both met with Andropov. Also we will have Ambassador Tom Watson, Jr., testifying, and I know that he has some very strongly held views.

Again, a warm welcome to you, Mr. Secretary. We are eager to hear what you have to say.

Senator Pell, I would like to call upon you for any comments you would like to make.

Senator PELL. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

The reason for these hearings is that the most important objective that we face and the world faces, is the avoidance of nuclear war—it may be a negative objective, but it is in all our minds. Other wars we can handle. Nuclear wars, I feel, would be beyond our ability to contain and perhaps to survive. It dwarfs all other problems.

Our chairman just mentioned the effect on young people of the looming cloud of nuclear war. I had a very interesting experience in my State when I asked a group of people, how many of you think you will live to see or be incinerated in a nuclear war? People our age do not think about that so very much, or very rarely. But when you go to the younger people, the college age kids and the high school kids, usually more than half of their hands go up, and I think it is they who have to carry the load in the future in any case. I hope that they are able to grow up.

Now, in my mind, the peril that we face is greater now than it was 2½ years ago, when this administration took over. I hope I am wrong, and I hope that your testimony will show that I am wrong, but I think a very increasing crescendo of administration rhetoric, although somewhat subdued in the last few weeks, has alarmed people. Also, the departure of people who really, while of a conservative cast, believed strongly and vigorously in arms control, like Gene Rostow, or Tom Enders, who believed in the two-track approach in Central America, has made us concerned about what the real direction of the administration is.

Again, I hope the testimony and the facts, which are most important, will show that our situation is not worsening from the viewpoint of the possibility of war.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you, Senator Pell.

Mr. Secretary, if you would, please proceed.

## STATEMENT OF HON. GEORGE P. SHULTZ, SECRETARY OF STATE

Secretary SHULTZ. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, distinguished members of this committee.

I appreciate the opportunity to meet with you and discuss our approach to United States-Soviet relations in the context of our broader foreign policy. As you have suggested, this has all sorts of dimensions to it that weigh on peoples' minds. And it is, of course, a subject that I have thought about a great deal.

The President has not only taken the time to talk with me about this, but has read through this testimony and made a few suggestions, which I found it possible to accept, and has signed off on the testimony. I feel very confident in saying that I am speaking not only for myself, but for the President in this statement.

The management of our relations with the Soviet Union is of utmost importance. That relationship touches virtually every aspect of our international concerns and objectives, political, economic, and military, and every part of the world.

We must defend our interests and values against a powerful Soviet adversary that threatens both. And we must do so in a nuclear age, in which a global war would even more thoroughly threaten those interests and values. As President Reagan pointed out on March 31: "We must both defend freedom and preserve the peace. We must stand true to our principles and our friends while preventing a holocaust." It is, as he said, "one of the most complex moral challenges ever faced by any generation."

We and the Soviets have sharply divergent goals and philosophies of political and moral order; these differences will not soon go away. Any other assumption is unrealistic. At the same time, we have a fundamental common interest in the avoidance of war. This common interest impels us to work toward a relationship between our nations that can lead to a safer world for all mankind.

But a safer world will not be realized through good will. Our hopes for the future must be grounded in a realistic assessment of the challenge we face and in a determined effort to create the conditions that will make their achievement possible. We have made a start. Every postwar American President has come sooner or later to recognize that peace must be built on strength. President Reagan has long recognized this reality.

In the past 2 years this Nation—the President in partnership with the Congress—has made a fundamental commitment to restoring its military and economic power and moral and spiritual strength. And having begun to rebuild our strength, we now seek to engage the Soviet leaders in a constructive dialog—a dialog through which we hope to find political solutions to outstanding issues.

This is the central goal we have pursued since the outset of this administration. We do not want to—and need not—accept as inevitable the prospect of endless, dangerous confrontation with the Soviet Union. For if we do, then many of the great goals that the United States pursues in world affairs—peace, human rights, economic progress, national independence—will also be out of reach. We can—and must—do better.

With that introduction, let me briefly lay out for this committee what I see as the challenge posed by the Soviet Union's international behavior in recent years and the strategy which that challenge requires of us. Then I would like to discuss steps this administration has taken to implement that strategy. Finally, I will focus on the specific issues that make up the agenda for United States-Soviet dialog and negotiation.

Together, these elements constitute a policy that takes account of the facts of Soviet power and of Soviet conduct, mobilizes the resources needed to defend our interests, and offers an agenda for constructive dialog to resolve concrete international problems. We believe that, if sustained, this policy will make international restraint Moscow's most realistic course, and can lay the foundation for a more constructive relationship between our peoples.

## I. THE SOVIET CHALLENGE

It is sometimes said that Americans have too simple a view of world affairs, that we start with the assumption that all problems can be solved. Certainly we have a simple view of how the world should be—free peoples choosing their own destinies, nurturing their prosperity, peaceably resolving conflicts. This is the vision that inspires America's role in the world. It does not, however, lead us to regard mutual hostility with the U.S.S.R. as an immutable fact of international life.

Certainly there are many factors contributing to East-West tension. The Soviet Union's strategic Eurasian location places it in close proximity to important Western interests on two continents. Its aspirations for greater international influence lead it to challenge these interests. Its Marxist-Leninist ideology gives its leaders a perspective on history and a vision of the future fundamentally different from our own. But we are not so deterministic as to believe that geopolitics and ideological competition must ineluctably lead to permanent and dangerous confrontation. Nor is it permanently inevitable that contention between the United States and the Soviet Union must dominate and distort international politics.

A peaceful world order does not require that we and the Soviet Union agree on all the fundamentals of morals or politics. It does require, however, that Moscow's behavior be subject to the restraint appropriate to living together on this planet in a nuclear age. Not all the many external and internal factors affecting Soviet behavior can be influenced by us. But we take it as part of our obligation to peace to encourage the gradual evolution of the Soviet system toward political and economic pluralism and above all to counter Soviet expansionism through sustained and effective political, economic, and military competition.

In the past decade, regrettably, the changes in Soviet behavior have been for the worse. Soviet actions have come into conflict with many of our objectives. They have made the task of managing the Soviet-American relationship considerably harder, and have needlessly drawn more and more international problems into the East-West rivalry.

To be specific, it is the following developments that have caused us the most concern.

First is the continuing Soviet quest for military superiority even in the face of mounting domestic economic difficulties. In the late 1970's the allocation of resources for the Soviet military was not only at the expense of the Soviet consumer. It came even at the expense of industrial investment on which the long-term development of the economy depends. This decision to mortgage the industrial future of the country is a striking demonstration of the inordinate value the Soviets assign to maintaining the momentum of the relentless military buildup under way since the mid-1960's. This buildup consumed an estimated annual average of at least 12 percent of Soviet GNP throughout this entire period, and has recently consumed even more as a result of the sharp decline in Soviet economic growth. During much of this same period, as you know, the share of our own GNP devoted to defense spending actually declined.

The second disturbing development is the unconstructive Soviet involvement, direct and indirect, in unstable areas of the Third World. Arms have become a larger percentage of Soviet exports than of the export trade of any other country. The Soviets have too often attempted to play a spoiling or scavenging role in areas of concern to us, most recently in the Middle East. Beyond this, the Soviets in the seventies broke major new ground in the kinds of foreign military intervention they were willing to risk for themselves or their surrogates. This has escalated from the provision of large numbers of military advisers, to the more extensive and aggressive use of the proxy forces as in Angola, Ethiopia, and Indochina, and finally to the massive employment of the Soviet Union's own ground troops in the invasion of Afghanistan. In this way, the Soviet Union has tried to block peaceful solutions and has brought East-West tensions into areas of the world that were once free of them.

Third is the unrelenting efforts to impose an alien Soviet "model" on nominally independent Soviet clients and allies. One of the most important recent achievements in East-West relations was the negotiation of the Helsinki Final Act, with its pledges concerning human rights and national independence in Europe. Poland's experience in the past 2 years can be considered a major test of the Soviet Union's respect—or lack of it—for these commitments. Moscow clearly remains unwilling to countenance meaningful national autonomy for its satellites, let alone real independence. Elsewhere in the world, the coming to power of Soviet-supported regimes has usually meant, as in Afghanistan, the forcible creation of Soviet-style institutions and the harsh regimentation and repression of free expression and free initiative—all at enormous human, cultural, and economic cost.

Fourth is Moscow's continuing practice of stretching a series of treaties and agreements to the brink of violation and beyond. The Soviet Union's infringement of its promises and legal obligations is not confined to isolated incidents. We have had to express our concerns about Soviet infractions on one issue after another—human rights and the Helsinki Final Act, yellow rain and biological warfare. We are becoming increasingly concerned about Soviet practices—including the recent testing of ICBM's—that raise questions about the validity of their claim of compliance with existing SALT agreements. Little else is so corrosive of international trust as this persistent pattern of Soviet behavior.

## II. THE AMERICAN RESPONSE: BEYOND CONTAINMENT AND DÉTENTE

This assessment of Soviet international behavior both dictates the approach we must take to East-West relations, and indicates the magnitude of the task.

If we are concerned about the Soviet commitment to military power, we have to take steps to restore the military balance, preferably on the basis of verifiable agreements that reduce arms on both sides, but if necessary through our own and allied defense programs.

If we are concerned about the Soviet propensity to use force and promote instability, we have to make clear that we will resist encroachments on our vital interests and those of our allies and friends.

If we are concerned about the loss of liberty that results when Soviet clients come to power, then we have to insure that those who have a positive alternative to the Soviet model receive our support.

Finally, if we are concerned about Moscow's observance of its international obligations, we must leave Moscow no opportunity to distort or misconstrue our own intentions. We will defend our interests if Soviet conduct leaves us no alternative; at the same time we will respect legitimate Soviet security interests, and are ready to negotiate equitable solutions to outstanding political problems.

In designing a strategy to meet these goals, we have, of course, drawn in part on past strategies, from containment to détente. There is, after all, substantial continuity in U.S. policy, a continuity that reflects the consistency of American values and American interests. However, we have not hesitated to jettison assumptions about United States-Soviet relations that have been refuted by experience or overtaken by events.

Consider how the world has changed since the Truman administration developed the doctrine of containment. Soviet ambitions and capabilities have long since reached beyond the geographical bounds that this doctrine took for granted. Today Moscow conducts a fully global foreign and military policy that places global demands on any strategy that aims to counter it. Where it was once our goal to contain the Soviet presence within the limits of its immediate postwar reach, now our goal must be to advance our own objectives, where possible foreclosing and when necessary actively countering Soviet challenges wherever they threaten our interests.

The policy of détente, of course, represents an effort to induce Soviet restraint. While in some versions it recognized the need to resist Soviet geopolitical encroachments, it also hoped that the anticipated benefits of expanding economic relations and arms control agreements would restrain Soviet behavior.

Unfortunately, experience has proved otherwise. The economic relationship may have eased some of the domestic Soviet economic constraints that might have at least marginally inhibited Moscow's behavior. It also raised the specter of a future Western dependence on Soviet-bloc trade that would inhibit Western freedom of action toward the East more than it would dictate prudence to the U.S.S.R. Similarly, the SALT I and SALT II processes did not curb the Soviet strategic arms buildup, while encouraging many in the West to imagine that security concerns could now be placed lower on the agenda.

Given these differences from the past, we have not been able merely to tinker with earlier approaches. Unlike containment, our policy begins with the clear recognition that the Soviet Union is and will remain a global superpower. In response to the lessons of this global superpower's conduct in recent years, our policy, unlike some versions of détente, assumes that the Soviet Union is more likely to be deterred by actions that make clear the risks their aggression entails than by a delicate web of interdependence.

Our policy is not based on trust, or on a Soviet change of heart. It is based on the expectation that, faced with demonstration of the West's renewed determination to strengthen its defenses, enhance its political and economic cohesion, and oppose adventurism, the Soviet Union will see restraint as its most attractive, or only, option.

Perhaps, over time, this restraint will become an ingrained habit; perhaps not. Either way, our responsibility to be vigilant is the same.

## III. PROGRAMS TO INCREASE OUR STRENGTH

In a rapidly evolving international environment, there are many fundamental ways the democratic nations can, and must, advance their own goals in the face of the problem posed by the Soviet Union. We must build a durable political consensus at home and within the Atlantic Alliance on the nature of the Soviet challenge. We must strengthen our defenses and those of our allies. We must build a common approach within the Alliance on the strategic implications of

East-West economic relations. And we must compete peacefully and even more effectively with the U.S.S.R. for the political sympathies of the global electorate, especially through the promotion of economic dynamism and democracy throughout the world. Finally, we must continue rebuilding America's moral-spiritual strength. If sustained over time, these policies can foster a progressively more productive dialog with the Soviet Union itself.

From the beginning of this administration, the President recognized how essential it was to consolidate a new consensus, here at home and among our traditional allies and friends. After 15 years in which foreign policy had been increasingly a divisive issue, he believed we had an opportunity to shape a new unity in America, expressing the American people's recovery of self-confidence. After the trauma of Vietnam, he sought to bolster a realistic pride in our country and to reenforce the civil courage and commitment on which the credibility of our military deterrent ultimately rests.

The President also felt that the possibility of greater cooperation with our allies depended importantly on a reaffirmation of our common moral values and interests. There were, as well, opportunities for cooperation with friendly governments of the developing world and new efforts to seek and achieve common objectives.

President Reagan also began a major effort to modernize our military forces. The central goal of our national security policy is deterrence of war; restoring and maintaining the strategic balance is a necessary condition for that deterrence. But the strategic balance also shapes, to an important degree, the global environment in which the United States pursues its foreign policy objectives. Therefore, decisions on major strategic weapons systems can have profound political as well as military consequences.

As Secretary of State, I am acutely conscious of the strength or weakness of American power and its effect on our influence over events. Perceptions of the strategic balance are bound to affect the judgments not only of our adversaries but also of allies and friends around the world who rely on us. As leader of the democratic nations, we have an inescapable responsibility to maintain this pillar of the military balance which only we can maintain.

Our determination to do so is an important signal of our resolve, and is essential to sustaining the confidence of allies and friends and the cohesion of the alliances. This is why the Congress' support of the Peacekeeper ICBM program has been such a valuable contribution to our foreign policy, as well as to our defense.

At the same time, we have begun an accelerated program to strengthen our conventional capabilities. We are pursuing major improvements of our ground, naval, and tactical air forces; we have also added a new central command in the Middle East that will enhance our ability to deploy forces rapidly if threats to our vital interests make this necessary. To deter or deal with any future crisis, we need to maintain both our conventional capabilities and our strategic deterrent.

We are also working closely with our allies to improve our collective defense. As shown in the security declaration of the Willamsburg summit and in the North Atlantic Council communique of just the other day, we and our allies are united in our approach in the INF negotiations in Geneva and remain on schedule for the deployment of Pershing II and ground-launched cruise missiles. That deployment will take place as planned unless we are able to reach a balanced and verifiable agreement at Geneva which makes deployment unnecessary.

Upgrading NATO's conventional forces is, of course, a collective alliance responsibility. At the NATO summit in Bonn a year ago, the President and the leaders of the Atlantic alliance reaffirmed that a credible conventional defense is essential to ensuring European security. We and our allies will continue our efforts toward this goal. At the same time, we have taken steps to ensure a more equitable sharing of the burden of that defense. As a measure of the value of such steps, we estimate that last year's agreement with the Federal Republic of Germany on host-nation support will cost about 10 percent of what it would cost to provide the same capability with U.S. reserves or 3 percent of what it would cost to provide that capability with active forces.

The Soviets apparently believe they can weaken or divide the Western alliance if they can dominate outlying strategic areas and resources. To deter threats to our vital interests outside of Europe, we are developing our ability to move forces, supported by our allies, to key areas of the world such as Southwest Asia. The allies are also working with us to contribute to stability and security in certain volatile areas, including Lebanon and the Sinai.

In Asia we are modernizing our forces and are working with our allies, especially Japan and Korea, to improve their ability to fulfill agreed roles and missions.

The balance of power cannot be measured simply in terms of military forces or hardware; military power rests on a foundation of economic strength. Thus, we and our allies must not only strengthen our own economies but we must also develop a common approach to our economic relations with the Soviet Union that takes into account our broad strategic and security interests.

In the past, the nations of the West have sometimes helped the Soviets to avoid difficult economic choices by allowing them to acquire a militarily relevant technology and subsidized credits. Possible dependence on energy imports from the Soviet Union is another cause for concern.

In the past year, we have made substantial progress toward an allied consensus on East-West trade. The Williamsburg summit declaration stated clearly: "East-West economic relations should be compatible with our security interests." The NATO communique 2 days ago made a similar statement. Our allies agree with us that trade which makes a clear and direct contribution to the military strength of the Soviet Union should be prohibited. There is also general agreement that economic relations with the U.S.S.R. should be conducted on the basis of a strict balance of mutual advantages.

Studies undertaken under NATO and OECD auspices have for the first time laid the groundwork for common analyses. We expect in time to draw common policy conclusions from these studies. The communique of the OECD ministerial meeting on May 9 and 10 declared that "East-West trade and credit flows should be guided by the indications of the market. In the light of these indications, governments should exercise financial prudence without granting preferential treatment."

The United States seeks agreement that we not subsidize Soviet imports through the terms of government credits. Beyond this, we urge other Western governments to exercise restraint in providing or guaranteeing credit to the Soviet Union, allowing the commercial considerations of the market to govern credit.

Similarly, at the IAE ministerial meeting in Paris on May 8, it was agreed that security concerns should be considered among the full costs of imported energy, such as gas; it was agreed that countries "would seek to avoid undue dependence on any one source of gas imports and to obtain future gas supplies from secure sources, with emphasis on indigenous OECD sources."

The fruitful cooperative discussions of these issues at the OECD, IEA, Williamsburg, and NATO are only a beginning. Economic relationships are a permanent element of the strategic equation. How the West should respond economically to the Soviet challenge will and should be a subject of continuing discussion in Western forums for years to come.

Since the 1950's, the Soviet Union has found in the developing regions of the Third World its greatest opportunities for extending its influence through subversion and exploitation of local conflicts. A satisfactory East-West military balance will not by itself close off such opportunities. We must also respond to the economic, political, and security problems that contribute to these opportunities. Our approach has four key elements.

First, in the many areas where Soviet activities have added to instability, we are pursuing peaceful diplomatic solutions to regional problems, to raise the political cost of Soviet-backed military presence, and to encourage the departure of Soviet-backed forces. Our achievements in the Middle East, while far from complete, are addressed to this goal; we are actively encouraging ASEAN efforts to bring about Vietnamese withdrawal from Kampuchea; we strongly support the worldwide campaign for Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan; and we have made considerable progress toward an internationally acceptable agreement on Namibia. In our own hemisphere, we are working with other regional states in support of a peaceful solution to the conflict and instability in Central America.

Second, we are building up the security capabilities of vulnerable governments in strategically important areas. We are helping our friends to help themselves and to help each other. For this purpose, we are asking the Congress for a larger, more flexible security assistance program for fiscal year 1984. That has a budgetary implication.

Third, our program recognizes that economic crisis and political instability create fertile ground for Soviet-sponsored adventurism. We are seeking almost $4 billion in economic assistance to help developing countries lay the basis for economic and social progress. We are seeking congressional approval to raise IMF quotas and broaden IMF borrowing arrangements to address critical financial needs of some of the largest Third World nations. We urge the Congress to approve the full amount requested by the administration toward meeting the U.S. commitment to the IDA.

Finally, there is the Democracy Initiative, an effort to assist our friends in the Third World to build a foundation for democracy. It is patronizing to assume that the peoples of the developing world do not have the same aspirations for liberty and democracy that peoples in the industrialized West are fortunate enough to enjoy. Therefore we are seeking ways to assist unions, political parties, journalists, and other groups that are striving to build pluralistic societies and democratic institutions. As we pursue critical security goals in areas as close to home as Central America, we continue to encourage, indeed to insist, that democratization and respect for human rights be part of the process. To the extent that our involvement there is constrained by congressional action, I must say, these very objectives are harmed the most.

Let me note here that the Soviet reaction to this project, which is very small, has been fascinating. When we held a meeting in the State Department of people from various parts of the world on the subject of free elections, it was denounced by the Soviet Union. The interesting thing was, they noticed it. I was also struck by the fact that in Mr. Chernenko's speech yesterday, he attached such importance to destroying President Reagan's Democracy Initiative. It seems we have their attention. If we can put the East-West competition on an ideological basis or on the basis of alternative economic systems, we will walk away with it.

## IV. NEGOTIATION AND DIALOG: THE UNITED STATES-SOVIET AGENDA

Together, these programs increase our political, military, and economic strength and help create an international climate in which opportunities for Soviet adventurism are reduced. They are essential for the success of the final element of our strategy—engaging the Soviets in an active and productive dialog on the concrete issues that concern the two sides. Strength and realism can deter war, but only direct dialog and negotiation can open the path toward lasting peace.

In this dialog, our agenda is as follows: To seek improvement in Soviet performance on human rights, which you emphasized, Mr. Chairman, in your opening statement; to reduce the risk of war, reduce armaments through sound agreements, and ultimately ease the burdens of military spending; to manage and resolve regional conflicts; and to improve bilateral relations on the basis of reciprocity and mutual interest.

This is a rigorous and comprehensive agenda, and our approach to it is principled, practical, and patient. We have pressed each issue in a variety of forums, bilateral and multilateral. We have made clear that the concerns we raise are not ours alone, but are shared by our allies and friends in every region of the globe. We have made clear that each of our concerns is serious. The Soviets know that we do not intend to abandon any of them merely because agreement cannot be reached quickly, or because agreement has been reached on others.

Let me briefly review the state of our dialog in each of these areas.

Human rights is a major issue on our agenda. To us it is a matter of real concern that Soviet emigration is at its lowest level since the 1960's, and that Soviet constriction of emigration has coincided with a general crackdown against all forms of internal dissent. The Helsinki monitoring groups have all been dispersed and their leaders have been imprisoned or expelled from the country. And the Soviet Union's first independent disarmament group has been harassed and persecuted.

We address such questions both multilaterally and bilaterally. In such forums as the U.N. Human Rights Commission, the International Labor Organization, and especially the Review Conference of CSCE—where Max Kampelman is doing a truly outstanding job—we have made clear that human rights cannot be relegated to the margins of international politics. Our Soviet interlocutors have a different view; they seek to dismiss human rights as a "tenth-rate issue," not worthy of high-level attention.

But our approach will not change. Americans know that national rights and individual rights cannot realistically be kept separate. We believe, for example, that the elements of the postwar European "settlement" that were adopted by the parties to the Helsinki Final Act in 1975 form an integral whole; no one part will survive alone. Guided by this conviction, we and our allies have held at the Madrid Review Conference that movement in one "basket" of this settlement—such as the convening of a European disarmament conference—must be matched by progress in other "baskets," especially human rights.

We insist on this balance because we believe that international obligations must be taken seriously by the governments that assume them. But there is also a deeper reason that directly concerns the question of security.

In Europe, as elsewhere, governments that are not at peace with their own people are unlikely to be on good terms with their neighbors. The only significant use of military force on the continent of Europe since 1945 has been by the Soviet Union against its East European "allies." As long as this unnatural relationship continues between the U.S.S.R. and its East European neighbors, it is bound to be a source of instability in Europe.

We have been just as concerned about human rights issues on a bilateral as on a multilateral basis. The need for steady improvement of Soviet performance in the most important human rights categories is as central to the Soviet-American dialog as any other theme. Sometimes we advance this dialog best through public expressions of our concerns, at other times through quiet diplomacy. What counts, and the Soviets know this, is whether we see results.

Let me turn to arms control, our second agenda item. We believe the only arms control agreements that count are those that provide for real reductions, equality, verifiability, and enhanced stability in the East-West balance. Success in our negotiations will not, of course, bring East-West competition to an end. But sustainable agreements will enable us to meet the Soviet challenge in a setting of greater stability and safety.

The United States is now applying these principles in an ambitious program of arms control negotiations including INF [intermediate range nuclear forces], START [strategic arms reduction talks], MBFR [mutual and balanced force reductions], and the ongoing discussions in the U.N. Committee on Disarmament in Geneva. If we can reach a balanced agreement in the CSCE at Madrid, we would be prepared to participate also in a conference on disarmament in Europe.

No previous administration has put so many elements of the East-West military equation on the negotiating table. You are aware of the

U.S. position in the various talks, so I need not go into great detail. I will, however, touch on a few main points.

In the strategic arms reduction talks, the United States has focused on the most destabilizing strategic systems, land-based ballistic missiles. Our objective is to strengthen deterrence while enhancing strategic stability through reductions. The President has proposed reductions in ballistic missile warheads by one-third. In presenting a comprehensive proposal, he has indicated that all strategic weapons are "on the table." Although our respective positions are far apart, the Soviets apparently accept the proposition that an agreement must involve significant reductions. This is progress.

We have recently undertaken a full review of the U.S. position, which included an assessment of the Scowcroft Commission's recommendations and some thoughtful suggestions from the Congress. One week ago, the President announced that he is willing to raise the deployed missile ceiling in accordance with the Scowcroft recommendations. He also announced that he has given our negotiators new flexibility to explore all appropriate avenues for achieving reductions. It is now up to the Soviet Union to reciprocate our flexibility.

We have also tabled a draft agreement on confidence-building measures that calls for exchange of information and advance notification of ballistic missile launches and major exercises. We want to move forward promptly to negotiate separate agreements on these very important measures, which would enhance stability in a crisis as well as symbolizing the common interest in preventing war. Yet another effort to prevent misperception of military activities on either side, and thus to lower the risk of war, is the President's recent proposal to expand and upgrade crisis communications between Washington and Moscow. Here, too, we hope for early agreement.

In the negotiations on intermediate range nuclear forces, "equal rights and limits" between the United States and the Soviet Union is one of our key principles. President Reagan's proposal of November 1981 sought to achieve the complete elimination of those systems on each side about which the other has expressed the greatest concern, that is, longer range, land-based INF missiles.

We still regard this as the most desirable outcome. Yet after more than a year of talks, the Soviets continue to resist this equitable and effective solution. In fact, their position has not substantially changed since it was first put forward nearly a year ago. The proposal made by Mr. Andropov last December would allow the Soviet Union to maintain its overwhelming monopoly of longer range INF missiles while prohibiting the deployment of even one comparable U.S. missile.

In an effort to break this stalemate, the President has proposed an interim agreement as a route to the eventual elimination of long-range INF systems. Under such an agreement, we would reduce the number of missiles we plan to deploy in Europe if the Soviet Union will reduce the total number of warheads it has already deployed to an equal level. This would result in equal limits for both sides on a global basis. Reflecting the concerns of our Asian allies and friends, we have made it clear that no agreement can come at their expense. We hope that in the current round of negotiations, the Soviets will move to negotiate in good faith on the President's proposal, which was unanimously supported by our partners at the Williamsburg Summit.

In the mutual and balanced force reductions talks in Vienna, NATO and the Warsaw Pact are discussing an agreement on conventional forces in Central Europe, the most heavily armed region of the world, where Warsaw Pact forces greatly exceed NATO's.

Last year the President announced a new Western position in the form of a draft treaty calling for substantial reductions to equal manpower levels. Although the Soviets and their allies have agreed to the principle of parity, which is progress, further progress has been prevented by inability to resolve disagreement over existing Warsaw Pact force levels and by problems of verification.

In the 40-nation Committee on Disarmament in Geneva, the United States has introduced a far-reaching proposal for a comprehensive ban on chemical weapons, an agreement which would eliminate these terrible weapons from world arsenals. This initiative has been vigorously supported by our allies and friends, as well as many nonalined nations. Our emphasis on the importance of mandatory on-site inspections has been widely applauded. An independent, impartial verification system, observed by and responsive to all parties, is essential to create confidence that the ban is being respected.

In other areas, we have proposed to the Soviet Union improvements in the verification provisions of two agreements to limit underground nuclear testing. So far the Soviet response has been negative. We have also initiated a dialog with the Soviets in one area where our respective approaches very often coincide: nuclear nonproliferation.

We should not anticipate early agreement in any of these negotiations. The Soviets have their own positions, and they are tough, patient negotiators. But we believe that our positions are fair and evenhanded and that our objectives are realistic.

Let me turn now to regional issues, which are the third item of our agenda and have historically been the matters that have most upset our relationship with the Soviet Union.

Important as it is, arms control has not been and cannot be the dominant subject of our dialog with the Soviets. We must also address the threat to peace posed by the Soviet exploitation of regional instability and conflict. Indeed, these issues, arms control and political instability, are closely related. The increased stability that we try to build into the superpower relationship through arms control can be undone by irresponsible Soviet policies elsewhere. In our numerous discussions with the Soviet leadership, we have repeatedly expressed our strong interest in reaching understandings with the Soviets that would minimize superpower involvement in conflicts beyond their borders.

The list of problem areas is formidable, but we have insisted that regional issues are central to progress. We have made clear our commitment to relieve repression and economic distress in Poland, to achieve a settlement in southern Africa, to restore independence to Afghanistan, to end the occupation of Kampuchea, and to halt Soviet- and Cuban-supported subversion in Central America. In each instance, we have conveyed our views forcefully to the Soviets in an attempt to remove the obstacles that Soviet conduct puts in the way of resolving these problems.

Last year, for example, Ambassador Hartman conducted a round of exploratory talks on Afghanistan between United States and Soviet officials in Moscow. Any solution to the Afghanistan problem must meet four requirements: Complete withdrawal of Soviet forces, restoration of Afghanistan's independent and nonalined status, formation of a government acceptable to the Afghan people, and honorable return of the refugees. This is not the view of the United States alone. These principles underlie the discussions now underway under the auspices of the U.N. Secretary General, which we support.

On southern African problems, Assistant Secretary Crocker has held a number of detailed exchanges with his Soviet counterpart. Southern Africa has been a point of tension and periodic friction between the United States and the Soviet Union for many years. We want to see tensions in the area reduced. But this more peaceful future will not be achieved unless all parties interested in the region show restraint, external military forces are withdrawn, and Namibia is permitted to achieve independence. If the Soviets are at all concerned with the interests of Africans, they should have an equal interest in achieving these objectives.

As in our arms control negotiations, we have made it absolutely clear to the Soviets in these discussions that we are not interested in cosmetic solutions. We are interested in solving problems fundamental to maintenance of the international order.

It is also our view that Soviet participation in international efforts to resolve regional conflicts, in southern Africa or the Middle East, for example, depends on Soviet conduct. If the Soviets seek to benefit from tension and support those who promote disorder, they can hardly expect to have a role in the amelioration of those problems. Nor should we expect them to act responsibly merely because they gain a role. At the same time, we have also made it clear that we will not exploit, and in fact, are prepared to respond positively to Soviet restraint. The decision in each case is theirs.

The final part of our agenda with the Soviets comprises economic and other bilateral relations. In our dialog, we have spelled out our view of these matters in a candid and forthright way. As we see it, economic transactions can confer important strategic benefits, and we must be mindful of the implications for our security. Therefore, as I have already indicated, we believe economic relations with the East deserve more careful scrutiny than in the past. But our policy is not one of economic warfare against the U.S.S.R. East-West trade in nonstrategic areas, in the words of the NATO communique, "conducted on the basis of commercially sound terms and mutual advantage, that avoids preferential treatment of the Soviet Union, contributes to constructive East-West relations."

Despite the strains of the past few years in our overall relationship, we have maintained the key elements in the structure for bilateral trade. We have recently agreed with the U.S.S.R. to extend our bilateral fisheries agreement for 1 year and have begun to negotiate a new long-term United States-Soviet grain agreement. Our grain sales are on commercial terms and are not made with Government-supported credits or guarantees of any kind.

As for contacts between people, we have cut back on largely symbolic exchanges but maintain a framework of cooperation in scientific, technical, and humanitarian fields. A major consideration as we pursue such exchanges must be reciprocity. If the Soviet Union is to enjoy virtually unlimited opportunities for access to our free society, U.S. access to Soviet society must increase. We have made progress toward gaining Soviet acceptance of this principle, as is indicated by the airing in Moscow this past weekend of an interview with Deputy Secretary Ken Dam.

Eight bilateral cooperative agreements are now in effect, and exchanges between the Academies of Science continue, as do exchanges of young scholars and Fulbright fellows. "America Illustrated" magazine continues to be distributed in the Soviet Union in return for distribution here of "Soviet Life," in spite of the absence of a cultural exchanges agreement. Toward the private sector, we have maintained an attitude of neither encouraging nor discouraging exchanges, and a steady flow of tourists and conference participants goes on in both directions. The number of U.S. news bureaus in Moscow has actually increased in the last year.

## V. PROSPECTS

It is sometimes said that Soviet-American relations are worse than ever. Certainly the issues dividing our two countries are serious. But let us not be misled by atmospherics, whether sunny or, as they now seem to be, stormy.

In the mid-1950's, for example, despite the rhetoric and tension of the cold war, and in the midst of a leadership transition, the Soviet Union chose to conclude the Austrian State Treaty. It was an important agreement which contributed to the security of Central Europe, and it carries an important lesson for us today. The Soviet leadership did not negotiate seriously merely because Western rhetoric was firm and principled, nor should we expect rhetoric to suffice now or in the future. But adverse atmospherics did not prevent agreement; Soviet policy was instead affected by the pattern of Western actions, by our resolve and clarity of purpose. And the result was progress.

There is no certainty that our current negotiations with the Soviets will lead to acceptable agreements. What is certain is that we will not find ourselves in the position in which we found ourselves in the aftermath of détente. We have not staked so much on the prospect of a successful negotiating outcome that we have neglected to secure ourselves against the possibility of failure. Unlike the immediate postwar period, when negotiating progress was a remote prospect, we attach the highest importance to articulating the requirements for an improved relationship and to exploring every serious avenue for progress. Our parallel pursuit of strength and negotiation prepares us both to resist continued Soviet aggrandizement and to recognize and respond to positive Soviet moves.

We have spelled out our requirements, and our hopes, for a more constructive relationship with the Soviet Union. The direction in which that relationship evolves will ultimately be determined by the decisions of the Soviet leadership. President Brezhnev's successors will have to weigh the increased costs and risks of relentless competition against the benefits of a less tense international environment in which they could more adequately address the rising expectations of their own citizens.

While we can define their alternatives, we cannot decipher their intentions. To a degree unequaled anywhere else, Russia in this respect remains a secret.

Her history, of which this secrecy is such an integral part, provides no basis for expecting a dramatic change. And yet it also teaches that gradual change is possible. For our part, we seek to encourage change by a firm but flexible U.S. strategy, resting on a broad consensus that we can sustain over the long term whether the Soviet Union changes or not. If the democracies can meet this challenge, they can achieve the goals of which President Reagan spoke at Los Angeles: both defend freedom and preserve the peace.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Secretary, on behalf of the committee, we thank you for a very comprehensive statement, probably the most comprehensive statement on United States-Soviet relationships that this committee has had for many years. It was well worth the wait to have you return and be our leadoff witness, and certainly it is a realistic statement, if not a hopeful statement. But there are hopeful signs in it.

Certainly, when you call for a constructive relationship with the Soviet Union, that is the goal and objective, I think, of the American people and of this committee, certainly, and our responsibility. And we do not disagree at all. We agree with President Reagan's goal that he outlined, that that is our job. It is the job that the free world really looks to us to do, and also to preserve the peace. That means the peace between ourselves and our adversaries, despite our differences. We are not going to resolve those differences though we can try to better understand each other's position. In your testimony, you have indicated that we are ready to negotiate equitable solutions to outstanding political problems.

In preparing for these hearings, I did ask our top staff involved with the Soviet Union, headed by our chief of staff, Ed Sanders, to go to the Soviet Union to get their point of view. We cannot have Soviets testifying before this committee. No foreign nationals do. We did want to get as up to date an impression of what they thought as we possibly could. I know that the staff report was abusive and offensive to some people. But it was factual from what they saw and heard, and accurately reported. It did not reflect the views of this committee or any member of the committee. It was the staff's report.[1]

Without objection, I would ask that the executive summary of the report be incorporated at this point in the record so that we can have that point of view, just as I tried to update myself immediately after the election of President Reagan in November 1980, by going to the Soviet Union and together with Ambassador Watson having 9 hours of talks with Brezhnev, Gromyko, Ustinov and the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the latter meetings being very unique but requested by me, as I did want the opportunity to tell them and to hear from them what their point of view was on the use of military power around the world.

[The executive summary referred to above follows:]

---

[1] The United States and the Soviet Union: Prospects for the Relationship, a staff report to the Committee on Foreign Relations, June 1983, 98th Congress, 1st session, S. Prt. 98-60.

## EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

In preparation for hearings on United States-Soviet relations, five staff members of the Foreign Relations Committee spent the last week of March in the U.S.S.R. The purpose of the trip was to gain a better understanding of the Soviet view of the relationship and to determine the prospects for changes in the relationship in the 1980's. Staff members also discussed arms control prospects in Bonn and with the negotiators in Geneva and Vienna. The key conclusions of the study are the following:

### *General*

- United States-Soviet relations have clearly continued to deteriorate over the last 3 years following the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and repression in Poland. The future evolution of the relationship will depend to a large extent on whether agreements can be reached on limiting nuclear weapons.
- The timing of the trip—shortly after the President's speeches in Miami on the evil nature of the U.S.S.R. and in Washington on space-based missile defense—highlighted Soviet sensitivities. While it is not always possible to discern what is said for effect and what is genuinely believed, virtually all the Soviets we met with complained bitterly that the belligerent, crusading tone of the Administration was raising the danger of superpower confrontation and an escalating arms race.
- The Soviets do not recognize the linkage between their vigorous military buildup and intervention in various parts of the world on the one hand and the Reagan Administration's efforts to upgrade American military capabilities on the other hand.
- The difficulties in improving the bilateral relationship are compounded by the fact that the two countries have quite different agendas in dealing with each other. The Soviets want arms control agreements and trade without strings; they reject the United States belief that human rights or disputes over Soviet actions in other regions (Afghanistan, Poland, the Caribbean) are appropriate issues between major powers. Conversely, the United States has consistently taken the position that arms control and trade policy cannot be considered independently from the degree of Soviet internal repression and external aggression.

### *Arms Control*

- The United States and Soviet differences in the INF talks are fundamental. To avoid any sign that progress is being made, Soviet negotiations were reportedly "belligerent" and "nasty as hell" during the last negotiating round. It is unlikely that an INF agreement will be produced prior to the December 1983 missile deployment date. As European public demonstrations increase in intensity during the year, the West German and other European governments may begin to press the United States for additional modifications to the current U.S. proposal.

- The deployment in Europe of Pershing II and cruise missiles is likely to take place, but it will generate a harsh Soviet reaction. It appears unlikely, however, that the Soviets will deploy land-based nuclear weapons in the Western Hemisphere in response.
- Both sides lost an important opportunity for a mutually beneficial INF agreement when they rejected the informal proposal put forward in 1982 by negotiators Nitze and Kvitsinsky. Perhaps the best chance for agreement remains something along the lines of that proposal.
- Prospects for agreement in the START talks are worse than for the INF talks. One senior U.S. START negotiator summarized the situation by saying that "we are playing in different ball parks." He concluded that "if the Administration wants an agreement during its first 4 years in office, it will have to move fast and make dramatic changes."
- After disclosure of the so-called Rowny memorandum, Ambassador Rowny's subordinates maintained their professionalism and tried not to allow the incident to interfere with the immediate business at hand. Behind the scenes, however, morale on the START team has deteriorated to the point where its future effectiveness could be seriously impaired.
- The only prospect for movement in START appears to be modification in the U.S. position as outlined by the Scowcroft Commission combined with Soviet modifications based on an acceptance of the Administration's determination to proceed with strategic modernization.
- The prospects for Mutual and Balanced Force Reduction talks are somewhat better. Serious probing of the East's intentions is called for in the June round of talks.
- Perhaps the most disturbing finding of the trip is the extent to which the current arms control impasse has led to a deterioration in the bilateral relationship. The Soviets describe the overall state of bilateral relations using terms such as "a critical situation," "pushing us to the brink," "a highly dangerous path," and "extreme pessimism."

### *Foreign Policy*

- American thinking about the Soviet Union occasionally lapses into extreme views ranging from an assumption that both countries share the same fears, values, and problems, to an assumption that the Soviet Union typifies the antithesis of American values. The Soviet Union is a more complex society and a more complicated participant in world affairs than extreme views would allow.
- The United States has only a marginal ability to affect Soviet decisions by means of rewards and punishments. The factors which determine Soviet strategies and priorities are only partially related to external developments. Soviet military spending, for example, is based on a range of considerations in addition to its perception of external dangers at any given time.
- Events in Poland have posed probably the greatest threat to the Soviet Union in Eastern Europe since the war. Solidarity's challenge is that of a genuine worker's revolt in a system which purports to govern in the name of the worker. The ability of the

United States or other Western countries to affect events in Poland will probably continue to be slight for the foreseeable future.

- Soviet officials acknowledge that the Israeli invasion of Lebanon was, in the short run, a major shift in the regional correlation of forces against them. They argue that in the long run, however, the invasion will prove to be a strategic setback for the United States because the United States is now "inextricably implicated" in the policies of the Israeli Government. The Soviet presence at SAM 5 sites in Syria raises the prospect for serious confrontation in the Middle East.
- The Soviets clearly intend to try to isolate the United States on the Namibian problem and the issue of Cuban troops in Angola. They intend to seek to use the delay in reaching a settlement to highlight the U.S. association with South Africa.
- In other areas of the world, Soviet officials denied the existence of Soviet policies despite the fact that they are well documented in the West. For example, they deny any involvement in the Salvadoran insurgency, they scoff at allegations that they use poison gas or biological toxin agents in Indochina and Afghanistan, and they say they are not seeking to gain advantage in United States-Soviet relations by "playing a China card."

### *East-West Trade*

- The economic sanctions imposed because of Afghanistan and Poland have had a devastating effect on America's reputation as a reliable supplier. If disputes over East-West trade policy (resulting from these sanctions) continue among the allies, they will have a corrosive effect on the ability of the West to deal with other crucial issues of defense posture, arms control, and Soviet intentions elsewhere in the world.
- Trade between the Soviet Union and the West increased an unprecedented tenfold in the decade of the 1970's. The prospects for continued growth in the decade of the 1980's are much bleaker. The United States share of Soviet trade will probably decline as the United States becomes more of a supplier of last resort, and the Soviets diversify sources and as other countries try to bring their trade accounts into better balance with the Soviets.

### *Soviet Domestic Politics*

- Although Andropov appears clearly in charge and able to speak for the Soviet Communist Party, he probably does so at this stage on the basis of a fairly fragile leadership consensus. If Andropov wants to make any significant policy departures, he must first be politically strong enough to overcome the tenacious resistance of a hierarchy whose positions and privileges are based on the status quo.
- The urgent Soviet priority is the economy. It is too early to tell what the Andropov leadership's economic policy will be. So far, Andropov seems to be buying time by focusing on worker discipline and political corruption.
- The current human rights situation in the Soviet Union is grim and getting worse. A renewed across-the-board crackdown began in 1979 and intensified in 1982. This attitude extends even to cases of 14 individuals who have U.S. citizenship by right of birth, whom the Soviets refuse to allow to leave.

The CHAIRMAN. Your statement today is a valuable assessment, and our job now will be to try to work with you to find activist, bold and creative answers. In the advice and consent responsibility we have by the Constitution, no administration has sought the advice of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee more frequently than you have as Secretary of State and given us the chance to constructively comment on positions. And you have listened more than any Secretary in I think history, possibly, to our views. You have not accepted them all, obviously, but you have been thoughtful and careful in approaching us, in getting our views, and we very much appreciate that.

We will begin a 10-minute questioning period, and I would ask as a first question one where I have had some difference of opinion with the administration. I did not disagree when I came back in November 1980, that the new President should not rush into a meeting with the head of the Soviet Union, Brezhnev. I felt there should be a reasonable period for preparation. But I did grow somewhat impatient as time went on and there was never a real effort. And finally, Secretary Haig did agree, after many consultations, did agree in public testimony that we would issue an invitation to Brezhnev to meet with President Reagan. But it was too late then. He was too ill, he could not come to New York to the U.N. meeting. He could not meet with the President. So we missed that opportunity.

I have urged that we meet at the proper time with Andropov. I think it is dangerous in this kind of a world for the two leaders of the major superpowers not to sit down face to face, and I do not think we or they have to have, as President Nixon did, a SALT I ready to sign. I do not know if we are ever going to get to START I if we do not somehow get a better sense of direction from the two Chiefs of State who have the ultimate responsibility. I say this even though I respect the fact you have met a number of times with Foreign and Deputy Prime Minister Gromyko, and will have another, fourth meeting, coming up this fall.

What can you tell this committee about the possibility of having a summit meeting, not with the expectation that big agreements are going to be made, but that at least we will be absolutely certain that our President enunciates right from the top what our policies are, and lets them have the same opportunity to do that.

I do not know whether they will accept the invitation, but I would like to see us issue an invitation in the reasonable near future, not the end of next year. That is too late, in my judgment.

When can we look forward to a summit meeting with a properly prepared agenda but no high expectations and the world put on notice, that its purpose is just to gauge each other to be sure there is no miscalculation or misunderstanding, and to try to better understand each others polices?

Secretary SHULTZ. The President's view is that a summit meeting could be a good thing. He is ready to have one if the meeting is well prepared and if there is a high probability of some significant outcome from it, so that it is substantive in nature. He fears that a meeting for the sake of a meeting would raise expectations very high, and if all that happened was that there was a meeting, it would do more harm than good.

So there is in principle a readiness to have that meeting, but an operational requirement, that it have a substantive content that is prepared and on which we can move forward.

I have gone through the very helpful and thoughtful, good staff report that you mentioned earlier. I notice in that report that the authors say this is basically the Soviet position on a summit as well.

The CHAIRMAN. I realize it is the Soviet position. I have been told that directly. They want to wait until there is something to sign and celebrate. I do not think we have the time for that, and I want to ask you a personal question. In your own past experience as one of the ablest and most experienced negotiators in American governmental history, have you always felt it necessary to be able to have an agreement signed and sealed and ready to be delivered before the principles who can make some of those basic decisions have their first meeting?

Secretary SHULTZ. I do not think you have to have everything precooked, but I think timing is a very significant part of any negotiation. Certainly it is not advisable to go rushing in with your top negotiator with an agenda that is not structured and is not going to advance your objectives properly. We need to be able to see our objectives being advanced in any discussion in a reasonably concrete way in order to make it desirable for the President to engage.

I might add that we do have many negotiations going on with the Soviet Union, as I brought out in my testimony. We have to think about those forums and how to advance things in those forums as well.

The CHAIRMAN. My own assessment is we are making very little progress in those negotiations, and for that reason, we need a stimulus. But we will carry on this dialog, Mr. Secretary, some other time.

I would like to insert in the record a letter that the President sent to me. I think he sent a similar letter to Senators Nunn and Cohen on the build-down. The President stated in his May 12 letter that the mutual and verifiable build-down proposal would facilitate a START agreement. His administration is now currently examining how the build-down should be structured. I believe most of my colleagues here have cosponsored the build-down resolution.

Can you give us some progress report on this effort to design a specific build-down proposal?

And any of these questions that you want to turn to some of your colleagues for or just fill in the record later on, you certainly can.

[The letter referred to follows:]

THE WHITE HOUSE,
*Washington, D.C., May 12, 1983.*

Hon. CHARLES H. PERCY,
*U.S. Senate,*
*Washington, D.C.*

DEAR CHUCK: Thank you for your recent letter on our strategic modernization program and its relationship to our arms control proposals. Your letter represents the bi-partisan spirit which I believe will help achieve our common goals of ensuring effective deterrent forces and equitable and verifiable arms reductions.

The fundamental U.S. goal in negotiations concerning arms reduction, and especially in our approach to the START negotiations, is to seek agreements that would enhance security and stability by reducing overall force levels while permitting modernization of U.S. forces necessary for a creditable deterrent. As you know, the Scowcroft Commission noted that elements of our START proposal are consistent with and supportive of the Commission's findings. I agree wholeheartedly with the essential theme of the Scowcroft Commission's approach to arms control: the attainment of stability at the lowest possible level of forces.

The Scowcroft Commission's recommendations on modernization and arms control are integrally related. Our action with respect to these recommendations must be equally comprehensive. That is why I am now reviewing our START proposal in order to develop such modifications as are necessary to reflect the Commission's approach, which I share. To cite just one example, the Commission report recommended that the proposed limit on deployed ballistic missiles currently contained in the U.S. START position be reassessed since it is not compatible with a desirable evolution toward small, single-warhead ICBMs. There are a number of alternative approaches available to integrate this and the other Commission recommendations into our approach to arms reductions. As modifications are made to our START proposal, I will continue to seek stability at the lowest possible level of forces.

The planned deployment of the Peacekeeper missile as proposed by my Administration is compatible with the long-term objective of the Scowcroft Commission Report. The Peacekeeper missile, deployed in a mix with small single-warhead ICBMs, would permit us to maintain the effectiveness of our deterrent and enhance stability.

At the same time, let me emphasize that we do not seek a first strike capability. To this end, we will constrain the number of Peacekeeper missiles to the minimum number needed to assure the effectiveness of our deterrent and no more. Our task, of course, would be much easier if the Soviets would agree to work with us to reduce the ratio of accurate warheads to missile silos. Clearly, consistent with our national security requirements, the overall level of Peacekeeper deployment will be influenced by Soviet strategic programs and arms reductions agreements.

In addition, I fully recognize the central role that the small, single-warhead ICBM plays in the overall modernization program recommended by the Scowcroft Commission Report. We will promptly undertake a major effort to bring the proposal of a small, single-warhead ICBM to fruition on a high priority basis.

In considering the implementation of the essential ICBM modernization program, the Scowcroft Commission also recognized that a series of decisions involving both the Executive Branch and the Congress would be necessary in the months ahead in order to determine the future shape of our ICBM force. Further, it noted that not all of these decisions can or should be made in 1983. The deliberate approach to decision making proposed by a number of members of Congress is fully in keeping with the intent of the Scowcroft Commission Report. I fully recognize that a lasting consensus on such an important issue must be built up carefully and I intend to take the time necessary to forge that lasting consensus.

I urge all concerned, however, to keep in mind that if we draw out critical elements of the decision-making process unnecessarily, we encourage the Soviets to delay in negotiations while continuing apace in their own weapons modernization programs.

To avoid this, I am seeking a clear show of support from Congress to signal U.S. resolve. A case in point is the clear necessity of approving funds promptly to procure Peacekeeper missiles. Working together, this should be achievable while simultaneously meeting our mutual desire to deal with deployment issues, whenever possible, in a careful, deliberate manner.

You have suggested that certain additional initiatives could be helpful in moving us toward our goals of security and stability at reduced levels of forces. One of the most prominent of these initiatives is the idea of a "guaranteed build-down."

The principle of a mutual build-down, if formulated and implemented flexibly, and negotiated within the context of our modified START proposal, would be a useful means to achieve the reductions that we all seek.

It would, if properly applied, reinforce our intent to cap the number of strategic ballistic missile warheads on both sides and to cause each side to reduce those levels steadily and substantially over time.

It could be implemented flexibly and with reasonable latitude for each side to balance the forces it deploys and reduces. Variable ratios as appropriate, would encourage more stabilizing rather than less stabilizing systems.

It could be implemented in conjunction with an agreed floor which, when reached, would trigger the suspension of the build-down rule, subject to renegotiations.

As you have acknowledged, any build-down concept must recognize the importance of strategic modernization and the necessity of maintaining a balance during the reduction process to deal with asymmetries in United States and Soviet forces. It would, of course, require agreement on effective verification measures, including counting rules for all systems.

My Administration is currently examining the structure of a build-down proposal which would meet these criteria and would facilitate a START agreement embodying substantial reductions in nuclear forces. I will work with you and your colleagues to develop such a proposal.

Finally, I want to stress the extraordinary contribution made by the Scowcroft Commission. It provided an opportunity for non-partisan analysis of an exceptionally difficult issue as a prelude to obtaining necessary bi-partisan support for critically needed modernization of our strategic forces. While not prescribing the details or the timing, the Commission report suggested certain directions that the continued evolution of our complementary strategy for arms reduction could take. Over the short term, follow-on arrangements involving members of the Commission, as well as close coordination with the Congress, will be extremely helpful both technically and politically in thinking through this evolution. However, we are giving careful consideration to determining which follow-on arrangements best meet our common objectives.

In this regard, I do see merit in a panel with bi-partisan composition and with staggered terms of membership to provide advice and continuity in this area. I will work with the Congress, building upon the experience of the Scowcroft Commission, to strengthen and supplement our consultative and advisory processes to assure a lasting, national, bi-partisan consensus concerning arms control initiatives—a consensus which will deserve to be sustained from one Administration to the next.

Sincerely,

RONALD REAGAN.

Secretary SHULTZ. We believe the proposal is intriguing and has a lot of interesting aspects to it. It is one of those things that sounds simple and turns out to be complicated as you look into it. It is being studied very intensively in our process, at the urging of the President. He is pushing this group and has asked for a report very promptly on the group's conclusions. And if they do not produce a consensus of view, he has asked to hear what the different views are and what the different options are as people see them.

So the subject is getting the President's attention, and he is pushing the study process and will have displayed to him the various considerations in a prompt way. There has not been any conclusion reached, however.

The CHAIRMAN. Right.

You mentioned in your testimony two treaties that have not been ratified, the Peaceful Nuclear Explosion [PNE] Treaty and the Threshold Test Ban [TTB] Treaty. I have expressed over a period of 2½ years my frustration about our inability to get from the administration a specific go-ahead on those treaties.

We have now asked the Soviets to look at the verification aspects of them, and we have had a rejection.

Is it not possible, and in view of the Soviet reaction to the U.S. enhanced verification proposal that we first test their existing verification provisions before adding to them, that we can think of some other approach? An exchange of letters might be a possibility, where we could actually get support from the administration so that we could advise and consent and we could finally ratify two treaties now, one signed by President Ford, one by President Nixon, that have been languishing before this committee for many years.

Is there not any way we could move them forward?

Secretary **Shultz**. We are trying. I agree with you that it is not good to negotiate treaties and have them languish. They should be taken up and dealt with.

But the issue comes back to this problem of verification. Treaties that are not readily verifiable poison the atmosphere. Take the question of whether or not some recent Soviet ICBM tests violate SALT II or not; partly you can scratch your head about the particulars but our uncertainty also displays the looseness of the treaty. So I think when you have something that is going to raise questions in verification and also where, as I gather it, techniques have become available since the treaty was negotiated that would improve verification, it makes sense to go back and try to tighten it up a little bit.

The most recent Soviet nuclear test is an example. As you know, under our current verification procedures, when a Soviet blast goes off we get data from it which tells us that, on the basis of the available information, the most likely yield of the Soviet warhead was X. But there is a probability distribution around the figure. The tail of the distribution on the high side is over double the 150 kiloton level permitted by the treaties, and the most likely in the probability distribution is well above. However, the low end of the tail is well within the limit.

So that poses a very hard issue of verification, and if you can improve on that, it seems to me you are much better off. You are less likely to wind up saying well, are they cheating or are they not cheating? Right now we do not have any way of saying.

That is why the President decided to go back and try to see if we could not improve the verification process.

The **Chairman**. Just a concluding comment on those two. In view of the fact that both Presidents Nixon and Ford have urged me to see that we do move forward to ratification of these treaties, in view of the fact that many members of this committee have urged that we do so as a symbol that we can get something done, could we just ask for your pledge that a best effort will be made to find a way somehow in the Shultz fashion that we do these treaties and find a way to upgrade the verification, but be able to do so in such a way that we can finally ratify those treaties and complete our end of it.

Secretary **Shultz**. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The **Chairman**. Was that yes or no? [General laughter.]

Secretary **Shultz**. Oh, yes, as I said, if we can have improved verification, we would want to go forward. We will reach around for ways to try to achieve it. But it is a difficult problem, and I think that you do have to be careful with treaties which are undertaken. After all, it is a very serious matter, and the Senate votes on it and so on, and then when it is all done it turns out that, well, there is this restriction, and when a blast goes off, we cannot tell whether it is within the restriction or not by an order of magnitude. That is a big difference.

The **Chairman**. And yet for the first time in the history of our relationship, one of these treaties provides for onsite inspection, which I think is in the interest of the United States.

Thank you, Mr. Secretary.

Senator Pell.

Senator **Pell**. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

One of the concerns that I have is that with the increasing range of these weapons—for instance, I believe the Pershings will be able to reach a target in the Soviet Union within a quarter of an hour or so—that the tendency will be for one side or the other to respond, or to retaliate mechanically, so that if unfortunately there was an electrical malfunction, or a flock of geese, or something of that sort stimulated the sensitive antenna, there would be a response without a human being getting in the middle.

Is it conceivable, or are you free to say in a public session, that such a thing could happen? Can you give us an assurance that in the United States at least we would never let off a nuclear weapon without a human being being responsible for giving the command?

Secretary SHULTZ. The President is the person that carries around the key ingredients of command. Beyond that, I think I would rather not make any comment. But I agree with the implication or what I take it to be the implication of your question, that work on what we call confidence-building measures is important. Those are stabilizing measures that tend to give each side prior notification, keep people informed, maintain contact about these matters, and that is desirable.

And so I call your attention to the confidence-building measures the President has put on the table in connection with START and in connection with INF. He has also made separate proposals concerning the hot line and also ways of handling possible crises that might be caused if you found a nuclear weapon in the hands of a terrorist or some crazy leader. Those are matters that are very much worth working on.

Senator PELL. I know that in the incidents at sea, there have been direct discussions with the Soviet military, their admirals and our admirals. It has worked out pretty effectively.

Why is it that there seems to be a reluctance on their part to engage in direct confidence-building measures between their military and our military?

Secretary SHULTZ. That was one of the President's proposals, which Secretary Weinberger developed, that there be a direct military-to-military communication link. We proposed four separate confidence-building measures. One was upgrading the hot line; another was crisis management, which I have already mentioned. A third was the military-to-military, and another was for an embassy communication link. As to the latter two, the Soviets told us they did not quite see any good purpose to them. They did not foreclose discussion of them. On the first two they came back and said they were interested in discussing them. So we will proceed with those discussions.

I do not know why they rejected the two others.

Senator PELL. The door is not closed, though, on the latter two?

Secretary SHULTZ. It is not closed. They were very responsive. We made a proposal and they came back in due time and said we are interested in two and we do not think the other two are worthwhile. But they have not foreclosed discussion of them.

Senator PELL. How soon—this is a very tough question with your crystal ball, I guess, but do you expect to see within the next year or so, realistically, the outline of an agreement at INF or at the START talks?

Secretary **Shultz**. My own thinking about that subject goes like this. We should examine our positions always to be sure that we have reasonable propositions on the table, reasonable in the sense that we think they are in our interests and protect our interests and at the same time are demonstrably fair. We should be ready to engage in the give and take of negotiation and discussion in an effort to find an agreement. That is what we have control over, is what we do.

What the Soviets will do is hard to predict. What we can say is if we are reasonable in our approach and ready to engage in give and take, an agreement is possible if they decide to behave likewise. If they decide otherwise, it will not be.

I think we need to be very careful that we do not somehow get ourselves in the position of feeling that it is very important to get an agreement for its own sake. You are an old negotiator yourself, Mr. Chairman—even though you complimented me—and you know that the minute you see the other guy really wants an agreement, you have got him. Then you can drive and drive and drive. And we just must not get in that position.

Senator **Pell**. Do you see any possibility or any merit to the ideas of combining the INF and the START talks, because if that happened, the question of the British and the French would become relatively insignificant compared with the whole ball of wax, and Mr. Nitze seems to be doing a fairly effective job there. Maybe his energies could be used in the whole.

Secretary **Shultz**. I think they are being conducted separately, and, that is the way to keep them.

Senator **Pell**. You would not want to see them combined.

Secretary **Shultz**. No, sir.

We have said that as time passes, if there is no agreement, our deployments will start on schedule and carry through on the schedule, but we will be prepared to continue the negotiations. If, while the process of deployment is going on, an agreement is reached, then the deployment schedule can be adjusted. We would like nothing better than to wind up watching them destroy all their SS–20's, while we get rid of the deployment that we had undertaken.

Senator **Pell**. On another subject but also concerning the Soviet Union, do you believe anything can be done to reverse the decline in the emigration of Soviet Jews?

Secretary **Shultz**. I certainly hope so, and we bring that up with them all the time. You wonder why a country wants people in it that do not want to be there. But at any rate, we emphasize the importance that we think that holds. We emphasize its relation to the Helsinki Final Act, and we push it. They, of course, regard it as an internal affairs of theirs. But at any rate, it is very high on our agenda, and the number of people being allowed out is at a pitifully low level right now.

Senator **Pell**. A more general question. You and I both know that we will never start a preemptive war or make a preemptive strike against the Soviet Union. Do they get acccurate reporting and pictures, do you believe, of our view? Do you feel that you are able to talk in a very direct way with your opposite number, or are they getting a varnished view without having a real knowledge of our own intentions, which are just as important as our own capability?

Secretary SHULTZ. Exactly what view is being transmitted to the few people right at the top, of course, I do not know. Our society is open and it is quite easy to see that our society is one that has peaceful intentions and is not aggressive. Our record is also clear in that regard.

We have discussions with Soviet leaders, and we try to make our views clear. I do have the impression that transcripts get read. Let me mention one little sidelight of the meeting that the Vice President, Ambassador Hartman, and I had with General Secretary Andropov on the occasion of President Brezhnev's funeral. After you get through with the general meeting, you get up and stand around for a few minutes. The Vice President said to Andropov, well, you and I have something a little in common in our backgrounds. And the General Secretary laughed. He said, that's right; he said, we are the men of peace. Have you ever read the transcripts of the discussions between Shultz and Gromyko, because they are the men of war?

But I think we have tried to communicate openly with each other, and they also. I am not capable of being really warlike. I am not that kind of a person. But I do try to be direct and frank with Mr. Gromyko in our discussions and other discussions as well, and he is equally so.

But the point that I make from that story is that apparently the transcripts do get read.

Senator PELL. Thank you very much, Mr. Secretary.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you, Senator Pell.

Senator Helms.

Senator HELMS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Secretary, the Kennedy-Khrushchev agreement, although it was not a negotiated treaty, seems to me nevertheless to be the most important arms control agreement in history because it settled the most dangerous nuclear crisis in history.

Early last year, the President of the United States, the Director of the CIA, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs, and the Under Secretary of Defense all stated publicly and without any reservation whatsoever that the Soviets were violating the Kennedy-Khrushchev agreement of 1962.

Do you recall that?

Secretary SHULTZ. I will take it as a fact.

Senator HELMS. It is a fact.

There is evidence that the Soviets already have deployed nuclear delivery capable Bear bombers and MIG-23 fighter-bombers in Cuba. They also have a strategic submarine base with a nuclear warhead storage facility in Cuba.

My question, Mr. Secretary, is since the Soviets have violated by the administration's own proclamation the most important nuclear arms agreement in history, why really is there any reason to believe that they will not seek to evade or to violate a START agreement?

Secretary SHULTZ. The question of a violation of the Kennedy-Khrushchev accords is a question I will put on the table without being in a position of wanting to respond directly. But I think the question of violation of agreements undertaken does pose a very important issue for us in any subsequent negotiation, and what it says to us, it seems to me, is that we should seek agreements that have a very strong provision for verification so that when it comes to execution of the agreements, we do not do it on the basis of trust and confidence as you would in the many tyes of settings, but we do it on the basis of an ability to monitor very closely whether or not it is being carried out.

Senator HELMS. So what you are saying to me is that you are going to take this into consideration in connection with any negotiations.

Secretary SHULTZ. Yes, sir.

Senator HELMS. Let me go further.

During the past year there have been four high level Soviet threats to deploy Soviet nuclear missiles in the Caribbean, or Central America, if the United States goes ahead with GLCM and Pershing II deployment in NATO this coming December.

Mr. Secretary, do you consider these threats to be all the more provocative and arrogant because they came after the top level U.S. statements that the Soviets were already violating Kennedy-Khrushchev?

What goes on here?

Secretary SHULTZ. As to the pattern of Soviet threats connected with deployments in Europe, you see not only those that you mentioned in the Caribbean, but also a number of threats issued just before the German election, and interestingly, one they shot across the bow of the Williamsburg summit.

What they seem to produce by these tactics of threat is a very strong reaction. Of course, the declaration on peace and security at Williamsburg was not simply a response to the Soviet threat; it had a deeper thrust to it, but the threat played a part, just as I do believe the Soviet threat had an impact, not the one they contemplated, on the German election.

To me, the most important thing that has been taking place—most visibly in the last 6 months or so, although it has always been there—is the clear cohesion and unity among the allies to stick with our program and schedule, and the very conscious relation of that cohesion and unity to the values that we share. The defense of those values is what this is all about.

So I think there has been a kind of a re-emergence and rebirth of these realizations. At this point in time we have genuine cohesion and unity. The Soviet threats, interestingly, have probably contributed something to that.

Senator HELMS. Do you think our allies are taking what I have been saying into consideration in terms of supporting us?

Secretary SHULTZ. I think they look very carefully at us as anyone does at someone that he is going to ally himself with and basically depend on. They ask themselves, can we depend on that country, or that person, or organization, or whatever it may be? We certainly want to be a dependable ally, and we are a dependable ally. I think the renewed strength of the United States is a very important part of this whole picture. I do not mean simply renewed military strength, and I do not mean simply economic strength, although those are very important elements.

There is a sense around the world that the United States is back. We are not boisterous or whatever, but are, nevertheless, self-confident. We are clear in our values, and we intend to stick with them.

Senator **Helms**. More importantly, do they understand that the offers to negotiate within reasonable terms by the United States are in good faith?

Here at home we have all the claptrap of protesters who never say a word about what is going on in terms of the Soviet Union. I just do not want our foreign policy to be misled, and I certainly do not want our allies to be misled on that point.

Secretary **Shultz**. Well, let me say that that is a question that is always raised: Are you negotiating in good faith? We say we are. We do not think that the test of good faith can be allowed to become whether we get an agreement, because then you undermine your capacity to negotiate. The test of good faith is the reasonableness of the positions, the posture of give-and-take; with our allies, we have been involved in an intense and rich process of consultation. So they feel that they have had their oar in, and the positions that have emerged are ones that have been done jointly in a way.

So that gives confidence that these are thoughtful positions and that allied interests have been considered, and so on. With the leadership, we are doing very well in this regard, but obviously it is a part of the tactic in this negotiation of the Soviet Union to try to get across the idea to various population groups that we are not negotiating in good faith and therefore deployment should not go on. That is their tactic, and of course, ours is otherwise.

Senator **Helms**. All right.

One final question, Mr. Secretary.

I have been seeking to obtain from you for several months now the full materials relating to the Kennedy-Khrushchev agreement. I have asked by mail, by letter to you, and I have been in consultation with your associates on frequent occasions about your appearing before the Western Hemisphere Subcommittee of this committee. I think, Mr. Secretary, that the American people deserve to have a full and open hearing on the Kennedy-Khrushchev agreement, what is in it, what is not in it, what is being violated, what is not, and I think they deserve to have, if you will forgive me—and I say this with all respect—I think they deserve to have your testimony, not somebody else's, yours.

So, Mr. Secretary, my question is, is it going to be possible to persuade you to come before the subcommittee or the full committee, if the chairman wishes to discuss the Kennedy-Khrushchev agreement?

Secretary **Shultz**. You asked me that question, I think, in my confirmation hearing, and I ducked a little then. I will duck a little now. We have offered to have Assistant Secretary Burt come and testify, but the best is——

Senator **Helms**. He can come and testify with you, but I want you to come.

Secretary **Shultz**. You want me.

Senator **Helms**. What is the answer?

Secretary **Shultz**. It is tough. In the end I guess I will do it, but I hate to do it, frankly.

Senator **Helms**. Why?

Secretary **Shultz**. It is something somebody else can do, and there is a limit on the amount of things that you can really come to grips with and master. That is, you want a witness who can tell you all the ins and outs, and I can get to do that, but—well, if you want me to, I will do it.

Senator **Helms**. Very well.

Thank you, Mr. Secretary.

Secretary **Shultz**. Do not pin me down to some particular date right away because, I will tell you, my schedule is tough.

Senator **Helms**. We will work it out.

Thank you, sir.

The **Chairman**. I would like to say, Senator Helms, that I did assure Secretary Shultz that, knowing the burdens placed upon his office, which are immense, beyond anyone's knowledge, that whenever we could obtain testimony from someone else, we would do so.

Now, he has agreed to appear, but I want you to have that background, that I did make that agreement with him when he became Secretary, as I did with Secretary Haig, because I know the immense burdens placed upon your office.

Secretary **Shultz**. Probably I will not be able to testify because the person that does the scheduling back in the Department will shoot me when I return from having agreed to do it. [General laughter.]

Senator **Helms**. Well, we will get you a bullet-proof vest.

The **Chairman**. Thank you, Senator Helms.

Senator **Helms**. Mr. Chairman, that is the first time I have ever asked the Secretary himself to appear, and I appreciate your agreeing to come.

The **Chairman**. I noticed he had a few conditions on it, though.

Senator **Helms**. Not many.

The **Chairman**. Not many, no.

Senator Tsongas.

Senator **Tsongas**. I yield to Senator Cranston.

The **Chairman**. Senator Cranston, Senator Tsongas has yielded to you.

Senator **Cranston**. Thank you very much.

Mr. Secretary, I welcome you to this hearing. It is certainly on a very important issue before our country, and indeed, one that affects the fate of the world. I think the American-Soviet relationship is the most important that has ever existed between two peoples because never before have two peoples had the capacity to not only destroy each other totally, but quite possibly, to destroy the entire world, or at least human life upon this planet.

I agree with a great deal that you have said, and I want to compliment you on the thoughtful and moderate tone of your statement.

I disagree with a number of points, however, including where you say, "important as it is, arms control has not been and cannot be the dominant subject of our dialog with the Soviets." I know there are other issues that are of vast importance. You cannot separate one from the other. As you state, we have differences that are deep in philosophy and in purpose with the Soviet Union, and in principle, and that our task is to manage those relationships in ways that do not lead to war, and it seems to me that arms control is the most important aspect of all of this because that is a way to contain the dimensions of whatever disputes we may have, to insure that they do not erupt into a nuclear conflict if that can be avoided.

In your testimony you spell out the agenda in the dialog. I agree with that agenda. You state that strength and realism can deter war, but only direct dialog and negotiation can open the path toward lasting peace, and I agree with you very much on that point.

I agree with your criticism of Soviet behavior. That behavior has certainly increased tension between our two countries. I am glad that your statement contained nothing labeling the U.S.S.R. as the "focus of evil" in the world. I do not think that that kind of rhetoric and saber-rattling that sometimes accompanies that kind of rhetoric on both sides contributes to the sort of a dialog that can lead to an understanding.

Having said that I agree with your criticisms of Soviet behavior, and I of course do, those of us who are advocating efforts to reduce the tensions between our two nations are very cognizant of many Soviet actions that are foreboding and threatening and alarming and highly unpleasant.

Now, can you tell us what the United States, for its part, has done to contribute to the tension that exists between the United States and the Soviet Union?

Secretary SHULTZ. Nothing. [General laughter.]

Senator CRANSTON. You really believe we have done nothing that contributes to the tensions between us?

Secretary SHULTZ. The Soviets say, for example, that we are contributing to the tension by the program of deployments of Pershings and GLCM's in Europe. I reject that argument totally. Those deployments are a response to the massive SS–20 deployments. They are not provocative on our part; they are responsive on our part.

Similarly, our actions around the world have been the actions of a helping hand, not aggrandizing our own power. It is simply not the case that when we build our strength, given the background, that this contributes to tension, unless you say that the way to relieve tension is just to do whatever the Soviets want. Then, of course, they would not be so tense, but a lot of us would not like it very well to live under their system.

Senator CRANSTON. We most certainly would be tense under those circumstances. I do not quarrel with the particular example that you cite, but I do not know how we can negotiate effectively with them if we are incapable of putting ourselves in their shoes and seeing the world as they see it.

Secretary SHULTZ. That is a different question. I agree with you on that. If you are going to negotiate with somebody, you have to say to yourself, well, how does this look and what, given their problem, will make more sense, and so on. You have to do that.

Senator CRANSTON. It seems to me that interventions in other countries by us have increased tensions—and you would certainly not deny that we have intervened in the affairs of other countries for our purposes. Those who launched those interventions thought that they served American purposes. The Soviets may have viewed them as otherwise. It goes all the way back, long before either of us or anyone in this room had any impact or influence on American policy, to the first days of the Soviet revolution when there was an intervention by the United States and other Western powers at Archangel and other steps designed to seek to prevent the Communists from taking over that seemed to serve the purposes of America at that time. That is a part of our history that is perhaps somewhat alarming to the Soviets. Our more recent interventions in other countries to sustain the status quo, no matter what that status quo, no matter how tyrannical on the far right that status quo, no matter how brutal that status quo, has led to concerns I think in other parts of the world about how strong our commitment to freedom and democracy is.

It is appropriate to criticize violations of human rights in the Soviet Union. I do. So do you. and so do others. But to not express concern about violations of human rights in a similar vein wherever they occur seems to me to lead to a sort of hypocritical double standard which raises a question as to how sincere our protestations are about democracy and freedom. I know you believe in it deeply as I do.

Secretary SHULTZ. Well, let's take chapter and verse here. Let's go back into the post-World War II period. Let's take Korea. Did we intervene unjustifiably in Korea?

Senator CRANSTON. No; I do not think so.

Secretary SHULTZ. Are we in Korea now unjustifiably? I do not think so. I think that was a necessary response on our part to a Soviet effort to expand their boundary, in effect.

Senator CRANSTON. The problem that I see is when we wind up backing a right wing dictatorship in the hope that that will prevent a left wing dictatorship from emerging, it often fails to work. For example, in Cuba we backed Batista, we got Castro; in Nicaragua, we backed Somoza, put him in power, and we wound up with the Sandinistas. In Vietnam we backed totalitarian right wing Saigon, and we got totalitarian left wing Hanoi.

Efforts more carefully tailored to producing a middle ground result might be more successful, and I think we should not always view communism as the source of all evil. The problems—they are evil. I have no question about that. I want to be very clear on that point.

Secretary SHULTZ. Can I quote you?

Senator CRANSTON. But the problems in Latin America did not really begin in Moscow or Havana. They began with poverty and degradation and violation of rights by right wing dictatorships. People decided they did not want to put up with that. The Communists move in as parasites on that circumstance, trying to attain their own aims, their own goals of power, and their own form of tyranny, and I think we should seek to differentiate between the causes and the parasite.

Secretary SHULTZ. I agree with that, and I said so in my testimony on their behavior in the Third World. I agree with you that in Central America, for example, the principal problems we have to address ourselves to are the need for more democratic forms of government and the need for economic development in which that development is widely shared.

However, we are never going to get those things if a military action takes those countries over. So we have to provide a shield, as Senator Jackson has said, to support and make possible the key objectives that we have.

Senator CRANSTON. I know that you share that view. I am glad that you do. And I hope that your influence is great in moving us toward policies that would fulfill the purposes consistent with those goals.

It seems to me that our failure to ratify four treaties that were negotiated with the Soviet Union relating to arms control matters and nuclear tests has placed some burden on us in negotiations with them to come up with approaches that can be agreed to by both of us and then ratified in this country.

Secretary SHULTZ. I agree with that wholeheartedly.

Senator CRANSTON. Thank you very much.

One final question.

I am concerned about the qualitative nature of the arms race, the modernization which creates more and more deadly, more and more destructive, more and more accurate weapons, which are usually increasingly difficult to verify. I am not sure how we stop that. I propose a bilateral nuclear freeze as a beginning, and that is only the beginning of something much more substantive, to reduce. I know that you differ on the freeze.

How do we soon arrest the qualitative arms race that threatens to get out of hand?

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Secretary, I know you have to leave at 12:15. We have four Senators left that have not asked any questions. If you could make it concise and fill it in for the record if you would like.

Secretary SHULTZ. I think arms control negotiations can play an important part in that. The reduction of tensions, as we see them through these various regional issues, can play an important part in that. The emergence of more respect for human rights everywhere, including in the Soviet Union, can play an important part in that. And improved bilateral relations may play an important part.

So if we can pursue this agenda creatively and effectively, I think it helps in that regard.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you.

Senator Lugar.

Senator LUGAR. Mr. Secretary, I think your statement was an extraordinary and comprehensive document covering all bases, and I am hopeful that it will be widely read and widely shared, as I know you hope it is.

The question I have is a question that falls just on the edges of the various other places you have tacked down. I know you have been visiting with the foreign ministers of the NATO nations recently, and tried to move them, as you have in the past, toward more of a sharing of the global problems that the Soviet Union presents, specifically, areas beyond NATO. At the moment, one such area which presents, I think, a very formidable challenge is the problem of Syria and the SA-5 missiles in particular, which apparently have a high degree of Soviet involvement in personnel, maybe physically on the ground as well as——

Secretary SHULTZ. They are. They are manning those weapons, so far as we know.

Senator LUGAR. And their intentions we are not certain of, but it seems to me we face a situation you have taken a look at not only from NATO but even more from on the ground in your shuttle diplomacy.

What is to be our course in attempting to face that challenge both from the standpoint of the NATO nations and maybe our own response in the event that difficulties ensue? I am not certain from what source they might ensue, but clearly with a Soviet presence there and with a volatile situation in Lebanon and in Syria, what will our response be? First, in the event that Soviets are involved with Israel in conflict, to what extent will we be able to draw upon our NATO alliance in either the shifting of forces, the sharing of burdens, and various other ways, or other responses, given the fact that they, too, have troops on the ground as we have in our Marine component?

Secretary **Shultz**. That is a very thoughtful and deep question. The NATO alliance, of course, addresses a certain geographic area. It is not global. It is a limited concept, and so naturally you stay with that concept within the NATO joint command and alliance responsibilities as such. In the NATO discussions, it is recognized that members of the alliance, in varying degrees for different parts of the world, do have interests outside Europe, that may sometimes ally themselves in one way or another in different parts of the world, and that there are implications for NATO when actions are taken or fail to be taken.

This has increasingly been recognized in the communiques, the most recent one that we had in the meeting in Paris last week. The defense ministers also recognized that point. So that the notion of efforts beyond NATO is present there. The Lebanon situation is a good case in point. There are UNIFIL forces there, of course, from a variety of countries, and the multinational force is composed of French, Italian, United States, and now British forces. We are there, but that is not a NATO exercise. That is an exercise of these countries acting independently of NATO and in a sovereign way, but nevertheless knowledgeably in terms of the NATO responsibilities.

So I think the question you have raised is a deep one. It is being addressed and worked at, for we obviously have to serve our global interests and others have to, too.

Senator **Lugar**. Let me just probe a bit further, because I am deeply concerned, as I know you must be, that conflict in that area could occur. We hope that it does not, but we simply do not know why the Soviets have come in in that way or why the Syrians have invited them specifically for that purpose.

Secretary **Shultz**. I think we can speculate reasonably accurately on those points.

Senator **Lugar**. Well, this has occurred. What is your own speculation?

Secretary **Shultz**. Obviously, the Soviet Union gains a foothold in that part of the world through their military presence. You can have all kinds of arguments about the war in Lebanon, but it did not cast a lot of glory on the Soviet weaponry, and so they have new weaponry in there. As you pointed out, they are there, they are manning those weapons, and it no doubt is an effort on their part to restore their credibility and to have a presence from the Syrian point of view. It gives them added strength as they confront their problems as they see them.

From our standpoint, I think it raises the risks in the area—and we have said this directly to the Soviet Union—that they are there, they are associated with the Syrians, they are associated with the organized PLO fighters and terrorists, and also associated with some Iranian and PLO and other terrorist groups that are not necessarily easy to control. So that raises the risks. It also points up the importance of pushing, as we are pushing, for the evacuation of all foreign forces from Lebanon. We are fully engaged in the effort to bring about Syrian withdrawal, and working with the Lebanese.

And I might say that yesterday in the vote of the Lebanese Parliament we had an outstanding event. We all ought to take note of it and give President Gemayal some very strong support and applause for bringing off the ratification of the Israeli-Lebanese agreement, despite strenuous efforts by the Syrians to disrupt it and by a margin of—I think the vote was only two negative votes and four abstentions, and 65 positive votes. Anyway, it was a demonstration of the widespread support for the agreement and for the evacuation of all foreign forces in Lebanon.

Senator LUGAR. Mr. Secretary, our position in the two-track talks has been one of asking the Soviets to destroy SS–20 missiles. We want them to destroy all of them. We have given them the option of destroying some of them. Is there any evidence whatever, and if not evidence, even supposition that the Soviets have any intent of destroying any of the SS–20s? At least all rhetoric thus far has been that they might move them. That, of course, has antagonized the Japanese, and may have constituted a foreign policy blunder on the part of the Soviets in their reticence to destroy these weapons, but as we approach these negotiations, do you have any reasonable grounds to hope that the Soviets would in fact destroy the first SS–20?

Secretary SHULTZ. Only the general notion that when confronted with strength and determination, and deprived of the alternative of derailing the deployments through their political efforts, they might regard arms control, less military spending, and so on as more desirable for their purposes, but we do not have any strong indications in the negotiations. I think there have been some hints around the edges that maybe they would destroy a missile rather than move it, but that is by no means laid out, and it is not on the negotiating table.

Senator LUGAR. It may state the obvious, but a freeze position from that standpoint would leave all the SS–20s in place presumably, and as a result, be a nonnegotiable situation as far as the Soviets are concerned in perpetuity.

Secretary SHULTZ. A freeze right now in the INF area would be a hell of a deal for the Soviet Union. It would be a terrible deal for us and for our allies.

Senator LUGAR. Thank you very much.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you, Senator Lugar.

Senator Tsongas.

Senator TSONGAS. Mr. Secretary, following on Senator Lugar's point, comparing the Syrian missile sites issue and the Middle East generally with Nicaragua, El Salvador—Central America generally—which of those two do you believe is the most volatile and is more likely to raise the possibility of a United States-Soviet confrontation?

Secretary SHULTZ. They are both volatile areas, and they both contain risks. I think the stakes are high enough that we need to be engaging ourselves fully in both areas. I do not know that it is worthwhile to argue whether one is more important than the other.

Senator TSONGAS. But in terms of a risk factor for a United States-Soviet confrontation, you see them as equally risky, the same probability of superpower confrontation?

Secretary SHULTZ. I think both represent big problems, and big problems for us, and the risks are great in both areas. The consequences, the possible consequences are sobering, and as I say, I think both merit full attention. I do not know how to put them on a scale and weigh them very well, and I do not know that we need to do that. What we need to do is recognize how tremendously important both are.

Senator TSONGAS. In a discussion with a previous questioner, you said that you are uncertain as to what view of the United States was being transmitted up to the key people in the Soviet leadership. Would not a summit be the best way of getting around that question?

Secretary SHULTZ. If it is prepared well enough, and there is a substantive outcome, that is possible. It can be a constructive thing, as I have said. But I think just a general discussion, with no special drive to it, could very well dash hopes rather than do anything that is reassuring. I think Senator Pell's point was well taken that people are troubled. If you are going to do something you want to do something that gives genuinely and realistically the basis for some reassurance. If you do something that only winds up disturbing them more, I do not think that is constructive. So that is a concern.

Senator TSONGAS. You made reference to the fact that you have to have unity at home. I think that is true, but unless something happens, you are going to be the only administration going back to the fifties that either did not negotiate a treaty with the Soviets or met with them. I mean, everybody else thought there was some value to face-to-face negotiation. You are going to end up as the only administration that did not see them.

Secretary SHULTZ. So be it. I do not think we want to get ourselves in a position where because we do not want to be the only administration that did not make an arms control agreement, therefore let us make one. That is no way to approach it. We should only be ready to make one if it is substantively sensible from our standpoint. If we are not able to make one, well, then, that is the way the chips fall.

Senator TSONGAS. That may be true, but the refusal to meet, I think, does not wash among the American people.

Secretary SHULTZ. There is no refusal to meet. We are meeting the Soviet Union in a wide variety of forums constantly. The President has repeatedly stated his readiness to meet with the Soviet leader on the basis of a well-prepared agenda and the possibility of something worthwhile coming out of the meeting. So there is no refusal to meet at all.

Senator TSONGAS. Let me just say, I think part of the reason we were so enthusiastic and remain so as to your appointment is that you understand very well how you meet with people and negotiate. You certainly neutralized all of us by coming into all of our offices without an agreement in hand. I would just argue for the same approach with Andropov.

Mr. Chairman, we have sat here for 2½ years and raised issues like arms control, Namibia, peaceful nuclear explosions, et cetera, and the response is, well, we are working on it, and we are hopeful that something can be worked out. We meet again 6 months later, and we get the same response.

I think this committee clearly does not share the administration's view that the Nixon-Ford Threshold Test Ban and Peaceful Nuclear Explosions Treaties are inadequate, and I think we fail in our responsibility to simply raise it all the time and get these nonresponses and then look forward to the same thing next year. I think the committee should hold hearings, bring these treaties up, put it on the agenda, and force the administration to come before the American people and explain specifically what is your objection, and to explain why the Nixon-Ford treaties are unacceptable, because they have managed to put the issue off, and I would suggest that probably 99 percent of the American people have probably no idea that these two treaties are sitting here, and the reason they do not know about it, I think, basically, is our responsibility.

So, I would urge the chairman and the ranking minority leader to look at the possibility of bringing that up. I would hate to sit here for 4 years and not have at least made an effort to get those treaties out. Let us talk about them. Let us see what the problems are. I feel the same way about SALT II, but I think those are more arguable. The Nixon-Ford treaties, especially because of the on-site inspection provision, are enormously important in principle, and I would hope that the committee would hold hearings. Let us put it on the agenda, and at least get it out of the committee to give the administration an incentive to move on this matter.

The **Chairman**. Thank you, Senator Tsongas. We will discuss that in some detail with Director Adelman this afternoon, as you perhaps know. We will make every effort to try to work this out with the administration. I am all for improved verification, and I am well aware of the fact that we are concerned about breaches of treaties that have occurred, and we know that they have occurred in some cases with the Soviet Union, and have pointed out clearly to them 2½ years ago that those breaches that have occurred in the anthrax situation. Their failure to follow through on the consultation required by our treaties is a setback. They put all the blame on our back, and I told them SALT II was not our failure exactly. I do not know whether it would have been confirmed or not, but certainly their movement into Afghanistan made the discussion of it impossible. It was President Carter and Senator Robert Byrd, the majority leader at that time, who said we could not even discuss it because of their actions in Afghanistan.

Senator Kassebaum?

Senator **Tsongas**. Mr. Chairman?

The **Chairman**. I am sorry. I thought you were finished.

Senator **Tsongas**. No.

Those treaties are before our committee, so irrespective of the administration's responsibility, we have our own. I think we should put that on the agenda and raise it, and I would hope that the committee would see fit to do that.

Let me raise one final question in response to Senator Cranston. You said, Mr. Secretary, we have done nothing to raise tensions with the Soviets, and you have also said that it is good to put yourself in the position of your negotiator adversary and try to sense what their view is. If you were a Soviet, and you were asked the same question, what have the Americans done to aggravate tensions, what would a Soviet legitimately felt response be?

Secretary SHULTZ. What they are saying right now to people who go to Moscow is that the prospect of development of U.S. Pershing IIs and cruise missiles in Europe is raising the tensions, this is a provocative act, and so forth. That is what they are using as an illustration. And why is that? I pointed that out in my response to Senator Cranston as something that it seems to me is not provocative on our part unless you have a definition of provocation that precludes self-defense. But you asked for what they would say. That is what they are now saying. They are concentrating on their deployments. That is the focus of attention on their part.

Senator TSONGAS. Do you think that the testing of the F-15 antisatellite system this fall is a wise effort without even trying to negotiate with the Soviets away that "Star Wars" issue?

Secretary SHULTZ. I think we have to develop our own strength and capabilities, certainly in the kind of world we live in.

Senator TSONGAS. Why not sit down and talk to them before we test?

Secretary SHULTZ. I am at something of a disadvantage in answering that question, but I think the technical situation is such that it is hard to see just where you would go in such discussions. The area is much more unexplored than other areas of weaponry that are discussed.

Senator TSONGAS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you, Senator Tsongas.

Senator Kassebaum?

Senator KASSEBAUM. Mr. Secretary, I want to thank you. I appreciate your statement, and I hope you will forgive me for my foghorn voice, but I just wanted to ask you a couple of things. I think you will certainly agree that we need a substantive arms control agreement rather than just any treaty, and you mentioned that the negotiators had a new flexibility. There are a couple of suggestions that have been made up here that I think could be supplementary agreements to a certain extent that would in no way prejudice more in-depth, longer, larger agreement. One would be a moratorium on testing of all MIRVed ICBMs that have been developed since May 1979. This would encompass the modified SS-18s and the SS-X-24, the solid fuel missile that the Soviets have just begun to test, and our MX.

It seems to me one of the merits is that it is easily verifiable, it does not require long negotiations, it is something that can be accepted or rejected. If we propose it, if they would agree, then it goes into effect. Another suggestion that has been made up here is a resolution introduced by Senators Nunn and Levin that calls for an exchange of military personnel between the Soviet Union and ourselves. These are just a couple of things that I think, given the nature of the situation, might be worth exploring, and I would like you to comment briefly.

Secretary SHULTZ. Well, we need to explore constructive ideas. I think we have to be careful on testing, that we do not propose something that would be disadvantageous to us, given the fact that over the past 10 years or so, the Soviet modernization effort has been stronger than ours, and we are in the process of modernization essentially to regain ground that we lost. To the extent that a testing moratorium made it harder for us to engage in the modernization that we need, it would be a problem, but at any rate, the idea certainly needs to be thought about. As to military exchanges, that is a more expanded version of what we proposed to the Soviet Union, which was a military-to-military communications link. As I said earlier, while they said they did not see any benefit to that, they did not say they would not discuss it, but they certainly did give a negative response. These are all things in the category of confidence-building measures that we are pursuing.

We have a lot on the table, and we need to keep thinking about these things, and trying to bring some to fruition.

Senator **Kassebaum** [presiding]. Thank you.

We have a vote on.

Senator **Pell**. Madam Chairman, I just want to interpolate that I strongly support the suggestion of the Senator from Massachusetts that we have hearings on the Threshold Test Ban and Peaceful Nuclear Explosions Treaties, and my own suggestion that we bring up the Genocide Treaty simultaneously.

Senator **Glenn**. Mr. Secretary, I am sorry I could not be here earlier. I was tied up on some other things on the floor. And because we only have a moment, let me just comment that I hope we are taking cognizance of the verification problems on the new proposals now being made in Geneva. Adequate verification seems to me to be at the heart of whether we are going to be able to act favorably on the treaties awaiting ratification and the new ones you are currently negotiating. Things, such as the numbers of warheads, for instance, and new aggregate levels of launchers, magnify our verification difficulties. I hope you are making this a part of the negotiations.

Mr. Secretary, we all know that American Presidents have usually inherited poor relations with the Soviets. President Eisenhower had the Korean war, President Kennedy the Berlin Wall, President Nixon, Vietnam. Even Jimmy Carter seemed to inherit only intractable disputes. And we all know why: The Soviets have amply and clearly demonstrated that their foreign policy is inherently aggressive. To paraphrase Lord Acton: the Soviet quest for absolute security is absolutely dangerous. It depends on both military conquest and political subversion, and as long as this quest for absolute security remains the driving force behind Soviet policy, the potential for conflict and instability will persist.

Over the last 20 years, the Soviets have managed to neutralize U.S. strategic superiority, upset the nuclear balance in Europe, and develop a capacity to project military power into every corner of the world.

In January 1981, then, President Reagan faced challenges as trying and demanding as those that confronted Eisenhower and Kennedy. He assumed office 2 years ago pledging to solidify the Western alliance and apparently believing that his administration could "force" the Soviets into better behavior. Two years later, the question in our dealings with the Soviets and with our allies is whether we have either changed Soviet behavior or solidified the alliance. I believe we have failed on both counts.

My impression—and perhaps you can dispel that impression today, Mr. Secretary—is that U.S. policy, vis-a-vis the Soviet Union, suffers from a serious case of schizophrenia.

Sometimes the President tells us the Soviet system is weak and about to collapse; other times he ominously warns of a growing Soviet menace.

Sometimes the administration talks of peace and of the need for arms control negotiations; other days, we hear threats of going to war in Central America.

Sometimes we hear of resisting repression in Poland; but we see only lighted candles in the White House windows.

Sometimes we hear of "punishing" our allies for allowing the Russians to purchase pipeline equipment; the next day, the administration announces the sale of millions of tons of American grain to the Soviet Union.

Sometimes we hear that the Russians have reserved to themselves the "right to commit any crime, to lie, (and) to cheat"; the next day the President writes to Brezhnev:

> Is it possible that we have permitted ideology, political and economic philosophies and governmental policies to keep us from considering the real, everyday problems of our peoples?

Mr. Secretary, there are many in this country who believe—given the record of the last 2 years—that this administration tends to confuse belligerency with firmness and verbal bombast with serious discussion. I know, Mr. Secretary, that these traits are not characteristic of your approach to dealing with the Soviets. Perhaps, in your appearance here today, you can remove some of the aura of schizophrenia and provide us with a clearer sense of where United States-Soviet relations are headed.

Secretary SHULTZ. I think your point is well taken, and it is being addressed.

Senator GLENN [presiding]. All right. That is a good short answer. Good. Thank you. I guess I am the last one left here.

The committee will stand adjourned, subject to the call of the Chair.

[Whereupon, at 12:13 p.m., the committee adjourned, to reconvene at 2 p.m., Thursday, June 16, 1983.]

# UNITED STATES-SOVIET RELATIONS

---

**THURSDAY, JUNE 16, 1983**

United States Senate,
Committee on Foreign Relations,
*Washington, D.C.*

The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 2:04 p.m., in room SD-419, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Hon. Charles H. Percy (chairman of the committee) presiding.

Present: Senators Percy, Helms, Pressler, Pell, and Biden.

The Chairman. I think it is a tribute not only to the subject matter but to our distinguished witnesses today that we have standing-room only. We have tremendous public interest in this series of hearings that we have under way.

We meet this afternoon for the second time in this important series of hearings on the United States-Soviet relationship in a nuclear age. Yesterday Secretary of State Shultz testified on the Reagan administration's Soviet policy.

This afternoon we are privileged to hear from two outstanding former U.S. Ambassadors to the Soviet Union, and from Mrs. Harriman also. Both of our former Ambassadors have distinguished themselves in notable contributions to American life in other fields as well as the field of diplomacy.

We will first hear from Averell Harriman, successful railroad man and investment banker and former Governor of New York, 1955 to 1958; Secretary of Commerce to President Truman; Director of the Mutual Security Agency.

Governor Harriman has also found time to hold a fair perecntage of our major diplomatic positions: Special Envoy to Churchill and Stalin, 1941–46: Ambassador to Moscow, 1943–46; and to London in 1946; Ambassador at Large in 1961 and again in 1965–68; Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs, 1961–63; Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs, 1963–65; and personal representative of the President at the Paris negotiations on Vietnam, 1968–69.

Governor Harriman has known every Soviet leader from Stalin to Andropov. He and Mrs. Harriman, who is also here today and who will make a statement of her own, met with Andropov in Moscow on June 2.

Our second witness will be Thomas J. Watson, Jr., former chairman of IBM and, I happen to feel, one of the most enlightened, intelligent, hard-driving but also very fair businessman with the broadest possible perspective on the role of business and the strength of business in commanding and creating better relationships around the world.

His relationship with the Soviet Union began a long time ago. As a matter of fact, he traveled with the U.S. lend-lease mission to the Soviet Union in 1940 when the Soviet Union and the United States were allies in World War II. He returned to Moscow as U.S. Ambassador from 1979–81.

His career at IBM has been a legend, but I think also he has always believed in calling the shots as he saw them. I have been privileged to see him in the Business Council through the years say things bluntly and forthrightly to his business colleagues, preceding it many times by saying, you are not going to want to hear what I have to tell you, but—and then he lets it go.

Everyone respects him, whether they be Republican or Democrat, and we are very anxious to hear what he has to say. I know that he will be very forthright. He has become one of the Nation's most articulate spokesmen on the problems of nuclear war. It is a preoccupying and a consuming concern of his life now, and from his writings we know how he has been alerting the Nation and also governments to what the problems are.

So we look forward very much indeed to our very distinguished witnesses, three of them, today addressing themselves to the theme questions of these hearings.

First, how might the United States and Soviet relationships evolve in the 1980's? Can it improve significantly or how much worse might it get? Second, how much and how best can the United States influence Soviet policy? And, finally, how much and how best can arms control agreements restrain the arms race and improve strategic stability.

Our witnesses are two former Ambassadors who have lived among the Soviets, have dealt with them, have negotiated with them. Each has watched a period of limited cooperation between the United States and the Soviet Union slide back into deepening and dangerous hostility. Both have seen in their adult lifetimes the nuclear arsenals of the two superpowers grow and grow and become ever more dangerously destructive in their capabilities. Both have in their writings and statements in recent years given voice to the fear of the ordinary citizen that we in Government are not doing enough to control these terrible weapons.

We welcome the three of you very warmly indeed today. Governor Harriman, we would be pleased to hear from you.

## STATEMENT OF HON. W. AVERELL HARRIMAN, FORMER U.S. AMBASSADOR TO THE SOVIET UNION (1943–46)

Governor HARRIMAN. Mr. Chairman, I appreciate greatly the opportunity to appear before this committee and testify on the all-important international question of Soviet-American relations. I have submitted to your staff a statement covering my talk with Mr. Andropov in Moscow when we were there a couple of weeks ago.

It is too long, however, to read this morning, so I have prepared a summary of that statement. I cannot read it myself—my eyes have given out on me—and I have asked my wife to come and read that statement. With your permission, she will do so.

The **Chairman.** I would be very happy to have her do so and you will be available to answer questions, of course.

Governor **Harriman.** Of course, I would be very glad to answer all questions.

The **Chairman.** Thank you very much. Mrs. Harriman, why do you not proceed then first to read the statement on behalf of Governor Harriman, and then we will have Ambassador Watson testify, and then we would be pleased to have you give testimony in your own right. The complete text of Governor Harriman's testimony will be incorporated in the record.

Mrs. **Harriman.** Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I am honored to appear before this committee once again. I appreciate very much this opportunity to report on my recent visit to the Soviet Union and the conversation I had there with General Secretary of the Communist Party Yuriy Andropov.

I am particularly gratified to testify at this time before the committee because 1983 marks the 50th anniversary of the establishment of diplomatic relations between the United States and the Soviet Union, because this year it is 40 years since I first went to Moscow as our Ambassador in wartime, and because it is 20 years since under the direction of President Kennedy I negotiated the Limited Nuclear Test Ban Treaty.

Looking back over nearly 60 years of my experiences in Soviet affairs, I find that my basic judgments have not been fundamentally altered. I continue to maintain, as in 1945, that in ideology there is no prospect of compromise between the Kremlin and ourselves, but that we must find ways to settle as many areas of conflict as possible in order to live together on this small planet without war.

I hope that my testimony can contribute to the committee's important inquiry through these hearings into the state and prospects of United States-Soviet relations. I commend the effort the committee has begun, for relations between the United States and the Soviet Union are strained today and in danger of deteriorating still further.

The importance of this situation is not that it might threaten our trade or our economy. It is important because in an age of more than 50,000 nuclear weapons further deterioration ultimately threatens the national security and national survival of the United States. That is why improved relations with our most powerful adversary are so important.

Therefore, if these hearings could accomplish but one objective, I would hope that they might help impart a new sense of urgency to the search for better relations between the United States and the Soviet Union, for if we accept growing hostility with complacency then we shall drift downward and such drift in the face of today's increasing nuclear threat is unacceptable national policy for either the United States or the Soviet Union.

I have no illusions about the Soviet system or its policies. I am aware of its strength. But I also know its weaknesses and I am confident of our own strengths as well. It is with this sense of confidence that we should approach the Soviet Union, for trepidation is unworthy of our greatness and merely removes the policy initiative from our hands, certainly an outcome inappropriate for America.

Mr. Chairman, I wish to emphasize that my visit was a private one, that I carried no messages from our Government to the Soviet leadership, and that I have brought no official communication back. My purpose was to make the acquaintance of the new Soviet leader, General Secretary Andropov, which I did on June 2 during a conversation that lasted for 1 hour and 20 minutes.

His tone throughout was very direct, at times even blunt. On a personal level, he was courteous to me and my wife without being effusive, responsive to our comments without being conciliatory on matters of substance. He appeared to be in good health, tanned, rested, at ease and fluent.

I would like to emphasize before this committee three observations that came across to me during our meeting with the General Secretary. First, he expressed to me a very clear and, in my judgment, genuine sense of concern about the growing threat of nuclear war. At one point during his prepared statement he said, and I quote:

> Today the Soviet people and the American people have a common foe—the threat of a war incomparable with the horrors we went through previously. This war may perhaps not occur through evil intent but could happen through miscalculation. Then nothing could save mankind.

I wish to stress that this sense of concern does not in my mind imply that he will pursue Soviet goals and Soviet objectives with any less vigor, only that he realizes that the avoidance of mutual destruction is the foremost Soviet objective and that he is deeply concerned that events today are propelling both superpowers in a direction neither can afford.

My second observation concerns the importance that the General Secretary attached to reciprocity. My sense is that General Secretary Andropov does not expect the United States to be the only actor in the drama willing to alter positions in the interest of a more stable, safer world. He believes in mutual action.

This leads me to my third observation from our meeting. Near the close of our meeting he said that he was ready and interested in developing Soviet-American relations, to search for joint initiatives, proposals which might make the present situation easier. He added that he would, in that instance, be awaiting the U.S. response.

He did not mention specifics, nor did I respond with specifics. This is the responsibility of governments. I did, however, emphasize to General Secretary Andropov a principle taught to me by years of negotiations. We should first deal with those matters where we have the best chance of success. There may be other matters which are more difficult, but it is not useful in the first instance to go into those with which we are at variance.

We should first go into those matters on which we have the best chance of agreement. Today, with negotiations on nuclear arms nearly at an impasse and the clock ticking away remorselessly, this principle could serve us well.

This process of negotiation will also be served best by direct, consistent, and constant communication and I believe we have reached the moment when negotiation can best be advanced by such communication at a well-prepared summit meeting.

On the subject of communication and understanding, I was particularly gratified that the General Secretary referred to the establishment of the Harriman Institute for the Advanced Study of the Soviet Union at Columbia University. Mr. Andropov said that he welcomed the efforts of my family to develop solid and thoughtful scholars and diplomats who could have an objective, even if at times critical, understanding of the Soviet Union.

In keeping with the goal of strengthened U.S. study of the Soviet Union, I strongly reiterate my support for legislation still pending in the Congress that would provide substantial financial support for Soviet studies in our Nation.

Mr. Chairman, last week marked the 20th anniversary of President Kennedy's historic speech at American University. This speech soon led to negotiations and to agreement on the Limited Test Ban Treaty. This success was the result of the common action of our two nations and their leaders.

It is this will that both nations must summon forth once more. Despite all the issues that divide our two countries, none can question that on the issue of preventing nuclear we have a common interest. Two nations, the most powerful on this Earth, hold the fate of each other and the future of mankind in their grasp.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

[Governor Harriman's prepared statement follows:]

### Prepared Statement of Hon. W. Averell Harriman

Mr. Chairman, I am honored to appear before this Committee once again. I appreciate very much this opportunity to report on my recent visit to the Soviet Union and on the conversation I had there with the General Secretary of the Communist Party, Yuriy Andropov. Along with this prepared testimony, I am also submitting for the record the statement I made to the press in Moscow on June 2nd following this conversation.

I am particularly gratified to testify at this time before the Committee on this subject because 1983 marks the fiftieth anniversary of the establishment of diplomatic relations between the United States and the Soviet Union; because this year it is 40 years since I went to Moscow as our Ambassador in wartime; and because it is 20 years since, under the direction of President Kennedy, I negotiated the Limited Nuclear Test Ban Treaty.

Looking back over my experiences of these years, I find that my basic judgments have not been fundamentally unaltered, although conditions have changed radically. I have been attacked for those judgments from both ends of our political spectrum. Some have called me a warmonger; others have denounced me as too soft on communism. I continue to maintain, as in 1945, that in ideology there is no prospect of compromise between the Kremlin and ourselves, but that we must find ways to settle as many areas of conflict as possible in order to live together on this small planet without war.

I hope that my testimony can contribute to the Committee's important inquiry through these hearings, into the state and prospects of United States-Soviet relations. I commend the effort you have begun, for relations between the United States and the Soviet Union are strained today and in danger of deteriorating still further.

The importance of this situation is not that it might threaten our trade, or our economy. It is important because, in an age of more than 50,000 nuclear weapons, further deterioration ultimately threatens the national security and national survival of the United States.

Despite nuclear weapons in the hands of both our nations for more than 30 years, there has been no nuclear war. This has been our good fortune, and this good fortunate has given us opportunity. Not to use this opportunity is simply not the prudent course for our future national security. We must actively seek a safer world.

This is why improved relations with our most powerful adversary are so important. I cannot rest comfortably merely trusting in the hope that sanity and common sense shall prevail forever between two nuclear-armed superpowers when suspicion, enmity, and fear are present in our relations.

Therefore, if these hearings could accomplish but one objective, I would hope that they might help impart a new sense of urgency to the search for better relations between the United States and the Soviet Union. For, if we accept growing hostility with complacency, then we shall drift downwards, and such drift—in the face of today's increasing nuclear threat—is unacceptable national policy for either the United States or the Soviet Union.

Mr. Chairman, eight decades ago as a young boy I glimpsed a barren corner of Siberia in the course of a scientific expedition led by my father. Russia and the Soviet Union have intrigued me ever since. Nearly six decades ago, I went to the Soviet Union as a businessman, in connection with a concession to mine manganese in the Caucasus, and met for the first time some of the leaders. Four decades ago, I served as our Ambassador during 3 years of common effort to defeat Nazi Germany. Two decades ago, at the direction of President Kennedy, I negotiated the first major United States-Soviet arms control agreement, the Limited Nuclear Test Ban Treaty.

I have no illusions about the Soviet system or its policies. I am aware of its strength. But I also know its weaknesses, and I am confident in our own strengths as well.

It is with this sense of confidence that we should approach the Soviet Union, for trepidation is unworthy of our greatness and merely removes the policy initiative from our hands—certainly an outcome inappropriate for America.

I have traveled to the Soviet Union both as a private citizen and officially in recent years. It was as a private citizen that I requested assurance this year that I would be received by General Secretary Andropov if I made another trip to Moscow. I obtained the assurance and accordingly traveled to the Soviet Union at the end of May with my wife, Pamela.

I wish to emphasize that my visit was a private one, that I carried no messages from our Government to the Soviet leadership and that I have brought no official communication back. Although I discussed the trip with Secretary Shultz, the initiative was entirely my own. My purpose was to make the acquaintance of the new Soviet leader. I met General Secretary Andropov on Thursday, June 2nd, in his office at the Central Committee of the Soviet Communist Party. He received my wife and me for a conversation that lasted about 1 hour and 20 minutes.

I would like to give you a sense of the views he expressed. Two themes predominated. One was a strong anxiety about the current state of United States-Soviet relations and the danger it holds, in his view and in mine, of conflict arising from misunderstanding or miscalculation. His second point, expressed with almost equal force, was his desire to see relations reestablished on a normal and productive basis in order, as he said in private and in the public Soviet accounts of our talk, to fight our "common foe": the threat of war. He made no detailed suggestions for ways to move the relationship away from mutual suspicion and hostility toward the kind of atmosphere and arrangements which marked our World War II alliance. Very much in the manner of his predecessors and colleagues with whom I have talked, he tended to deny Soviet responsibility for the deterioration of relations. He complained that every American election campaign was accompanied by anti-Soviet statements. He said the elections pass, but leave their aftermath of mistrust and enmity.

Mr. Andropov presented these points in a prepared statement which he read at the opening of our talk and again, without referring to notes or to his aide, Andrei Aleksandrov-Agentov, during the back-and-forth of our conversation. In that longer portion of the meeting I interjected to clarify his meaning and, partially to correct him. I pointed out that many Soviet actions had damaged relations and continued to impede their improvement. Our meeting was not for the purpose of identifying specific areas or issues on which our two nations could make progress. Nevertheless, in response to my request, the General Secretary reaffirmed his willingness to think about steps for the improvement of relations. He also suggested that we look for joint initiatives which could help ease the current situation.

His tone throughout was very direct, at times even blunt. But his most spontanous comment was a question—rhetorical in nature—about what feasible actions on his part could alter American policies and attitudes. On a personal level, he was courteous to me and my wife without being effusive, responsive to our comments without being conciliatory on matters of substance. He appeared to be in good health, tanned, rested, at ease and fluent.

I am reluctant to draw any dramatic conclusions either from his willingness to receive me or from his remarks. It is, however, not without importance that we were able to talk of periods when Soviet-American ties were closer and dealings more constructive. I believe my visit gave him an opportunity to stress his preference for such a relationship and his concern about its deterioration. Although that emphasis was, in large part, for public consumption, I also believe that—as is often the case with Soviet declarations—it reflects a policy choice, not simply a propaganda line.

I would like to emphasize before this Committee three observations that came across to me during our meeting with General Secretary Andropov.

First, he expressed to me a very clear—and in my judgment genuine—sense of concern about the growing threat of nuclear war. At one point during his prepared statement he said:

"Today the Soviet people and the American people have a common foe—the threat of a war incomparable with the horrors we went through previously. This war may perhaps not occur through evil intent, but could happen through miscalculation. Then nothing could save mankind."

I wish to stress that this sense of concern does not in my mind imply that he will pursue Soviet goals and Soviet objectives with any less vigor—only that he realizes that the avoidance of mutual destruction is the foremost Soviet objective and that he is deeply concerned that events today are propelling both superpowers in a direction neither can afford.

This observation I state with force, for my reading is that his concern, as I said before, is genuine.

My second observation concerns the importance that the General Secretary attached to "reciprocity." We may have, in my mind, reached the point where neither the United States nor the Soviet Union will be the first to make an initial significant concession in the interest of giving momentum to reducing the current tension between our nations. We have not, however, reached the point where mutual steps are beyond attainment and therein lies opportunity and promise. My sense is that General Secretary Andropov does not expect the United States to be the only actor in the drama willing to alter positions in the interest of a more stable, safer world. He believes in mutual action.

This leads to my third observation from our meeting. When I noted that I would be soon holding a press conference on the meeting, he responded to my request for a statement that I could use, by saying that he was ready and interested in developing Soviet-American relations, to search for joint initiatives, proposals which might make the present situation easier. He added that he would in that instance be awaiting the U.S. response.

He did not mention specifics, nor did I respond with specifics. This is the responsibility of governments. In this connection, however, I would like to emphasize a principle taught to me by years of negotiations. This principle is particularly applicable to the current state of relations between our nations—and I made this clear to General Secretary Andropov during our meeting 2 weeks ago.

We should first deal with those matters where we have the best chance of success. There may be other matters which are more difficult, but it is not useful in the first instance to go into those with which we are at variance. We should first go into those matters on which we have the best chance of agreement.

Let me give one historical example of how this principle can be put to advantage. Twenty years ago, during the Cuban missile crisis, our nation avoided nuclear holocaust, maintained our national security, and preserved peace at the same time. We succeeded in the negotiating process that resolved this crisis because President Kennedy was not blinded by an attitude of all-or-nothing.

President Kennedy took the Soviet Union's points most favorable—those contained in the first communication from Chairman Khrushchev—and built upon them a response, consistent with our security, that paved the way for progress. Above all, the President did not allow our actions to be paralyzed by the least favorable clauses of a Soviet proposal.

Today with negotiations on nuclear arms nearly at an impasse and the clock ticking away remorselessly, what we learned then could serve us well once more.

This process of negotiation will also be served by direct, consistent, and constant communications, and I believe that we have reached the moment where negotiation can best be advanced by such communication at a well-prepared summit meeting.

On the subject of communication and understanding, I was particularly gratified that the General Secretary referred to the establishment of the Harriman Institute for the Advanced Study of the Soviet Union at Columbia University. Mr. Andropov said that he welcomed the efforts of my family to develop solid and thoughtful scholars and diplomats who could have an objective—even if at times critical—understanding of the Soviet Union. In keeping with the goal of strengthened U.S. study of the Soviet Union, I strongly reiterate my support for legislation still pending in the Congress that would provide substantial financial support for Soviet studies in our nation.

Mr. Chairman, last week marked the twentieth anniversary of President Kennedy's historic speech at American University. This speech soon led to negotiations, and these negotiations led to agreement on the Limited Test Ban Treaty. This success was the result of the common action of our two nations and their leaders.

It is this will that both nations must summon forth once more. Despite all the issues that divide our two countries, none can question that on the issue of preventing nuclear war we have a common interest. Two nations, the most powerful on this Earth, hold the fate of each other and the future of mankind in their grasp.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much, Mrs. Harriman.

I would like to insert into the record a copy of Governor Harriman's June 2 Moscow press statement, which I think would be of interest to all of those who will carefully read this record.

[The information referred to follows:]

### STATEMENT BY GOVERNOR HARRIMAN, MOSCOW, JUNE 2, 1983

My wife and I came to the Soviet Union as private citizens. We met today with General Secretary Andropov for about an hour and twenty minutes. I will not go into the details of our conversation, but I can characterize them for you in the following general terms.

He was frank in expressing his concerns about the state of our relations. I was equally frank in expressing my view, and pointed out that it is possible for the Soviet Government to take steps which can improve relations.

The General Secretary said and authorized me to say to you that it is the most sincere and fervent desire of the Soviet Government to have normal relations with the United States and to develop them in the best tradition of our relations in the past. He said we do have good traditions in our relations and the Soviet Union does not forget them. He added that the Soviet Union was ready and interested to search for joint initiatives which would make the present situation easier.

My wife Pamela in the course of the discussions said it would be helpful to have wider exchanges between our countries, particularly involving the members of Congress, and that it was better to talk directly than through written communications. He reacted favorably.

He spoke favorably of the establishment of the Harriman Institute at Columbia University, and also the hope that it would develop solid and thoughtful experts on the Soviet Union.

The CHAIRMAN. Ambassador Watson, we would be pleased to hear from you.

## STATEMENT OF HON. THOMAS J. WATSON, JR., FORMER U.S. AMBASSADOR TO THE SOVIET UNION (1979–81)

Ambassador WATSON. Mr. Chairman, I am told I had better move this, so I will try, or snuggle up to you, Governor.

First, I would like to thank you, sir, for allowing me to present my views. I find myself very fortunate in presenting them alongside one of the men I respect the most in all of the world and his wife.

Governor Harriman gave me my first public service job working as chairman of a youth and delinquency committee in New York State in 1956, and he has been a help to me ever since. I guess that was one of the main reasons why I went to Moscow and perhaps got through the vote in this committee. So I am glad to sit next to you, Governor, and follow you in testimony.

The CHAIRMAN. Ambassador Watson, I have just been advised by the floor that they are holding this vote that is on now until I get over and vote. So it will take me about 4 minutes. We will have to recess for 4 minutes. That is where the rest of the committee is, over there on a vote.

We will recess for 4 or 5 minutes.

[A brief recess was taken.]

The CHAIRMAN. The committee is very pleased indeed to welcome back again Ambassador John Sherman Cooper, who has not been back many times. This is an auspicious occasion when he once again enters this room where he served with distinction for so many years.

Ambassador Watson, we would be delighted to have you proceed now.

Ambassador WATSON. I had just finished a preamble and paid my respects to Governor Harriman and had not really started my main statement, so I shall now begin.

I have testified previously to this committee on this subject, so I will be very brief today. Rather than going into the technology or the diplomacy of the questions you are addressing, I will try to give you simply what I believe to be commonsense. I will be blunt about the grave peril facing the United States and the tremendous responsibility resting squarely upon the shoulders of this committee to do something about it.

I have not forgotten Hungary, Czechoslovakia, Poland or Afghanistan. I have not forgotten Sakharov. But we must deal with things as they are, not as we wish they were. I recognize the difficulty in reaching consensus and the chairman of this committee's problem of presiding over a committee with many divergent opinions and many other responsibilities.

But I submit to you that the danger we face today warrants laying aside all other matters, even staying in session day and night, if that is required. We are in great peril and I believe we are coping with it on a business-as-usual basis. I pray that I am totally wrong in my conclusion. But I ask you to put it to a simple test.

Step back, wipe your mind clear for a moment of all that you know about the logic of each step in the buildup of thermonuclear weapons over the past three and a half decades. Just focus on the situation as it exists today.

The United States and the Soviet Union are approaching 10,000 strategic nuclear warheads each, ranging in power from small ones about four times Hiroshima to big ones several hundred times Hiroshima. In addition, the United States has several thousand tactical weapons in Europe as well as a significant number of nuclear weapons which can be delivered on the Soviet Union by aircraft from carriers or land bases around the periphery of Russia.

The Soviets also have additional thousands of weapons which can reach Europe and China. Most of these weapons can be called into action instantly or on very short notice, and they are so powerful that just a few could cause disaster on a scale never imagined.

Now turn your thoughts to the political leaders of these countries and how they are dealing with the situation. Are they in close touch with each other, showing respect for each other's vital interests and great delicacy in treating the issues which might upset the nuclear applecart?

The honest answer is that they are doing no such thing. They are calling each other names. They are conducting the most frigid diplomacy imaginable and make no serious effort to reach an agreement on even the basic question of preventing a further spiral of the arms race. In fact, both sides are clearly girding themselves to run that race—testing new weapons and making decisions to build and deploy them.

Arms control has fallen to a very low priority. Unratified treaties, hitherto observed by both sides, are unraveling. Treaties which have long been in force, thus making the world a little safer, are being called into question.

In short, over the next several years we can expect a totally unrestrained nuclear arms race, coming on top of an already obscene overabundance of destructive power in the context of no real Soviet-United States communication and with grave suspicions of the most evil intentions on both sides.

Would you not agree that that situation was perilous?

I ask you to forget for a moment the history of the recent decades which have brought us to this pass. For it matters little who is at fault, and in any case I think the United States, under both Democratic and Republican Presidents, bears its share of the blame.

The real question is: Are you members of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee today doing everything humanly possible to make certain that every word, every gesture, every action of the U.S. Government is calculated to avoid disaster?

I know that you have raised questions about key appointments and have pressed on behalf of certain unratified treaties. However, in the cold light of today's realities, these actions are essentially palliative. You must think in much bigger terms. Intense, frank, and controversial hearings might be one tool if they lead to effective restraints on dangerous policy. In some cases, fiscal control is your best leverage.

I do not for one moment underrate the difficulties faced by the political leaders in working for orderly and sensible government, with one eye on a sometimes fickle electorate and the other on the knives in the hands of the political enemies in this city. However, the future survival of the United States should tower over politics.

The outlook for serious arms control has been so negative that the slightest sign of positive movement is greeted with unwarranted relief and optimism. The President has assured the country that he is approaching the resumption of the START negotiations with new flexibility. That is commendable and I hope the flexibility is combined with foresight and deep understanding of the issues.

But he is late. If he had demonstrated flexibility and understanding 2½ years ago, we might now have an agreement in sight, if not in hand. Instead, the prospect is that at best there will be some sort of informal understanding which may temporarily ease concerns but makes no permanent progress toward security from nuclear war.

Soviet-American treaties have been successfully made and adhered to. There has been no real evidence of major infractions on either side.

The members of this committee have the principal responsibility to offer perspective to the administration, to give it advice and not just consent, to challenge it when necessary, and to hold it to its promises. This committee has a great tradition for leadership. In the postwar years it developed a vitally needed bipartisan approach. It played an equally crucial role in challenging the conventional wisdom on Vietnam and held on to this issue with bulldog tenacity until a new consensus on Vietnam emerged.

Now the polls show that the American people, in their down-to-earth wisdom, understand that no matter how brilliantly contrived, nuclear weapons are good only for mutual suicide or for deterrence of nuclear attack. We know that we have more than enough for this purpose, and building more will simply continue the spiral and make us less safe.

The people are demanding action, and this places awesome and very uncomfortable responsibility on every committee member. Commonsense tells us that doubling the nuclear arsenal of either side would not increase the security of that nation materially, yet the administration advocates still more nuclear weapons.

A draft, strong conventional forces, and steps toward a healthy economy and lesser deficits—all of which would require real personal sacrifices—would demonstrate our national will and would be a more effective way of defending our freedom.

Arthur Vandenberg, a previous chairman of this committee, many years ago posed the question: is "the wit of man competent to deal with this murderous discovery?" The Congress and this committee must now take the lead in providing finally, after 38 years, that the answer is yes.

Thank you.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much, Ambassador Watson. We appreciate that a great deal. It is going to be very thought-provoking and I have a couple of questions for you on your testimony.

Mrs. Harriman, we are delighted to have you now testify in your own right.

## STATEMENT OF MRS. W. AVERELL HARRIMAN

Mrs. HARRIMAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I am pleased and honored to appear today with my husband before this committee.

Averell in his statement has given you a report on our meeting with General Secretary and now President Andropov. With that in mind, and rather than provide a second report, I would like to present several points of emphasis from my own perspective.

I found the General Secretary to be courteous, very firm and blunt. He appeared to be completely in command of the subjects we discussed. I had expected this from previous reports. Clearly, as in all such meetings, there were statements made primarily for their effect. I was impressed, however, with the consistent depth and extent of Mr. Andropov's concern over the dangerous course both nations are on today.

We may disagree with him about the causes of the situation and the culpability for it, but no impression that I took away from the meeting is more in my mind than the General Secretary's grim reading of Soviet-American relations.

He spoke of grounds for alarm. He spoke of the threat of a war incomparable with the horrors we went through previously, and of war through miscalculation. He spoke of moving toward the dangerous red line.

My impression was not of a man threatening war or mouthing platitudes. My impression—and I want to stress this—was of a man who sensed imminent danger and who feared that our two nations were moving in a direction which caused him and his country to feel increasing alarm.

Another observation I would like to make concerns the need for reciprocity and for moving beyond the sterile path of each blaming the other for where we are today. But we need more than reciprocity. We need mutual initiatives—not one side first and then the other, but both nations together; not diplomacy by public speech and press release, but quiet and serious diplomacy that can achieve a new direction in our relationship.

Relations between the United States and the Soviet Union have gotten to the point that it is difficult for either country to take the first step because each fears too much to be seen as backing down. If there is to be a compromise, then it must be mutual and taken in tandem—in other words, a step in common.

On the basis of our meeting with General Secretary, now President Andropov, I believe that such an opening is possible. He acknowledged the need for reciprocity by the Soviets and this theme of reciprocity was repeated in the Tass, Pravda, and Izvestia accounts of our meeting.

During Averell's talk with President Andropov I raised only one point—the matter of visits to the Soviet Union by leading Americans in government and politics. Specifically, I expressed the hope that the General Secretary would take steps to insure that Members of Congress, such as a group led by House Majority Whip Tom Foley due to arrive in Moscow on July 1, be recieved at the highest possible level and that such visits should be made as substantive as possible. His answer to this was yes.

Frank and instructive talk at all levels can do a great deal over time to remove misunderstandings on both sides and to bolster the political framework within which formal diplomacy proceeds and without which agreements reached can never be brought into full force.

Columbia University last year established the Harriman Institute to help create a new generation of scholars knowledgeable about the Soviet Union. Both Averell and I were gratified that the General Secretary specifically referred to this development. We hope that these initiatives will be supplemented by others in different parts of the country.

As I conclude my brief remarks, Mr. Chairman, let me say that the world becomes an increasingly dangerous place in which to live. The stakes are so great that we must not overlook any chance to improve the possibility of finding areas of agreement with the Soviet Union. I am convinced that opportunities exist today.

It is absolutely imperative that we seek to reduce Soviet-American tensions without lowering America's guard. We must be realists in the pursuit of peace, recognizing that while the Soviet Union may be our adversary, war itself is now the greatest common enemy of us all.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much, Mrs. Harriman.

Ambassador Watson, I would like to have a little further reaction from you on bipartisanship in foreign policy. You dealt with this committee in the past. You have made reference to the bipartisan spirit that has governed this committee in past years. I made note of it in an article I wrote for Foreign Policy magazine 2 years ago—the Vandenberg bipartisan foreign policy—and I would like to say that we have developed, because of the leadership of Senator Pell, a bipartisan spirit this past 2½ years.

We did have a tough vote on the nuclear question last year. We have to get a two-thirds vote from this committee for a treaty ratification that is on the floor of the Senate, and we did vote out a resolution that concluded by stating we should destroy every nuclear weapon. And over two-thirds of this committee, in a bipartisan spirit, supported that resolution.

Do you feel that the world would be safer if we just simply admitted that this deterrence buildup that we are constantly doing, with proliferation now to 16 countries attempting to build atomic weapons, is too dangerous, and we perhaps ought to start all over again, and, as this committee came down firmly, make our goal the destruction of every single nuclear weapon?

Ambassador WATSON. Senator, I do not think that is really possible. I think with the technology floating around that you would have to destroy so much more than weapons. You would have to destroy papers and books and things in libraries. I just do not believe that the weapon will ever be done away with.

I think we are going to have to learn to live with it, and if we could learn to live with it at much lower levels, the world would be substantially safer. But were we to do away with it—and I am confident that neither side would ever agree to do that—some third party would build one and hold us all at ransom.

So I am afraid that the direction we will have to take is learning to cope with it rather than destroy it. But to have 50,000 of them around is inviting an accident, if nothing else, and I think that the world at the moment cannot afford to have that high a risk.

I am really disturbed that the Government of the United States does not seem to put this at the priority at which I, just speaking for myself, put it. I am certainly not necessarily right. I hope, as I said in my statement, I am wrong, but, as I say, I think we are teetering on the edge of a cliff here and I see government as usual.

The CHAIRMAN. Ambassador Harriman has stated in his testimony that he feels that a meeting of the two leaders, President Reagan and President Andropov, would be desirable. You have characterized the relationship between our two countries as deteriorating and our two countries out of touch with each other, and our leadership out of touch with each other.

What would be your impression as to the desirability of a summit meeting? How soon do you think such a summit meeting could be properly prepared for, and should we push toward that objective?

Ambassador WATSON. Senator, I would put it in sort of an order—and this is off the top of my head—but I think the first thing we ought to establish on a bipartisan basis is the progress that we are really making in Geneva. Are we really negotiating in good faith and along the general lines that Kissinger and Nixon started, or are we off on some new adventure to try to negotiate from an entirely different point of view?

If it is the latter, I think a meeting would end up as sort of an argument rather than any effort to get agreement. So if you all on this committee, as you used to, are monitoring the START talks at both the strategic and the intermediate level, and if we are in fact making progress there and we have not set up insurmountable goals for the Soviet Union such as a total restructuring of their strategic arsenal, which has been in the newspapers from time to time, then I think it would be great if, based on just a little progress there, the two leaders got together, because they could speed that progress tremendously.

But to meet when our negotiators or if our negotiators are in a head-to-head lockup with the Soviets, I think that might be self-defeating.

The CHAIRMAN. With those caveats, I would like to insert, at this point in the record, the statement made by Warren Christopher before this committee this morning in another hearing unrelated to this, but in which I took the occasion with the former Deputy Secretary of State to put the same question to him—should there be a meeting—and I would like his statement to be a part of the record of this particular hearing, because I think it is an important statement that he has made on that subject.

[The information referred to follows:]

[Excerpt from a hearing on the Executive Council on Foreign Relations, June 16, 1983.]

* * * * * * *

The CHAIRMAN. I wonder if, while Warren Christopher is still here, I could ask him to come back for just a moment.

I would like all of us to think about a particular question. I do not know any better group or cross-section of this country that I could put this question to in an informal way, nor anyone better than Warren Christopher to draw upon his judgment, as I have so many times.

The question has come up as to whether or not the President of the United States should meet, one-on-one, face-to-face, in the same room, with the now-President, as of yesterday, of the Soviet Union and the man who holds the same power today, after 7 months, that Brezhnev did after 13 years in office. He has consolidated his power. He is the spokesman for the Soviet Union.

Both of these Chiefs of State really possess the power to destroy all life on this planet. They have that capability at hand. They are both subject to human frailities and they are subject to miscalculations and they are subject to all kinds of electronic mistakes.

I happened to be in a room at the time with Ambassador Tom Watson, who will be testifying this afternoon, at a time in NORAD when a false signal came in and all hell broke loose. They thought missiles were really coming at us.

That episode subsequently was inaccurately written up in Readers' Digest, The author of that story seemed to say that there was calm and peace, and they knew what they were doing. It was utter chaos. No one knew what they were doing, including us.

But the question has been, should they get together. Both governments have taken the position that we should wait until we have something really significant to announce, or decide, or sign. And the Soviets have said well, after all, President Ford and Brezhnev met when they signed Salt I.

I do not see anything in the immediate horizon of great significance that is going to be signable. I do not see much progress being made in many areas.

I think something has to happen. When things happen, they have to happen at the top. Then they start happening down below. You do not put the pressure from the bottom up. It comes from the top down, many times.

I know, in my own experience, we had a bitter relationship with a competitor when I took over as president of Bell and Howell in January 1949, a bitter relationship. Now, competition is good, but that relationship was not good.

The first week, I went over to see the head of this other company and asked what was the basis for this bitterness that existed between these two companies that had a lot in common to build an industry together.

He explained that it was a simple thing that went back years, to my predecessor, and we resolved it in five minutes and, though we competed heavily after that, there was not a word of bitterness uttered, and we worked together to expand the indudstry and strengthen the economy in many respects.

That was the first example I had, decades ago, that sometimes it is best to just sit down and talk and then not have so-called Soviet experts always telling the President what he should do, and advising him, and so forth. The President ought to get a gauge himself of who he is dealing with as an adversary and find out what we may have in common. We certainly have in common, at least, the preservation of the human race and life on this planet, and that ought to bring us somewhat together.

My question—this was a long prelude to it—under what conditions would you like to see, Secretary Christopher, the two Chiefs of State of the Soviet Union and the United States of America get together and have a face-to-face talk.

It is interesting, and I raise it in this context, because the Mayor of the town of Lawrenceville, Kans., wrote a letter to Andropov and said, I think you ought to meet with President Reagan. Why not meet right here in Lawrenceville, Kans., and I will be happy to host you.

It was not a brush off that was given. The Soviet response, as I recall it—and I will ask that we put in the record the response that did come forward as I cannot remember it very clearly, but it was something along the lines that they would be happy to consider summit sites if conditions for a summit can be worked out.

It was not an utter rejection, and here was, to me, the Mayor of that small town in Kansas emphasizing what a lot of people have emphasized to me, this is a dangerous world we are living in, and the reason the Freeze Movement, the reason the Ground Zero Movement, the reason so many movements have started from the people, and town hall meetings and so forth, is that they are not sure governments are moving fast enough to cope with some of these problems.

Mr. Secretary, would you care to comment on that noncontroversial subject and give us the benefit of your wisdom?

Mr. CHRISTOPHER. Mr. Chairman, I want to be careful not to be understood as making any kind of a political statement, or becoming involved in criticism of the President. My role here today would be quite undermined if my statement were seen along those lines and, indeed, I have tried, in private life, to refrain from that largely, because we had our chance and there is another chance now. So I do not want to be seen to be critical of either the President or Secretary Shultz.

With that prelude, I would say that I am deeply concerned about what I regard as a deterioration of United States-Soviet relations. It seems to me they have gone downhill very steadily since 1972 or 1973 at the height of détente. We probably expected to much of détente, but there is very little fabric left in the relationship at the present time.

The arms control discussions are about all that is left and we have three unratified treaties with the Soviet Union in the arms control field and that situation can only add, I would think, to the controversy.

There is a sequencing problem here that worries me very much. It is the one you referred to.

We wait to make progress until the two heads of Government can meet when, in fact, the fundamental condition for making progress may be that the leaders meet with each other and establish some rapport.

I think there is a tremendous opportunity now for President Reagan and Mr. Andropov to meet and to get acquainted with each other, to exchange positions. I think they can meet, particularly because they are both new on the world scene, they have not been together, without the need to have some dramatic event bringing them together.

Putting it in a broader frame, Mr. Chairman, since getting back into private life, I have been very puzzled as to why it is we do not have more regular meetings with our principal adversary so that we have some communication.

You know, there is an annual economic summit which we prepare for with our allies. We have annual meetings with a number of other countries, and yet we do not have any regular forum with the Soviet Union.

If we could establish some sort of a regular dialogue, then we would be in a situation where we did not have to have some great achievement in order to meet.

But I put emphasis on this sequencing question. You might call it, more colloquially, the chicken and egg problem, and I think we ought to get by that. We should at least have one meeting where they get to know each other and see if that will not, then, produce some results, because the present situation has led to a deterioration that deeply worries me.

I hope I can say that without injecting any kind of political controversy into the discussion.

The CHAIRMAN. I do not think you have any political connotation whatsoever. The reason I ask the question is that this group has had so much experience over the years with what can be done with personal contact——

Mr. MCCLEAN. I was just going to add, if I may, Mr. Chairman, that, of course, the Executive Council on Foreign Diplomats is important and the sharing of information and knowledge is important. We are not out, in our conferences, to reach agreement. We do not come out with white papers, or agreement papers. We are as able to disagree, at the end of our conference, as at the beginning, but we all come out much wiser and much better people for it.

I believe that the President of the United States, as another great American, can also do the same thing, and he has demonstrated that at Cancun and Williamsburg where no great achievements have been recorded for history, but I think a clear, better understanding has come out of those, and I think the President could do well in the East Bloc sector as well.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you, very much.

* * * * * * *

The CHAIRMAN. Now, may I ask this panel, all of you in the room, to respond, and I would like Merle and Donna Woodlow to vote as well, with a show of hands, would you favor, not immediately, but when an agenda can be adequately prepared that hopefully within a matter of months, not years, or put off the indefinite future, but hopefully, say, by the end of this year, or this year some time, or certainly early next year, not late next year, a meeting face to face with the two Chiefs of State of the Soviet Union and the United States of America.

All those who would, raise your right hand.

[A show of hands.]

The CHAIRMAN. All those who would oppose such a meeting, raise your right hand.

[A show of hands.]

* * * * * * *

The CHAIRMAN. That is a unanimous vote, and I am going to report that the National Security Council, to the President, and to the Secretary of State.* * *

* * * * * * *

The CHAIRMAN. I think in general we would concur that it is desirable to keep up communications and have them at the highest level. I just happen to believe that we are going to make more progress in Geneva if we do have a summit meeting and start to give directions and orders as to how fast those negotiations should proceed.

I would like to put a question to both of our distinguished Ambassadors on the nature of the freeze, the nuclear freeze. Perhaps first—well, either one of you can go first on it—a freeze in the production, deployment and testing of nuclear weapons has been proposed.

I would like to divide the question into two parts— whether a freeze is practical between the United States and the Soviet Union, whether we do have adequate parity of strategic forces so that we literally could freeze and then start to reduce with safety, as against a freeze in Europe which apparently is opposed by all 16 countries because they feel the Soviets have been building and building and building and they have not been, and they are just 6 minutes or so away.

They, all of them, are uniformly terrified. Not merely the demonstrators, but the governments also, are concerned about a freeze imposed upon them when the Soviets have been building and emplacing one SS-20, for instance, every 5 days. They feel they would be frozen at a great disadvantage.

So my question would be could we separate the two and could we impose a freeze between the United States and the Soviet Union on strategic weaponry with safety, and then work toward reductions, and separate that from the intermediate nuclear force proposals in Europe?

Governor HARRIMAN. Mr. Chairman, the question of a freeze is a complex problem. I have come out in support of a freeze, but also believe that it has to be negotiated, and the problems that you have indicated have to be considered in connection with a freeze.

So I do not think you should say you are for or against a freeze in the abstract. You have to negotiate a freeze which is in our interest and workable and in which our commitments to our allies are considered.

I am for taking any steps that are safe which would reduce the number of nuclear weapons that are being produced, so I do not want to be indicated that I am in any way opposed to that. But a freeze has to be negotiated and it has to consider all the factors which you have mentioned and which I have mentioned, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. Ambassador Watson.

Ambassador WATSON. I think that I would just parallel Governor Harriman's statement on that, except to say that we did at one time have an aim in our treatying of essential equivalence, and I think there is essential equivalence in the larger weapons, as defined by the Nixon-Kissinger initiation.

I think that the SS-20 has been a very difficult weapon, and I think the Soviets probably regret putting it in the field. At the same time, they have felt that we for 30 years have had them surrounded with our own peripheral weapons.

I am not sure that I can answer your question effectively, but I can say that a strategic weapon in the United States or in the Soviet Union is a strategic weapon clearly, but if you deploy an SS-20 on the Kamchatka Peninsula or in Yakutsk it threatens Alaska and some of the Northwestern United States cities and it therefore becomes a strategic weapon.

So I am afraid that if you tried to freeze just strategic weapons without having a part of that same treaty attending to the intermediate weapons that you really would not have a great deal. In fact, I think you might be favoring the Russians in doing that.

The CHAIRMAN. We have another vote on. It is the final passage of the supplemental appropriations bill that we have been working on for

2 weeks, and I have 2 minutes to get over there. Senator Pell is on his way back already.

I would like to leave with you one question which you can respond to just as soon as Senator Pell comes back. Ambassador Watson, and maybe both of you could respond to it, you have characterized, Ambassador Watson, a balanced United States-Soviet policy standing up to the Soviets when United States interests are at stake, but working with them when we can.

Apart from the obvious area of nuclear weaponry, what other areas occur to you as areas of mutual interest that we ought to be able to sit down at a summit meeting or in a series of meetings at lower levels and really work with the Soviet Union in finding answers to those common problems?

The meeting will be recessed for just a few minutes.

[A brief recess was taken.]

Senator **Pell** [presiding]. The meeting will come to order. At the request of the chairman, he asked that I resume the hearing and I believe he left in the air the answer to the question as to whether there were any other approaches that could better be used, and I believe that Ambassador Watson was just about to reply. Is that correct?

Ambassador **Watson**. Yes. My best answer to it is that in the first place I do no think we can have very good relationships with the Soviets without trying to reduce mutual suspicion. The Soviet-American relationship has been in the political arena for so long and politics have been mixed up with Soviet-American relations for so long that we built up tremendous mutual suspicions.

I suppose that Ambassadors back to 1933 or 1934 when we opened up the relationship have been trying to break those suspicions down. I think it would be great if we could understand the Soviets, perhaps, and have them understand us, and I think the Harriman Institute is a great step in that direction. But the Soviets really have not changed, as you know, Senator Pell, in a couple of hundred years, perhaps 300 years. It is just a new title for czarism.

In specific places, if the Senate was willing to set up a consistent policy on trade, we could certainly trade with the Soviet Union very profitably. We saw how important that trade was to Western Europe when we tried to stop the pipeline trade. We certainly could help them greatly and probably mutually in agriculture and in the past we have had very satisfactory cultural and artistic exchanges.

But we have to avoid being in a crisis all the time, and I think that that is very, very difficult. As a matter of fact, I think that if a bomb went off somewhere in the Middle East that had nothing to do with the United States or the Soviet Union—strike the area because that is not a very good area to use as an example—the Soviets and ourselves would effectively establish a crisis control within a period of 2 weeks.

As a matter of fact, in a briefing in Europe by NATO officers a general asked me one day when he ended up his scenario in the great, large strategic exchange, and everybody was destroyed, and I complained somewhat about that strategy, he said, well, don't you think, Mr. Ambassador, that there is a possibility that one of these bombs may go off in a Third World area and the ensuing destruction may shock everyone back into reality and we will do something about controlling the weapons?

I said I thought that was possible, but a pretty frail reed upon which to rest a policy. But the facts are that if a third party did use this weapon, we would be cooperating with the Soviets in a matter of hours, if not days, to save both our skins, and to not be able to do it before that is what must be very frustrating to you all as committee members, and certainly frustrating to all of us who watch it happen.

The CHAIRMAN [presiding]. Governor Harriman, I wonder if you would like to comment on this same question?

Governor HARRIMAN. As I understand the question, it was: Are there any other matters besides arms control that should be considered?

Of course, my reply to that is that there are: human rights is one of the important issues, and, as Mr. Watson has said, trade is a very important issue. Exchange between us is very important. I am very strongly for developing trade which would be beneficial to us as well as to the Soviet Union, and any agreement that we can reach, no matter on how small an issue, will help us reach agreements on other issues.

I think we should bear that in mind and I think we should be looking for ways in which we can come to agreement on some issue which will help us improve our relationship. All important is to improve our relationship, to remove suspicion, and to build confidence.

The CHAIRMAN. Would you think it helpful for us to have a long-term grain agreement with the Soviet Union now that four or five other countries have already signed long-term grain agreements?

Ambassador Watson, would you care to comment on that?

Governor HARRIMAN. Yes; I think it would be very good to have a long-term agreement. This business of its being used every year as a football is not good, and I think it would be excellent to have an agreement. It is very important for the Soviet Union, this movement of grain, and the movement of surplus grain from the middle west is also very important.

So I think you are right, sir.

Ambassador WATSON. I agree with that, Senator.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much.

Senator Pell.

Senator PELL. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I am particularly glad to be at this hearing. I did not have a chance to make an opening statement because of the votes, to say how glad I am that this hearing is being held to hear Ambassadors Harriman and Watson.

And also, as Ambassador Harriman knows and some of my colleagues may not know, it was just about 31 years ago this month that I resigned from the Foreign Service to be the deputy campaign director for Averell Harriman in his Presidential campaign. If we had been successful in that campaign, perhaps many of the problems that we are facing might be a little bit different. But in any case I am very glad to be here, joining in welcoming an old friend, Governor Harriman.

Yesterday at the hearing we had with Secretary Shultz he described his philosophy on American-Soviet relations and negotiations, saying that the only way to get a satisfactory deal is to make it clear we are not anxious for an agreement and are willing to forego it—in other words. not to appear too anxious.

Yet, as I recall, Ambassador Harriman, when you negotiated the Limited Test Ban Treaty in 1963, you got together with the Russians and made it quite clear in advance that President Kennedy and also the British wanted an agreement, and then, Governor, you negotiated hard with the Russians for 2 weeks and got one.

I was curious what your reaction was to this theory of Secretary Shultz that we must not let the Russians know we are eager for an agreement.

Governor **Harriman**. Senator, I think that what you gained in resigning to support me was probably one of the most unsuccessful actions that you have ever taken, but I would express again my gratitude for it. [Laughter.]

In regard to your question of how to negotiate with them and how to appear not too anxious, as suggested by the Secretary, I have found at certain times it was well to do the reverse.

I remember when I went to Moscow to negotiate the nuclear test ban for President Kennedy the press came up and asked me, how long are you going to be here? Well, the normal answer to that is always, well, the Russians are very difficut to get along with; it is going to take a long time. And I suddenly realized that if I said that, I would be stuck there for a long time.

So I took the reverse position. I said that President Kennedy was very keen to get this Limited Test Ban Treaty and if Mr. Khrushchev was equally keen as the President I think we could be out of here within 2 weeks. All the way through those negotiations the Soviets were pressing me whenever I had to wire to Washington and get some authorization for some changes in the agreement and they were pressing me and pressing me to get this agreement.

We initialed the agreement on the 13th day and I left Moscow on the 14th day. So that is the case in that particular case. I will not say it is the way you would always use, but in that particular case it was an exact reverse of what the Secretary suggested was the way to deal.

I think you have to have some understanding of the psychology of the situation and you have to give the Soviets, as well as anyone else you are negotiating with, a sense that you are honest and sincere. As I say, each case is different and I would not want to lay down any particular method of negotiating with them.

I have been negotiating with them now for nearly 60 years and that statement comes after quite a lot of negotiations.

Senator **Pell**. Thank you very much.

Now, Governor, another question on another subject. I know you have touched upon the Kennedy-Hatfield freeze resolution. Am I correct in saying that you would support it?

Governor **Harriman**. Yes. I have publicly stated that I am in support of it.

Senator **Pell**. Good. Thank you.

I would like to turn and ask the same question of Ambassador Watson and add, if I may for a moment, my admiration for him. I know that in the course of the last year I think twice now I have come across very prescient statements of yours that I have inserted in the Congressional Record in the vain hope that my colleagues would read them, and I admire you very much.

Do you support the Hatfield-Kennedy nuclear freeze resolution?

Ambassador **Watson**. I do, and I support it, having recognized that that freeze movement or freeze initiative provides for a freeze and quick treatying to parity, and I think you have to understand both sides of it, which I know you do, because all too many people are talking about just a freeze, and just a freeze, I think, is an oversimplification.

But I do indeed support the Kennedy-Hatfield bill.

Senator **Pell**. Mr. Chairman, do I still have a minute?

The **Chairman**. Of course.

Senator **Pell**. Finally, turning to Mrs. Harriman, if I may, a woman I think is always more sensitive and more observant sometimes than men are. When you were in Russia, did you get the feeling that there is a sense of worry on the part of people that we are entering into a perilous period, or did you get the feeling that we have in America that everything is going along hunky-dory, that this is a lot of talk and we do not really have to worry about a nuclear war.

Mrs. **Harriman**. Senator, we were there a very short time, as you know—3 full days in all—but all the people with whom we came in contact seemed very, very aware of danger, imminent danger.

Senator **Pell**. Would you, Governor, feel the same thing? Did you get the same reaction?

Governor **Harriman**. Yes; I had the same reaction as my wife.

Senator **Pell**. Would you, Ambassador Watson, feel that in the period when you were there several years ago that there was an equal sense of danger and peril, or do you feel that the sense of danger and peril has increased?

Ambassador **Watson**. I think that the conditions that pertained right after Afghanistan, although I thought they were terribly frigid, must be rather warm relative to the conditions that pertain in the relationship at the moment. However, I never spoke to a Soviet who did not refer to the 20 million people that they lost in World War II and the fact that war must not happen again. Whether propagandistic or from the heart, it was probably some in one case and some in the other, but it was certainly on the minds of everyone.

Senator **Pell**. Just as one Senator I know I share completely the views you both have. To my mind, we are in exactly the same situation as—and I saw it happen—when two sailing vessels in Rhode Island were on a collision course and neither put over the helm and one demasted the other and the other was bowed and this is the situation we are in today.

It is actions like yours in coming forward and people who believe in the peace movement across the country and the world that are our hope to prevent nuclear war. I just wish the peace movement in the Soviet Union had the same freedom to operate that we do here. I think we are getting to the stage where, as Clemenceau said, that war is too important to leave to generals.

So people are saying nuclear war is too important to leave to governments. They are taking the reins in their own hands. But it's not enough for the peace movement to succeed here; the same movement has to succeed in the Soviet Union as well.

The **Chairman**. Thank you, Senator Pell.

Senator Pressler. I might point out that Senator Pressler is chairman of the Arms Control Subcommittee, as well as Oceans. It covers three-fourths of the world and leaves the other fourth to the rest of the committee.

Senator **PRESSLER.** Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Governor Harriman, I want to thank you again. Before I went to Russia I came to your home and had lunch with you, and you were very courteous to me about a year and a half ago. And we had a picture taken that day and I put it in my newsletter. so you have been in a Republican's newsletter, and I hope you do not mind.

Senator **BIDEN.** He may not, but I do.

Senator **PRESSLER.** I have some questions on arms control, but, first of all, let me ask both of you—and especially you, Governor Harriman—do you believe the Russians are using yellow rain or chemical warfare anywhere in the world?

Governor **HARRIMAN.** I have no way of getting information of that kind and I would hate to suggest a personal opinion. I think that the Pentagon is the place to which I would go, if I were you, sir, to try to get some information on that score. I have none, and I hate to comment on a subject on which I have so little information. Although I would be disturbed about it.

It is such an important question but one on which I have little information.

Ambassador **WATSON.** Senator Pressler, I have very little information, but I did sit through Sverdlovsk and make some demarches to Gromyko on Sverdlovsk where anthrax was the issue. I think it is too bad to try these issues in public.

The Soviets are canny people. They are not pleasant under the conditions that we normally classify people as being pleasant under, but they are terribly proud. So it is a very difficult thing to approach them with an accusation if they are innocent. And if they are guilty, it is very diffcult to get them to admit it.

We do have the Standing Consultative Committee, which I am sure you know about. It is too bad, as far as I am concerned, that these matters are not disposed of there and then, if they reach an impasse there, brought out into the public. It seems to me that everything that we have at issue with the Soviet Union is tried in the press. And I said before you came in, I thought the politicizing of the Soviet-American relationship was one of the main reasons it had gotten to such a low point.

Senator **PRESSLER.** Let me ask Governor Harriman if he feels that MX flight tests, if they were done now, would complicate the START arms control process.

Governor **HARRIMAN.** That is a very complex question, sir. I would like to really study it. It is such an important question.

Without giving you an offhand answer, I do not see the complication that the MX would have on other negotiations. Whether it is a wise thing for us to go ahead with the MX is another matter, but I do not see that the discussions on MX would complicate anything else.

I am sorry, sir. There seems to be in this particular spot where I am sitting a resounding which makes it difficult for me to hear the questions. Normally I can hear quite well.

Ambassador **WATSON.** I would agree with Governor Harriman's answer on that. I could add nothing to it.

Senator **Pressler.** For some time, I have advocated the ratification of the Threshold Test Ban Treaty and the Peaceful Nuclear Explosions Treaty. I want to commend our chairman, for I believe it is his intention to hold hearings sometime later this year, possibly, on where these treaties stand.

But in any event, and indeed in recent testimony by David Emery, I think our administration is moving closer to approving these treaties. I believe, Governor Harriman, you were involved in some of the preliminary negotiations of these. How important is it, in your view, that these two treaties be ratified by the Senate?

Governor **Harriman.** I was not involved. as I remember, with this test ban treaty, but from the little I have heard of it and discussed it, I am in favor of it and I would hope that the committee could do everything you can to get it ratified.

I think it is a step in the right direction and I am not as fearful as some people are about the question of verification. It is important to be sure that some way or another we know what they are up to or doing, or else it is dangerous. But at the same time you take a risk in not going forward with constructive action, and that has a risk as well.

So you want to weigh the two risks of doing nothing or taking some steps which have a risk, and my feeling is that I would go forward and take a small risk because the Soviets do not want to be caught cheating. I am not saying that they would not be willing to cheat if they could get away with it, but they do not want to be caught cheating, and if we could be satisfied that we can catch them before too long, I would be in favor of it.

Senator **Pressler.** My final question involved the character of the Russian people. Let me say as a Senator and a citizen, I cannot understand how the Russians can get their people to sacrifice so much to pay for their military armaments. I cannot understand how they are willing to have such a low standard of living, although they are aware of higher standards of living.

They must be very inspired and they must believe they have the the larger purpose in life. They do not revolt. They go on making enormous sacrifices. Indeed, if we get into space wars with them, they have already got an ASAT up and we have the Enterprise. We are getting ready to put an ASAT up. It is going to cost between $200 and $300 billion to build a space system. That is more than our budget.

The Russians are doing it too, but what is it in the character of the Russian people or the system that makes them so willing to sacrifice and so willing to have such a low standard of living year after year to support this military state that they have?

I address that to both of you, Governor Harriman, first, and then Mr. Watson, second.

Governor **Harriman.** The Russian people have nothing to say about how large the military establishment is. They also have never had any independence in their lives and therefore do not understand the American determination to have freedom.

My answer to your question is, I do not think the Russian people have any standing or say in how big the budget is, and if they did, they would not be able to do anything about it. There are some dissidents that are ready to take risks, but most of the Russians are not willing to take risks, because if they do, they usually get into serious trouble and are punished for it.

Senator **Pressler**. But they have a dialog. They have information. They have literature. They have certain contacts with the West. There are tourists. They know that their standard of living is low. There are no signs of revolt or open dissent.

It never ceases to amaze me what inspires them that they believe so strongly in communism, but they seem willing to accept this. I just cannot understand why.

Governor **Harriman**. I think you would be very much surprised how little information gets to the Soviet people. I am always surprised at that. They do not get this information pouring in from the West. They do not get any information that is not fed out to them, that is not carefully analyzed before they get to know it.

And what always strikes me when I go to Russia is how little the Russian people really know what is going on in the world. As a matter of fact, many of them feel that their standard of living is so good and much better than it is in other countries. That is an amazing thing, but it is true.

Therefore, they are badly informed and are very appreciative of small favors and small improvements in their condition.

Senator **Pressler**. Mr. Watson, do you have any response on that?

Ambassador **Watson**. I thought of the same question a great deal, Senator Pressler. I think the country—it is a difficult country and it produces very unusual type people. It is a very young people. I think it is only six or seven centuries old. They have been kicked around unmercifully by the weather, by constant invasions from all sides, and they end up being a patient and docile people.

It took an awful lot to even get them to fight in World War II, you know. They had to be prodded into battle sometimes, and sometimes they were prodded into battle by propaganda.

But you say they are so willing, and I think Governor Harriman gave you the right answer there. They really are not willing. They do not have any choice and they are backed up by the threat of Siberia and by the most effective propaganda machine that I have ever seen in my life.

Senator **Pressler**. Mrs. Harriman, do you have any thoughts on that?

Mrs. **Harriman**. I agree with my husband.

Senator **Pressler**. Mr. Chairman, I want to put in the record my remarks on the Threshold Test Ban and the Peaceful Nuclear Explosions Treaties, the comments of Chairman Percy and David Emery in their exchange during his nomination hearing, the discussion on those two treaties, if there is no objection.

The **Chairman**. There would be no objection, I am sure, to that, and we appreciate very much your support on this.

[The information referred to follows:]

### STATEMENT OF SENATOR LARRY PRESSLER ON THE THRESHOLD TEST BAN AND PEACEFUL NUCLEAR EXPLOSIONS TREATIES

For a long time now I have advocated the ratification of the Threshold Test Ban (TTB) and the Peaceful Nucleear Explosions (PNE) treaties. These accords provide for major advances in arms control verification. They were negotiated and signed by two Republican presidents, Richard Nixon and Gerald Ford.

At the time of the Adelman confirmation hearings, differences on ratification of these treaties were, for me, key reasons for opposing the nomination. In May of last year, I wrote an Op-Ed article for the Washington Post explaining my endorsement of these two agreements. I ask that it be printed in the hearing record.

Recent testimony before the Foreign Relations Committee by Deputy ACDA Director David Emery and findings presented at a scientific meeting in Baltimore take the position that there is no clear evidence of Soviet TTB/PNE violations. The view is shared by specialists at the Livermore Nuclear Weapons Laboratory.

Views expressed by David Emery in reply to questions posed by Senator Percy at his confirmation hearing suggest that the United States would benefit from ratification of these accords at this time.

The TTB and the PNE treaties are not perfect accords. But their ratification would demonstrate that the United States is capable of completing the arms control process through ratification. More importantly, both accords set precedents on verification. The PNE is an arms control agreement which for the first time provides for on-site inspection.

We must seek to improve nuclear testing limitations in future accords. But unless we ratify these accords now, we cannot move forward toward improved agreements.

The one major modification that is desirable prior to ratification is the creation of a consultative mechanism for the TTB accord in which problems can be resolved. Such a mechanism is already contained in the PNE treaty. Given such a consultative procedure, many of the uncertainties we currently face in monitoring these test limitations might be removed.

At the arms control markup at the end of this month, I will offer an amendment endorsing ratification of these two treaties, given Soviet willingness to accept a TTB consultative commission.

I ask that David Emery's replies to Senator Percy's questions at Mr. Emery's confirmation hearing be printed in the hearing record, together with an article from Science summarizing the views of several leading seismis specialists.

---

[From the Washington Post, May 28, 1983]

## TWO TREATIES READY TO GO

(By Larry Pressler[1])

In moving toward a major breakthrough on strategic arms reductions, let us not forget the need for some modest but important steps in the interim. In this, consideration should be given to the ratification of two negotiated and signed accords limiting nuclear weapons tests, the Threshold Test Ban (TTB) and the Peaceful Nuclear Explosion (PNE) treaties.

The TTB and the PNE were negotiated and signed between 1974 and 1976 by the Nixon and Ford administrations. The TTB prohibits all weapons tests with yields greater than 150 kilotons. The PNE accord places the same constraints on so-called peaceful nuclear explosions. The Soviets have looked favorably toward PNEs and the United States has not. The United States has concluded that in most instances chemical explosives are sufficient for civil projects, and they avoid the radioactivity problems associated with PNEs. For this reason, the PNE treaty will have a greater impact on Moscow.

Some quarters in the bureaucracy advocate that we not ratify the TTB and PNE so that we can retain the option of testing high-yield weapons. But as Gen. David Jones, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, has indicated, there are no plans for such tests; nor is there any real need to conduct them. Assuring reliability of our current stockpile of weapons can be achieved under the 150-kiloton level. Moreover, the Soviets are in a better position to profit from a move toward high-yield testing than is the United States. Moscow has ready-made facilities for such tests; we would have to start from scratch. There are few guarantees that Congress would fund such a program if we rather than the Soviets initiated testing above the threshold.

More important still is the likely impact of the 150-kiloton level upon the Soviet arsenal. The Soviets have long held a preference for multi-megaton weapons. These agreements would, therefore, be far more restrictive on them. If doubts on weapons reliability arose, this would first occur in Moscow. In the long term, moreover, the agreements might add to strategic stability. As new weapons came on line, their warheads would have to be tested to assure reliability. Likely Soviet doubts on the effectiveness of untested weapons might act as an incentive to move away from monster first-strike warheads.

---

[1] The writer is a Republican Senator from South Dakota.

Perhaps the most important provisions in these agreements deal with verification. The TTB provides for the exchange of geological and other test-related data required to assure compliance. The PNE's verification provisions are unprecedented. For the first time, the Soviets have agreed to on-site inspection.

The Reagan administration has made Soviet cooperation on the exchange of military data and on instrusive verification a litmus test of Soviet sincerity in arms restraint. The president's important strategic reductions will depend on progress on these issues. The PNE and TTB offer Soviet concessions on both counts.

Support for ratification of these agreements has recently come from a broad spectrum of individuals, "hawks" as well as "doves." The group includes a stream of witnesses from the administration and the wider national security community who have testified before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee.

Since 1976 we and the Soviets have lived by these agreements—neither side has tested above the 150-kiloton level, and both have issued statements promising to adhere to the threshold as long as the other side does the same. But only ratification would bring the real benefits. Only then would the Soviets provide the data promised during negotiations and only then would they be bound to allow on-site inspection.

---

[Excerpt from the nomination hearing of David F. Emery, to be Deputy Director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, May 17, 1983]

The CHAIRMAN. A few weeks ago, I notice you traveled to the U.S. weapons laboratories to review the verification issues raised by the Threshold Test Ban [TTB] and Peaceful Nuclear Explosion [PNE] Treaties. These proposals are modest in content, but they have important implications for the future of arms control. I think they loom as a major symbol.

The TTB and PNE treaties set important precedents on onsite verification and military data exchange. Their ratification would demonstrate to our allies and the Soviets that the United States can implement signed agreements. It is for these reasons I have advocated movement on these two treaties for these several years.

I am delighted that you used part of your time since indications you would be nominated by the President in assessing these two agreements, and I will limit my questions to those two areas. Having examined the studies and data on Soviet weapons tests at U.S. weapons laboratories, can you tell us what conclusions have been drawn by the laboratories?

Mr. EMERY. Yes, I can, Senator. I have had an opportunity to discuss that issue, which is of concern to this committee. And I know of the work you have done over the years in promoting the principle of the nuclear test ban.

With the many questions that have been raised over the last several years about verification problems and limits of our technology, I went to talk to the scientists and engineers at the laboratories who have done much of this research, to determine for myself whether ratification would be in the best interests of our country. And the conclusion I have drawn is ratification would be in the best interest of our country, and I think that conclusion is by and large shared by the laboratories as well.

Without getting into great technical detail, there are some verification issues which are in need of further attention. However, I see no major obstacle to ratifying the treaties, and I believe on balance limiting nuclear testing to a threshold of 150 kilotons, with a margin of error that we understand is due to various technologies available to us, in fact would be an important service. It would be stabilizing and beneficial.

The CHAIRMAN. Are there any other conclusions you have drawn as a result of these with respect to TTB?

Mr. EMERY. I think it is important we limit testing capability. Certainly, if we take a look at the level of 150 kilotons, which is certainly a moderate level, if not a higher level than we might desire, the fact of the matter is it does substantially limit the capability of either side to test weapons in the megaton range or larger, which of course had been done with impunity until the time of the treaties.

Therefore, I think I can concur with the conclusion that most of the scientists came to, that insofar as certain important scientific analyses can be conducted adequately within the current bounds of the treaty, there is really nothing lost in terms of our scientific knowledge, and certainly at the 150 kiloton level we are relatively confident that no major scientific breakthrough can be denied us or given to the Soviet Union within the bounds of the verification abilities we now possess.

I think there are certain ways we might be able to strengthen the verification provision, certainly: the data exchange that has already been agreed to in principle, expanding the use of onsite seismology, onsite verification and other things that the Soviet Union and the United States may agree to in the future, maybe an informal exchange of documents to encourage a high level of confidence, and I think a system maybe similar to the SCC which is operative now with SALT I, that would allow the United States and the Soviet Union to regularly explore questions of mutual interest.

It may be a case where a test or a series of tests are requested by one side or the other. A forthcoming exchange of views may in fact eliminate many questions and result in not only sound and solid compliance for TTB, but could well lead to a foundation for a treaty that would be at a significantly lower level, which of course is the direction we would like to move in over a period of time.

So on balance, I would say that we have a great deal to gain, and I think that the limits of technology we are aware of at this point are sufficient to guarantee that our national interests will be served and we will be moving fundamentally in a safer direction that will move away from the expanding dangers of nuclear technology.

The CHAIRMAN. Pending ratification of the treaties, the Soviet Union has pledged to observe the terms of them. After visiting the laboratory and talking with the engineers, are you satisfied the Soviets are in fact complying with these two treaties, the terms of them?

Mr. EMERY. Senator, looking at the data is what I think we must do, not just listen to the opinions of one person or another. You have to look at the data. The conclusion you must draw is the data neither prove conclusively they have violated the treaty nor does it prove conclusively that they have not.

That is probably the most honest thing you can say. But the data is also quantified in such a way that we understand that by far and away the great majority of detonations that have occurred have been in a range which leaves little or no doubt that those particular shots have been within compliance.

Of course, statistically, if you look at the traditional bell-shaped curve, which we call in mathematics a Kelsian distribution, you will learn that there may be a few shots statistically which may appear on the extreme edges, one that appears to be either very high or very low. Of course, those exist and will continue to exist until we were able to narrow down that range of uncertainty, which of course is the major challenge for our seismologists, physicists, and other people, whose job it is to improve the technology by which we verify treaties.

But the sum and substance is, I am convinced there is no conclusive proof the Soviets have violated. And of course, as I said, there is a possibility they have, but that is unproven.

The CHAIRMAN. I will leave the record open so your answers to the next questions may be expanded. I have about three minutes left to make this vote and then I must speak with the Secretary-General.

First, in your view what are the benefits and/or drawbacks of ratifying the TTB and PNE treaties at this time, beyond what you have already said were the benefits or drawbacks? And what would be the implications of ratification for arms control in general if we did ratify them?

Mr. EMERY. Of course, as I mentioned, one of the obvious advantages is it would stabilize it. It would define the limits on the size of tests that can be conducted, so that certain horrible weapons will simply not normally flow from tests at low levels.

Without expanding on that, let me simply say that there is another area which I think is equally important. That is the question of good faith. We are facing a very difficult series of negotiations in this crucial area—the START talks, INF, MBFR, and undoubtedly others will follow. And I think it is essential that the United States and the Soviet Union look at each other's actions with a minimum of distrust and a maximum of faith, that when an agreement is signed the nations who sign the treaty will in fact follow through and not only observe them completely and totally, but will also support the spirit and letter of those agreements in that context as well.

Now, certainly when PNE and TTB were negotiated, scientific capabilities were not necessarily as good as they are today. It is fair to ask the question of whether or not, knowing what we know today, we would have negotiated these treaties the same way. Of course, that is idle speculation.

But the fact of the matter is, even in observing the mess we have, they have fundamentally assisted us in our ability to test. And I think if we go ahead and ratify these treaties and then work to improve the verification, which we also desire, we will demonstrate that when the United States puts its good name on the line for a treaty of this significance it can be counted on to follow through.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Chairman, I will ask my last question and let you be the recipient of the answer.

I would like to make a prediction that the hearing will not be nearly as long as that of Ambassador Adelman, and I am sure that will be received as good news by you.

Mr. EMERY. Indeed it will.

The CHAIRMAN. I see no objection to it whatsoever, and I would ask that this be reported out to take immediate action on the floor. I think it will be good for ACDA to have not only a very active and hard-working Director, but an equally active and hard-working Deputy Director in place. I congratulate you and the Administration once again.

The last question I will put and leave you before you answer is: The Soviets have rejected the Administration's approach on verification data. Can you tell the Committee why in your judgment the Soviets have taken this action and what you would recommend as the way out of this dilemma so that we can move forward?

Please excuse by absence.

Mr. EMERY. Mr. Chairman, before I answer that question, let me thank you very much for your support. Mr. Council and I look forward to a very close working relationship with you and your Committee.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. EMERY. In answer to the Chairman's question, I am very much aware that the Soviet Union and the United States have had a bit of a running dialogue on some of the verification issues in recent months, and I think the Soviet position, if I can interpret it, is they feel they have already negotiated a treaty and why go back to the drawing board.

Unfortunately, there are a number of questions and I think that we are going to have to pursue improvements in verification. But I think they can be accomplished without necessarily renegotiating the whole thing.

The Soviets have told us on a number of occasions that once we saw the calibration data, once we saw their analysis of the geology in the test areas, that many of our questions will be satisfied, and that may well be. But I do not think anyone is willing to accept the Soviet word on those provisions simply at face value, and I think it is important that we set up a method of probing, analyzing and asking questions to satisfy ourselves that the information they give us is in fact accurate, and I think that is a very reasonable provision that we might expect to develop.

I would also note that the PNE Treaty includes a provision for a consultation, if you will, a consultative organization that will review the questions of this sort from time to time, so that both the United States and the Soviet Union can be satisfied that the answers it is receiving and the tests that are being conducted do indeed apply to the treaty and are factually accurate.

That provision does not exist in the TTB and the Soviets have agreed in principle on a closely related matter. It seems logical that we might be able to encourage them, even in an informal way, to do this on the other one. I do not think that is an unreasonable request. I think that is one option we may wish to pursue.

I discussed this with the Chairman earlier and I think I can say that he generally agrees there are many other things of that nature we can do that will enhance verification without opening up the touchy diplomatic question of going back to the drawing board on the treaty that both sides have been unilaterally observing since it has been negotiated.

[From Science, vol. 220]

## SCIENTISTS CHALLENGE CLAIMS OF SOVIET TREATY VIOLATIONS

(By R. Jeffrey Smith)

The Reagan Administration's judgment that the Soviet Union has violated the Threshold Test Ban Treaty came under renewed attack at a recent meeting of the American Geophysical Union. A number of prominent seismologists, including Lynn Sykes of Columbia University and Charles Archambeau of the University of Colorado, presented studies to support their conclusion that the Soviets have not exceeded the 150-kiloton nuclear testing limit. "The Russians are essentially in compliance, as far as we can tell," Archambeau said.

Although no formal charge of cheating has been lodged with the Soviets, President Reagan has stated that "we have reason to believe that there have been numerous violations" of the treaty (*Science*, 13 May, p. 695). He might have changed his mind after hearing the speakers in Baltimore on 2 June. "Based on what I heard this morning, I think we have a hard time justifying statements that the Soviets are cheating," said Bernard Minster, a Defense Department seismological consultant. "After listening to the presentations . . . most people would agree that you cannot assert that the Soviets have violated the treaty," said Rober North, another consultant.

Support for Reagan's claim was expressed by Ralph Alewine, director of the geophysical sciences division at the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA), and Thomas Bache, a program manager who works for Alewine. They said that the Soviets have detonated nine bombs above the 150-kiloton threshold since the treaty was signed in 1976.

But Alewine conceded that six of these apparently fall between 150 and 200 kiloton and are therefore not of serious concern. "They could be due to miscalculations on either side," he said. Two apparently fall between 200 and 250 kilotons, and one is apparently just over 300 kilotons.

Alewine described the latter detonations as being "egregiously above the limit." But he noted that the Soviets would be well within their rights "if they just said sorry we made a mistake." A provision of the treaty permits one or two accidental breaches of the threshold per year. Eugene Herrin, a seismologist at Southern Methodist University who chairs a DARPA advisory panel, has argued that all of the apparent Soviet violations could be due to such accidents, U.S. miscalculations, or both.

In any event, similar accidents occur at the U.S. test site, albeit less frequently. Alewine and Bache reported that in the same period two tests in Nevada have exceeded the treaty limit by 33 and 75 percent, respectively.

Milo Nordyke, who directs the verification program at Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory, where the bulk of the government's analysis is conducted, said after the AGU meeting that "DARPA, which takes the most conservative view, certainly seems to be in the minority. Of course, with the conservative view, you automatically get some evidence of Soviet violations. But you have to use the best estimate, not the most conservative one. This is a message that the politicians in Washington have a hard time understanding."

The CHAIRMAN. I have advised the administration that we must have positive answers as to how we can proceed with these two treaties, one of them signed by President Nixon, one of them by President Ford. I have received communication from both former Presidents of the importance that they attach to our signing these treaties in the national security interest of the United States of America, much less a symbolic movement forward.

Unless we do get a positive answer within a very short period of time, a couple of weeks, we will hold hearings on those treaties right here and take action ourselves, and I will ask the Senate Foreign Relations Committee to take action on them.

Thank you very much. Senator Biden.

Senator BIDEN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mrs. Harriman, Governor, Ambassador, I apologize for being late. I know you have been here a good while already. Let me pursue only one line of questioning and the paramount concern for me, and that is the question of intent—the intent of both the United States and the Soviet Union to actually reach an agreement on arms control.

I am somewhat concerned that the way in which we have structured or circumtances have structured the negotiating process could lead one to believe that the intent for an agreement in the near term is in fact lacking. Let me be more specific.

The fact that we have two separate negotiations ongoing—the INF discussions and the START negotiations—seems to me to increase the prospect of delay rather than enhance the prospect of an agreement. As a practical matter, it seems to me that we are not going to be able to make much real progress unless the two negotiations are in effect combined, because in INF we can argue about the French and the British nuclear forces, which total not a great deal compared to the Soviet-United States forces, and although in the INF discussion they stand out as a major item.

If they were folded into the overall central systems negotiation—the START negotiations—they might not be as insurmountable a question as they appear to be in the theater discussions. That is a long preface for a short question, and the question is this.

Would all of you comment on whether or not you believe that the present structure of the negotiations diminishes the prospects of significant arms control in the near term?

Governor HARRIMAN. I do not believe so. I do not see where they interfere. Do you want to comment?

Ambassador WATSON. I think so. I think it depends, Senator Biden, on what the basic intent of the administration is, and I have been unable to determine that, although I read as much as I can and talk to as many people who are involved as I can.

My own tendency toward organization in business would be that it would move faster if it was under one head, particularly since the two weapons flop over into each other's areas, and one becomes strategic and the other becomes tactical depending upon what the local situation is and how you deploy them.

But I think the basic problem is that the technology, as you know, is moving awfully rapidly and I do not know whether the negotiating process is moving forward or backwards. But if it is moving forward, it certainly is moving at a snail's pace. It is very difficult for me to see what the movement is.

Senator BIDEN. I agree with your assessment and your concern, Mr. Ambassador. As a matter of fact, that brings me to a second point.

There are, I guess you could say, four schools of thought. One, there is a distinct minority that suggests that regardless of what the Russians do we should move to diminish our reliance on nuclear weapons; a second that suggests that you cannot ever deal with the Russians anyway, you cannot trust them, so the only thing to do is to build.

And then the majority view that there is a need for arms control seems to split into two camps—those who say, as the administration is saying, and I hope they mean, that we need massive significant breakthroughs on arms reductions and we want to take the big, giant step, and those of us on the other side, in my case, who have been involved not as long as Senator Percy or either of you gentlemen at the table, but as long as my colleague from North Carolina, who I suspect draws a different conclusion than I would, which is that arms technology is so rapidly outstripping the negotiating process that unless we move in smaller steps for a series of interim agreements that do not affect the entire relationship but have as an agenda, if you will, moving toward a goal, but keep gradually cutting down the reliance on nuclear weapons on both sides.

Unless we take small steps, technology is going to exceed the ability of negotiators to arrive at any significant conclusion. So my question is, are you of the big-step or the tiny-step school these days, as I have characterized it or, as Ambassador Adelman says, when we discussed this he said, "Senator Biden, you want to take baby steps; I want to take giant steps."

Well, I characterized it slightly differently, but the point is, would you favor agreements that are not as comprehensive but can be achieved rapidly, or would you wait for the big hit, for that big agreement that is going to substantially reduce? What is your attitude about the negotiating process along those lines?

Governor HARRIMAN. That is a very general question, sir. My opinion is, my general opinion is, that it is easier to take small steps than big steps. On the other hand, if you take big steps, why you really achieve something.

My feeling is that our relations with the Soviet Union are such that I would like to see the maximum number of discussions and the maximum number of agreements reached. So I would be for the smaller steps as being in the long run the most useful. Perhaps in a few years we would be able to take the large steps.

In the nuclear test ban, as I have described it, we took a long step and we took it rather rapidly, but that was through the good fortune of the situation and I think you have to take each case on its own merits.

But you have asked a specific question. I would generally be for the small steps, for the many small steps, rather than to shoot for one big one.

Senator BIDEN. Thank you, Governor. Ambassador?

Ambassador WATSON. Senator Biden, I must say that I find myself quite pessimistic at the moment and, therefore, I would say that I would be for any steps at all. I do not really see that we are making any steps in this discretion.

In that connection, if I could, I would like to suggest that we have had the Standing Consultative Commission to monitor treaties over there for many, many years. There are still alive the chairmen of that committee, perhaps several chairmen, but Robert Buchheim presided over the last, from 1976-on. He probably has been before this committee.

You have in Governor Harriman a great Soviet expert. You have Ambassador Smith in this town. You have Ambassador Earle in this town, and you have Ambassador Scoville in this town. Now they all may be of one political persuasion or another—I do not know what any of them are—but they have had head-to-head on-line relationships with the Soviet Union and come out with concrete results.

It would seem to me that to not talk at length with those people to reestablish the fact that you can indeed negotiate with the Soviets. They are difficult. They are, by our criteria, they do not meet the way we would like to have them perform, but to run additional risks at world annihilation with a past record of being able to make agreements with them, and certainly the Standing Consultative Commission is in a position to tell you whether or not they have abided by, it seems to me is not correct.

Perhaps you have talked with Bob Buchheim and I believe he is even a Republican, which might endorse him more so than myself. But, in any case, you have a wealth of experience around here on Soviet-American negotiations, and the facts are that difficult though they are, they want to live just as much as we do.

So I am for your small steps, working into large steps, and I would just like to see any step. I think it is going to be awfully hard for the President, given the conditions we have now and 18 months left in the first term, to get any specific step. I would be awfully excited if we made a single step, a single small step.

Senator BIDEN. Thank you very much.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you, Senator Biden.

Senator Helms, we are delighted to have you join us.

Senator HELMS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I express my regrets at being late. We had a markup in Agriculture. We still have to eat in this country, so we marked up a dairy bill and some other legislation.

I appreciate your calling on me. At the outset, let me suggest to my good friend from South Dakota that the answer to his question about why the Soviet people are willing to "sacrifice" might best be answered by Alexander Solzhenitsyn, who happens to be a pretty good friend of mine, and the next time he is in Waashington, if you would be interested, I will see if I can work it out so that you can hear his version of why they are willing to be so sacrificial. I will give you a hint—the KGB.

Now, Governor and Ambassador, and particularly you, Mrs. Harriman, I am delighted to see all three of you. Let me address this whole negotiating process involving the Soviet Union and the United States.

I think the first question I would ask, and I think it is a most relevant one, is it or is it not valid for any administration, whether it be the Reagan administration or the Carter administration or whatever, to insist on verification? Is that not a fair and valid basis on which to begin negotiations?

Ambassador WATSON. Is that a question to me, sir?

Senator HELMS. Either one of you, sir.

Ambassador WATSON. Yes, sir; it is a very valid requirement and as far as I know we have made no treaties with the Soviet Union that are not amply verifiable.

Senator HELMS. Well, of course, "amply" is a subjective word.

Ambassador WATSON. Well, the Joint Chiefs of Staff indicated that SALT II is verifiable, sir.

Senator HELMS. Let me go back in history just a little bit. Probably the only arms control agreement—not a treaty, but an agreement—

that has ever been implemented effectively and demonstrably was the Kennedy-Khrushchev agreement. At least a shooting war was avoided there, and history has properly recorded the courage of John F. Kennedy in connection with that.

The problem is that the Soviets are said to be—by the top echelons of our Government—violating the Kennedy-Khrushchev agreement. Leave out Afghanistan and all the horrors going on there and all the rest of it, but we are talking about our front yard—Central America.

I am wondering if you agree with the assessment early last year by the Director of the CIA, by the President of the United States, by the Security Council, that the Soviet Union is indeed violating the Kennedy-Khrushchev agreement. I am talking about the Bear bombers in Cuba.

Ambassador **Watson**. While the Governor is making sure he heard the statement, I will tell you my answer and it is quite simple.

I believe that if they are violating that agreement that we ought to take some steps to prevent it. I have not seen a specific statement which stated unequivocally that they are violating it, but if they are violating it we should certainly take action.

Governor **Harriman**. I have no basis for questioning whether they are violating these agreements or not.

Senator **Helms**. I am sorry, sir. I did not understand you.

Governor **Harriman**. I think it is interesting, if I may use this as an example, that President Kennedy picked the question that he wanted to have answered in Cuba, and as a result of that he got a good decision. He picked the easiest question which was put to him and dealt with that and was able thereby to get agreement.

If he had gotten involved in all of the questions that were before us, he would not have gotten anywhere. I thought it was one of the very successful things that President Kennedy did.

Senator **Helms**. What would your priorities be, Mr. Ambassador, if you were the chief negotiator for the United States with respect to nuclear weaponry? Where would you begin and what would be the No. 1 priority with the Soviet Union?

Ambassador **Watson**. What would my target be?

Senator **Helms**. Your priority.

Ambassador **Watson**. I think that I would have to take the whole arsenal together, and my priority would be to simply begin to reduce the numbers at whatever point that the Soviets and the United States felt that we could most easily reach some sort of an accommodation, whether it be at the top or the bottom. I am not privy enough to the negotiations.

Senator **Helms**. To start somewhere?

Ambassador **Watson**. To start somewhere.

Senator **Helms**. The acoustics in this room are not the best. You may have difficulty hearing me, and we have difficulty hearing the witnesses from time to time. But did I understand you correctly to say that you did not understand what the administration's policy is with respect to arms control negotiations?

Ambassador **Watson**. I think I said something of that type, yes, sir. I suppose that the record will show it and probably it was an injudicious thing to say, but I occasionally do that too. It is difficult for me to understand what we are trying to do because we started with the understanding that, as I understood and read the papers, it was impossible to negotiate with them.

And then we waited quite a while and then we started a couple of negotiations which, it seems to me, have gone painfully slowly. So in light of those three things, which I think are close to facts, it is difficult for me to understand what the administration's policy on arms negotiation is.

As a matter of fact, I think the administration has done so terribly well in so many areas that a clear statement of where they are going on arms control would be an awfully useful thing for the country, it seems to me, right now.

Senator HELMS. We have a vote on and I have to leave, but I would like to ask if you know Ed Rowny.

Ambassador WATSON. Yes; I know him well.

Senator HELMS. Have you talked with him about it?

Ambassador WATSON. Have I talked with him lately?

Senator HELMS. Have you talked with him about the administration's policy?

Ambassador WATSON. No, sir, I have not talked with Ed Rowny since I got out of the government.

Senator HELMS. I hope you will, because we can differ on this approach or that approach, but it strikes me—and I am not saying this about you—but I see so many cheap shots at the President and on this whole policy. Now I for one am grateful that the President of the United States is not willing to give away the store. He, after all, was elected President. He is entitled to make a judgment about the ground rules that will be reasonably adequate from our side of the table.

To tell you the truth, Mr. Ambassador, I am always fearful, and have been for years, when we sit down to negotiate with the Soviets because they are smart negotiators and they don't have the slightest intention to give up anything that they do not have to give up. I think we ought to be equally hardnosed.

Now you can be hardnosed in a pleasant sort of way. You do not have to build a barrier, but I believe if you will talk to General Rowny and others you will find that there is a genuine desire to accomplish something.

In any case, I have to go vote. It is good to see all three of you. I had the pleasure of having dinner one night with your son, a most attractive young man.

Mrs. HARRIMAN. Thank you.

Senator PELL [presiding]. Thank you, Senator Helms. I am going to have to go over and vote in a second myself, but I want to hold the fort for the chairman, who is coming right back.

I think the chairman's intent is to close the hearings out about 4:15. I would be anxious to have a comment on one more point—and you must not think me rude if I leave, but the vote is going on now. Do either of you, Governor Harriman or Ambassador Watson, have any specific last nugget of advice to us in the Senate how we can help along the course that you wish?

I will ask Ambassador Watson first.

**Ambassador Watson.** I think that your committee, Senator, should examine—Senator Helms suggested that I talk with General Rowny, which I have done at great length over a period of 3 years when I ran the General Advisory Committee and went to Geneva every 3 or 4 months and saw you there a number of times.

I think you ought to examine the changing of the base structure of negotiation which was set up by President Nixon and Kissinger as we have evolved into this administration. I do not think you can change the ground rules with the Soviets and accomplish very much. So we have a new administration and the ground rules were all switched around, again we will move into further nuclear peril.

I think one of the things you could do that would be awfully useful to the country would be to set up a set of ground rules satisfactory to the Senate and stay with them. If you do not like the Nixon-Kissinger rules, set up some other ones. But we have new definitions now which change the definitions that we have abided by for 10 or 12 years.

**Senator Pell.** Thank you very much.

**Governor Harriman.** Senator, I would think to press for negotiations for, if I might suggest it, any negotiations, are good. I am not one of those who believes that you cannot negotiate and cannot be successful in negotiations, because it is clear that we have been successful in the past and any negotiations are important.

It is very dangerous to leave the Soviets thinking that we do not care about what goes on. It does make a tremendous difference, as has been brought out in this testimony, and the dangers are great. Therefore, I am for any negotiations that can be started.

**Senator Pell.** If you will forgive me, I have 3 minutes to make my vote, so I have to depart. The chairman does want to, I know, conclude the hearing. He will be here in a moment, so I must recess the hearing at this time.

[A brief recess was taken.]

**The Chairman** [presiding]. I think probably we would conclude, Governor Harriman, that this is not the way to run a railroad. You would never run IBM this way—to hold a hearing at a time we happen to have a supplemental appropriations bill on the floor and Senators had to be there, and just going back and forth is extremely difficult.

But I do want to tell you that an interesting thing happened. We have been having votes for weeks on the pay of the U.S. Senators. It is on the supplemental appropriation bill. I just do not think it ought to be on that bill and I have been voting steadily against it.

But when I went to the floor about three votes ago it was an even split, and my vote was the deciding vote, and two of my colleagues came up to me who are among our most valued Senators and said that we have a pay increase—and there was a 30-percent cap on honorariums—a pay increase to the same level as the House. We have not had a pay increase here for 4 or 5 years and the House is paid now $10,000 a year more than the Senators are.

So two Senators said to me unless we get this increase we are going to have to leave the U.S. Senate. And if I told you who they were you would agree that they are among our most valued Senators. They live right on their Senate salary. I voted for it and my campaign committee has just resigned. [Laughter.]

But at least you are 1 of 100, but occasionally, like the Vice President when he casts a vote on a split vote, occasionally your vote really counts.

We had hoped to have other former U.S. Ambassadors to Moscow with us today, but many of their schedules did not permit this.

One of this distinguished company, George Kennan, delivered a most thoughtful address on "The State of the United States-Soviet Relations" to a meeting of the American Committee on East-West Accord last May 17 here in Washington. I ask unanimous consent that the full text of Ambassador Kennan's remarks on that occasion be inserted in the record of these hearings.

[Ambassador Kennan's address follows:]

### "THE STATE OF U.S.-SOVIET RELATIONS," ADDRESS BY THE HONORABLE GEORGE F. KENNAN BEFORE THE AMERICAN COMMITTEE ON EAST-WEST ACCORD, WASHINGTON, D.C., MAY 17, 1983

I am moved to recall that it is just 2 years since I last spoke publicly in this city. The occasion then was the conferring of the Albert Einstein Peace Prize, and the subject treated was the nuclear arms race.

What I should like to talk about today is the Soviet-American relationship in its wider, and primarily, nonmilitary aspect.

As we all know, Soviet-American relations, in consequence of a process of deterioration that has been several years in the making, are today in what can only be called a dreadful and dangerous condition. Civility and privacy of communication between the two governments seem largely to have broken down. Reactions on both sides to statements and actions of the other side have been allowed to become permeated with antagonism, suspicion, and cynicism. Public discussion of the relationship has become almost totally militarized, in this country at least—militarized to a point where the casual reader or listener could only conclude that some sort of military showdown was the only conceivable denouncement of their various differences—the only one worth considering and discussing.

Can anyone mistake, or doubt, the ominous meaning of such a state of affairs? These phenomena—the ones I have just described—when they occur in the relations between highly-armed great powers, are the familiar characteristics, the unfailing characteristics, of a march towards war—that, and nothing else.

I do not have to point out the immensity of the danger this spells. The danger would be intolerable even if the two countries were armed only with what are called conventional weapons; for the history of the past century has shown that the damages produced by armed conflict between highly industrialized great powers in the modern age, even without the use of nuclear armaments, are so terrible that it is doubtful whether Western civilization could survive another such catastrophe. But the danger is now multiplied many times over by the nature of the weapons the two countries hold in their hands. While either of these two factors—the nature of the weaponry or the state of the political relations—would be a danger in itself, the two in combination present a shadow greater than any that has ever darkened the future of Western civilization. And how anyone can be complacent in the face of this situation exceeds my comprehension.

There are two questions to which I should like to address myself in these few moments we have together today. The first would be: is this state of the relationship necessary and unavoidable from the standpoint of the American policymaker—is there no way we could avoid it, and no way we could cope with it, other than by a continuing and intensified weapons race of indefinite duration? And the second question is: if this is not the case, what is there that we can do about it?

There are those in this city who would argue, I know, that this situation flows automatically from the nature of the regime that confronts us in Moscow and is therefore unavoidable. And to support that view they would point to a given image of that regime. It is an image largely of their own creation and their own cultivation. We are all familiar with it. It is an image of unmitigated darkness—the image of a group of men already dominating and misruling a large part of the world and motivated only by a relentless determination to bring still further peoples under their domination.

No rational motivation is suggested, as a rule, for this allegedly unbounded and unquenchable thirst for power. The bearers of it, we are allowed to conclude, were simply born this way—the products, presumably, of some sort of a negative genetic miracle; but in any case, being born this way and unable to help themselves, there is no way they could be reasoned with—no basis on which they could usefully be approached—no language they could be expected to understand—other than that of intimidation by superior military force. Only by the spectre of such a force—a nuclear force, in particular—could these men be "deterred," as the phrase goes, from committing all sorts of acts of aggression or intimidation with a view to subjugating other peoples and eventually conquering the world. There are, we are given to understand, no other inhibitions, no other considerations, no other interests, that could be expected to restrain them from such aggressive behavior.

Well, this image, if applied 30 to 40 years ago to the regime of Joseph Stalin, might not have been far from reality, but as applied to the Soviet leadership of the year 1983, it is grotesquely overdrawn, a caricature rather than a reflection of what really exists, and one which is highy misleading as a foundation for national policy.

The Soviet regime, born in the agony of the First World War, reflected from the start the profound estrangement of Russia from the Western world which that agony, and the resulting Russian Revolution, brought about, and has always been marked by a whole series of characteristics which complicate its relationship to Western powers. Some of these were inherited from the Tsarist empire of earlier centuries. Some betray, although in a much modified form, the militant antagonism toward non-Communist countries that was so prominent a feature of the Marxist-Leninist ideology of the early revolutionary period. There are traces, too, unfortunately (also, thank God, greatly modified) of the baleful influence once exerted on the Soviet regime by the years of Stalinist terror. But whatever their origins, there are indeed a number of characteristics of the present Soviet regime that make it a difficult one for us to deal with; and I do not know anyone familiar with that government who would deny this.

It has, for example, a high general sense of insecurity, a positively neurotic passion for secrecy, a marked sensitivity to conditions in border regions, and a tendency to overdo in the cultivation of armed force.

And as one of the consequences of this passion for secrecy, it has a positive obsession with espionage, in both the offensive and the defensive sense—an obsession that often gets in the way of normal and relaxed relations with other countries.

Its negotiating techniques tend to be, particularly for those not familiar with them, stiff, jerky, secretive, unpredictable, and above all, lacking in the useful sort of natural lubrication that comes from informal personal associations and exchanges among negotiators.

And then there are, too, specific policies that grate severely on Western sensibilities. The Soviet leaders do indeed make efforts to gain influence and authority among the regimes and peoples of the Third World; and while the methods they employ do not seem to me to differ very greatly from those of other great powers, including ourselves, and while the efforts in this direction have not met, generally speaking, with any great measure of success, I understand that these practices arouse alarm and indignation in large sections of our official community.

And then, of course, there is the fact that these leaders insist on maintaining a monopoly of political power in their own country and proceed harshly against those who appear to challenge or threaten that monopoly or even try to liberalize the political system; beyond which, they unquestionably use their military hegemony to support and to maintain in power in Eastern Europe regimes similarly inspired and similarly resistant—or almost as resistant—to liberalizing tendencies. All this, admittedly, is a constant thorn in the flesh of much Western democratic opinion.

And finally, while we are speaking of the difficulties, let us not forget the phenomenon, with which all foreign representatives and observers in Russia are familiar, of the curious dual personality which the Soviet regime presents to the outside world: the facade, that is composed of people—often amiable, and charming people—authorized to associate and communicate with the outside world; and behind that facade, never visible but always perceptible—felt, in other words, but not seen—the other, inner, conspiratorial personality, of whose inscrutable attitudes and intentions the foreigner is never quite sure, and which for that very reason probably incurs more suspicion than it deserves.

Now these, altogether, are formidable difficulties. Of course, they limit the relationship. And of course, they have to be taken into consideration by Western policymakers.

But there are three things I should like to say about them.

First, most of them are not new. Some have been there since the very outset of the Soviet-American relationship. All of us who have served there have had to contend with them. We were taught to regard them as part of the problem. And General Marshall, I recall, used to say to us: "Don't fight the problem."

Second, most of these difficulties are actually less acute than they were many years ago.

And third, they are counterbalanced by a number of more encouraging factors.

Of these latter, the most important consists of the many persuasive indications that the Soviet leadership, however complicated may be its relations with the West, does not want a major war—that it has a serious and primary interest in avoiding such a war, and will, given a chance, go quite far with us to avoid it.

By an "interest" I do not mean an abstract devotion to the principle of peace as a moral ideal. I mean a consciousness that certain things they most deeply care about would not be served by another great war. I cannot take time here to elaborate on this point. I believe that anyone who tries to put himself in the position of the Soviet leaders will at once see the force of it. Even if these men should be as evilly motivated as they are sometimes perceived to be, they are not free agents, wholly detached from the manifold complexities and contradictions that go with the exercise of great power. They constitute the government of a great country. They have a direct responsibility for the shaping of its social and economic life. It is from this society, and from the successful development of this economy, that they derive their strength. They cannot play fast and loose with either. Beyond which, they live and operate in a highly complicated international environment. There is no single consideration—there are a thousand considerations, and these quite aside from any so-called military "deterrence"—which would serve to dissuade them from any thought that their interests could be served by opening the Pandora's box of another world war. The view that sees them as so totally independent, so wholly on top of all their other problems, and so madly rivetted to dreams of world conquest, that it is exclusively by the interposition of an overwhelming opposing military force that they could be dissuaded from striking out in any and all directions with acts of aggression or intimidation—this view, which incidentally, seemed to me to permeate every page of the recent report of the President's commission on strategic missilery—is, if you will excuse my language, simply childish—inexcusably childish—unworthy of people charged with the responsibility for conducting the affairs of a great power in an endangered world. Surely we can do better than this in penetrating, with our imaginations and our powers of analysis, the true complexity of the forces that come to bear on the decisions of another great government and in forming a realistic idea of the motivation of its conduct. And surely, if we were to make this effort, what we would then see would be more reassuring than what, in the absence of it, we are led by our fears to assume.

And the area of common interest between the Soviet Union and ourselves is not limited to the need of both powers to see world peace preserved. Both are great industrial powers. As such, they have numbers of other common problems. Prominent among these are the environmental ones. Both of these countries occupy major portions of the environmentally endangered northern hemisphere. The Soviet leaders are no less aware than we are of the extent to which this hemisphere, even if it escapes nuclear disaster, will still be threatened by environmental pollution and deterioration. They know that these problems will not be mastered just by measures taken within any single country—that their solution will require international collaboration.

These environmental questions are only one example of the many problems and challenges that all the great industrial societies of this planet, including the

United States and the U.S.S.R., have in common. And these problems—the ones that unite us—the ones on which we can collaborate—are the problems of the future. The others—the ones flowing from the ideological conflicts of earlier decades—are the problems of the past.

These, then, are some of the pros and cons of the Soviet-American relationship and if these pros and cons are stacked up against each other, what you get is naturally a mixed pattern, embracing serious differences of outlook and interest, but also embracing positive possibilities that are more than negligible. This is a pattern which of course leaves no room for exaggerated hopes, or for fulsome and hypocritical pretences to a friendship which does not, and cannot, fully exist. But it also affords no justification for some of the extremes of pessimism that we see around us today—no justification for the conclusion that it is only by some ultimate military showdown that our various differences can be resolved—and no justification for the overdrawn image of the Soviet leadership to which I have just pointed. The United States lived for more than a century at peace with the empire of the Tsars. Despite the addition of several seriously complicating factors during the present century, it has lived for some six and a half decades at peace with the Soviet Union. And I can see, in this mixed pattern I have just been talking about, nothing to suggest that these two countries should not be able to continue to live at peace with each other for an indefinite number of decades into the future.

But this cannot be assured by the state of relations we have before us today. The true pattern of our interrelationship does not, as I have just said, suggest that the prospect for a peaceful development of Soviet-American relations are hopeless; but they could easily become just that if we are unable to rise above some of the morbid nuclear preoccupations that now seem to possess us—if we are unable to see the positive possibilities behind the negative ones and unable to give to these possibilities a chance to breathe and to realize themselves.

I recognize the fundamental importance of the outstanding questions of arms control. I know that they represent the greatest single problem we have before us in our relations with the Soviet Union. And I know that without progress in the solution of them there can be little hope of a peaceful future. But I would like the words I am speaking today to serve as a reminder that there are other dimensions to this relationship than just the military ones; and that not only are these other dimensions of sufficient importance to warrant attention in their own right, but that unless they, too, can be recognized, and cultivated, and their possibilities taken advantage of, the arms talks themselves are unlikely to have any adequate and enduring success. These two aspects of the relationship are complementary; and progress in the one is indispensable to progress in the other.

My plea, therefore, would be that we see what we can do to place this relationship as a whole on a sounder, more assuring, and less frightening basis. I recognize that, as of today, things are badly fouled up, and that any effort to straighten them out will unavoidably take time. There are those who believe that nothing that could be done from the American side even over the next year and a half would suffice to restore the atmosphere necessary to permit such an effort to go forward. I cannot share that extreme pessimism. Of course, the process will take time. But precisely because this is so, it is never too late to begin it; and there is nothing to prevent us from considering the sort of agenda that would be necessary to create a more normal state of affairs.

What might such an agenda look like?

Well, some of it flows, by implication, from what I have already said. We could try, first of all, to restore the confidentiality and the civility of communication. And we could cease treating the Soviet Union as though we were, out of one pocket, at peace with it, and out of the other—at war. We have no need to be trying to set back the economy, and depress the living standards, of another great people; nor is it in keeping with the American tradition to be engaged in such an effort.

About arms control, my views are widely known; and I shall not try to repeat them all here. We could acknowledge—and it is high time we did so—that the nuclear weapon is a totally useless one, which could not conceivably be used without catastrophe for ourselves and hundreds of millions of others. Recognizing this, we could reject all dreams of superiority and see what we could do about reducing the existing arsenals, with a view to their eventual total elimination. A number of approaches have been suggested: the freeze, deep cuts, the so-called "build-down," a comprehensive test ban treaty, and others. These are not alternatives. They are complementary. Any or all of them would be useful. But to get on with them, I believe that we would have to treat the problem as a whole in our talks with the Russians—not in a series of fragmentized technical negotiations—and to treat it at the senior political level, as it should be treated.

And then, turning to the more positive and hopeful possibilities which we have been so persistently ignoring, we could set out to take advantage of those areas where the peaceful interests of the two powers coincide and where possibilities for collaboration do exist. What have we to lose? If my memory is correct, we once had some twenty-two separate agreements for collaboration and personnel exchanges in a whole series of cultural and scientific fields. A number of these proved fruitful; some, I understand, did not; and I hold no brief for the retention of those latter. But some, including certain of the useful ones, have been allowed to lapse. These could be restored, and others, I am sure, could be added. There are many possibilities in the scientific field—possibilities for collaboration on environmental problems, on study of the Arctic and Antarctic, on oceanographic research, on public health, on nuclear fusion. The entire great area of the uses of outer space ought to be not only demilitarized but genuinely internationalized; and these two great countries ought to be taking a major, if not exclusive, collaborative part in that internationalization.

There are those who will say: yes, we had such agreements, but we did not get as much information out of them as the Russians did. To which I can only say: if this—the acquisition of military intelligence—is the only reason one can see for going into such agreements, then they had better be omitted altogether. But if we are prepared to place our hopes in their long-term effects—in bringing people together in a collaborative relationship and helping them to see each other and the rest of each other's society as human beings and not as some species of demon—then I am sure we will find that many of these arrangements provide more hopeful perspectives than the most ambitious of our efforts to learn how to destroy each other.

These collaborative arrangements require, as a rule, formalized agreements; and there will be some who will question whether we can trust the Soviet government to live up to such agreements when it makes them. Whenever I hear this question asked, I am surprised; for we now have six and a half decades of experience to go on and the answer provided by this experience is reasonably clear. You *can* conclude useful agreements with the Soviet side, and they *will* respect them—on the condition, however, that the terms be clear and specific, not general; that as little as possible be left to interpretation; that questions of motivation and particularly professions of lofty principle be left aside; and finally, that the other contracting party show a serious and continued interest in their observance.

And then, while we are on the question of the objections that will be raised to what I have suggested, there is one more I must face: and that is the question of "human rights"—whether, that is, it is proper for us to enter into any collaborative agreements with a regime whose practices in this respect differ so greatly from our own.

I am afraid that my answer to this question must be brief, and to many—unwelcome. Of course our sympathies are engaged for people who fall afoul of any great political police system; and I see no need to conceal it. But if what we are talking about are the inter-relations of governments, a choice must be made between the interests of democratization in Russia and the interests of world peace; and in the face of this choice there can be, as I see it, only one answer. Democracy is a matter of tradition, of custom, of what people are used to and expect. It is not something that can be suddenly grafted onto an unprepared people—particularly not from outside, and not by precept and pressure rather than example. It is not a concept familiar to the mass of the Soviet people; and whoever subordinates the interests of world peace to the chimera of an early democratization of Russia will assuredly sacrifice the first of those values without promoting the second. By the nature of things, democratization must wait; world peace can not. If what we want to achieve is a liberalization of the political regime prevailing in the Soviet Union, then it is to example rather than to precept that we must look, and we can start by tackling, with far greater resolution and courage than we have shown to date, some of the glaring deficiencies in our own society.

These, then, are some of the directions in which we could move and in which I should like to see us move. We have, I reiterate, so little to lose. At the end of our present path of unlimited military confrontation lies no visible destination but failure and horror. There are no alternatives to this path that would not be preferable to it. What is needed here is only the will—the courage, the boldness, the affirmation of life—to break out of the evil spell that has been cast upon us, to declare our independence of the nightmares of nuclear danger, and to turn our minds and hearts to better things.

Permit me now, if you will, one personal word in conclusion. These observations flow from an involvement on my part with Soviet-American relations that goes back, I believe, over a longer span of years than that of any one now in public life on either side. In the course of these years (and there are actually fifty-five of them) I have seen this relationship in some of its better times: particularly at the time of the establishment of diplomatic relations just a half-century ago—and again during our association with the Soviet Union in the waging of the Second World War. I have also seen it in some of the most bitter and disheartening moments it has known—have not only seen it in such moments but have felt some of their effects upon my own person. Precisely for this reason, I think I know as much as anyone about the difficulties the relationship involves. Yet at no time in the course of these fifty-five years have I ever lost my confidence in the constructive possibilities of the relationship. For all their historical and ideological differences, these two peoples—the Russians and the Americans—complement each other; they need each other; they can enrich each other; together, granted the requisite insight and restraint, they can do more than any other two powers to assure world peace. The rest of the world needs their forebearance with each other and their peaceful collaboration. Their allies need it. And they themselves need it—and can have it if they want it.

I wish I could convey something of this confidence to those around me in this city. I know that if this could be done, we would go forward without hesitation to face the challenges this view presents, and to shoulder, soberly but cheerfully, the burdens it implies.

The CHAIRMAN. I would also like to insert at this time in the record of these hearings the participants and conclusions of an important conference on United States-Soviet trade held in Chicago, Ill., last January 12. Since the committee did considerable work on East-West trade issues in hearings last year, we have not started with this aspect of the United States-Soviet relationship in hearings this year. But I would like these comprehensive hearings on the United States-Soviet relationship to show that work around the country continues on this important aspect of the overall relationship.

[The material referred to follows:]

### PARTICIPANTS AND CONCLUSIONS OF THE UNITED STATES-SOVIET TRADE CONFERENCE, CHICAGO, ILL., JAN. 12, 1983

In Chicago on January 12, 1983, an important U.S.-U.S.S.R. Trade Conference was held on what it can mean to the economy of the United States and the State of Illinois. It was convened by Erwin A. Salk, President of Salk, Ward & Salk, Inc., who was a delegate to the 1982 Annual Meeting of the U.S.-U.S.S.R. Trade and Economic Council in Moscow last November, and the following group of co-sponsors:

State of Illinois Department of Commerce and Community Affairs.
City of Chicago Department of Economic Development.
Chicago Association of Commerce and Industry.
Chicago Council on Foreign Relations.
Illinois State Chamber of Commerce.
International Business Council MidAmerica.
Business International Corporation.
American Committee on East-West Accord.
U.S.-U.S.S.R. Trade and Economic Council, Inc.
The Stanley Foundation.
Women in International Trade.
Northwest International Trade Club.
Central Seaway Company.
The Management Group.

The meeting was opened and chaired by Erwin A. Salk and John T. Allen, Jr., President of International Business Council MidAmerica and partner, McBride & Baker.

The Keynote Address in the morning was given by the Honorable Philip M. Klutznick, former Secretary of the U.S. Department of Commerce. The luncheon keynote speaker was Robert M. Schmidt, Vice Chairman of Control Data Corporation and the current President of The American Committee on East-West Accord.

The program and panelists were as follows:

10:30 to 12:30, Panel 1: Import-Export Trade Potential: Industry, Agriculture, and Small Business.

Michael Yanney:[1] President, Agricultural Corporation of America.

Alfred J. Murrer:[1] Chairman, The Gleason Works; Chairman, U.S.-U.S.S.R. Trade and Economic Council Small Business Committee.

John W. Kiser, III: Kiser Research, Inc.; Eastern Bloc Technology, Patent Licensing.

Dudley W. Miller: Acting President, U.S.-U.S.S.R. Trade and Economic Council, Inc.; Report on the November 1982 Moscow meeting of the U.S.-U.S.S.R. Trade and Economic Council, Inc.

2:00 to 3:30, Panel 2: Government Role in U.S.-U.S.S.R. Trade: Lifting Sanctions; Most Favored Nation Status; Trade Act of 1974, Export Administration Act of 1979, Export Trading Company Act of 1982.

Eugene Shershnev: Economic Counselor-U.S.S.R. Embassy, Washington, D.C., Representing Ambassador Anatoly Dobrynin.

Thaddeus Kopinski: Senior Editor, Business International Corporation.

Jan Vanous: Senior Economist, Wharton Econometric Forecasting Associates; Outlook for East-West Trade and extended Financial situation of the Soviet Union 1983–87.

Howard S. Marks: Professional Staff Member, U.S. Senate Committee on Governmental Affairs; Statement from U.S. Senator Charles H. Percy on U.S. Agricultural Policy with U.S.S.R.

4:00 to 5:30, Panel 3: Economic Effects of Trade; Counter Trade; Financing and Barter; Tourism.

Peter Fox: Director, Illinois Department of Commerce and Community Affairs; What U.S.-U.S.S.R. Trade can mean to the State of Illinois.

Vladislav K. Nazarov: Commercial Counselor, Deputy Trade Representative of the U.S.S.R. to the USA; The U.S.S.R.—Its Foreign Trade and Soviet-U.S. Trade Relations.

Jeff Smith: Senior Soviet Editor, Business International, Eastern Europe.

Francis H. Gorman:[1] President, Vega International Travel; Member, U.S.-U.S.S.R. Trade and Economic Council Tourism Committee.

*Yuri V. Kalashnekov, Trade Representative of the U.S.S.R. to the USA, and Yuri V. Legeev, Vice President of U.S.-U.S.S.R. Trade and Economic Council, Inc., will be present.*

Also, the following statements were included in the printed program:

From: The Protocol establishing the U.S.-U.S.S.R. Trade and Economic Council, Inc., June 22, 1973.

"Recognizing that such increased cooperation would contribute to the promotion of contacts between businessmen of the U.S.S.R. and the USA which in turn would assist in the development of mutually beneficial trade between the two countries."

NIKOLAI S. PATOLICHEV,
*Minister of Foreign Trade, U.S.S.R.*
GEORGE P. SHULTZ,
*Secretary of the Treasury, USA.*

"U.S.-Soviet trade could reach $10 billion by '85.", William Verity, Chairman, Armco Inc., Journal of Commerce, 11/17/82.

"Necessity for business cooperation will overcome all obstacles.", Nikolai Patolichev; Foreign Trade Minister, U.S.S.R., Journal of Commerce 11/17/82.

The general conclusions from the Conference were:

1. U.S. companies—both industrial and agricultural—are anxious to do business with the U.S.S.R. Most of these companies have had excellent experience in

---

[1] Attended meeting of United States-U.S.S.R. Trade and Economic Council, November 1982, Moscow.

their dealings with the Soviet Union and were extremely complimentary on these relationships.

2. The Soviets are most anxious to do business with U.S. companies. This was quite clear from both the United States-U.S.S.R. Trade and Economic Conference held in Moscow in November of 1982 and from the statements of the Soviet participants in the Conference in Chicago. Their concerns were (a) treatment on a basis of equality, (b) reliability of a contract, and (c) a desire to do business with the United States even though they can fill most of their needs elsewhere—either from other countries or through their own productive capacities.

3. No one in the world, including the United States or the Soviet Union, has a "hold" on high technology. These concepts are part of the "mythology" that exists. Competition is rampant throughout the world on new techniques. If most instances not available from the United States, available elsewhere. The U.S.S.R. is not interested in buying "old technology."

4. There is a reversed trade picture wherein U.S. companies buy patents, equipment, etc. from the U.S.S.R. and other Eastern European Countries.

5. The Soviet economy is not a weak economy and will not "collapse."

6. Studies by both Western European Countries and responsible Institutes in the United States show considerable increase in East-West trade—both imports and exports—over the next 5 years.

7. The Soviets and the Eastern European bloc have the capacity to meet their obligations and their credit worthiness is excellent. The net debt of the U.S.S.R. is only $8 billion, and the net debt of the Eastern bloc is only $54 billion. The bankers of the Western world should take this into consideration in terms of their negotiations.

8. Every billion dollars of U.S. exports can account for some 40,000 jobs.

9. The amount of potential trade is open-ended. Mr. Verity from Armco Steel, who was chair of the U.S. side in the November Moscow meeting, projects a potential by 1985 of at least $10 billion in trade. Eugene Shershnev, Economic Counsellor from the Soviet Union Embassy in Washington, said it was possible the figure could rise as high as $15 billion. Others feel that it can be open-ended even beyond this, particularly if we can rid ourselves of such things as the Jackson-Vanik Act, make necessary changes in the Import-Export Act, provide Most Favored Nation Status; "straighten out" procedures for doing trade. Even though the sanctions have been lifted, the companies are finding tremendous difficulty in receiving timely answers or timely permission with respect to trade approvals.

10. Sanctions do not work and never have worked. This was further verified on the Kupcinet program when Hodding Carter, former assistant secretary of state, joined Philip Klutznick, Eugene Shershnev and Erwin A. Salk in discussions on the January 12th Trade Conference.

11. Trade with the U.S.S.R. would add favorably to our balance of trade position by exports exceeding imports.

12. There was considerable emphasis, both in the Moscow and Chicago meetings, as to the role of small business in United States-U.S.S.R. trade. The Soviet Union expressed themselves very strongly on an interest in doing business with smaller companies as well as the larger ones.

13. It was announced that there would be a large Agribusiness USA Exhibition October 18–25. The chair of this committee is William P. Stiritz, Chairman, Ralston-Purina Company.

The CHAIRMAN. I would like to ask Ambassador Watson what level of trade he feels we ought to achieve should we move forward in this area, both in grain and in manufactured goods. Let us assume the unique technology contributing to, say, the defense establishment of the Soviet Union, obviously COCOM rules that out and I presume we all agree on that, but how do we resume certain normalized processes with the Soviet Union and yet answer those who are so concerned about Poland and what is going on in Poland and what is going on in Afghanistan and still the presence of 120,000 troops there?

How do we explain to them that in the overall interest of world peace it is in everyone's interest, possibly including our ability to influence the Soviets with respect to Poland and Afghanistan, that we do try to more normalize our relationship?

Ambassador Watson. Senator, you have a way of asking very difficult questions, not only here but elsewhere. I cannot answer that question clearly.

In the first place, I think the Senate of the United States has to adopt a policy of what we are going to be able to trade in. My former company does not do much Soviet trade and does not try to because the very minute that we sell a computer to Intourist somebody takes up the fact that maybe that computer is used at night to keep track of people in prisons.

It seems to me that it is counterproductive for us to be in there. It has been very productive for other companies to be in there that sell completely benign sorts of things. The Caterpillar Tractor Co., for instance, had a good Soviet trade and they are, I think, enjoined from doing any trade at the moment.

I would try to strike some sort of a definition of what is and is not strategic and if it exempts all computer companies, let it exempt them. But I think at the level of benign trade you are going to build up better understandings in spite of their misbehavior than to say we will not trade with you.

Furthermore, our policy on trade is forcing us away from good cooperative trade relations with the NATO countries because their policies are quite different than ours. I am sorry I cannot give you a better answer.

The Chairman. That is fine. That helps.

One other question that I would like to really leave as an option with you as to whether you submit an answer for the record, it would be up to you as to whether you want to or not, we would value very highly your evaluation of the Scowcroft Commission report.

It made a number of recommendations dealing with the MX, dealing with single warhead, dealing with certainly the question of—they did get into the implications of the build-down, but also other major questions. And arms control was a very important part of their thinking. But any comments that you would like to submit for the record, I will keep the record open until we receive your written comment on that. I would not ask you to go into a lengthy thing like that at this particular time.

I think as a former chairman of the Presidential Advisory Committee on Arms Control and Disarmament we would very highly value your feelings about that.

Ambassador Watson. I would be glad to submit that, Senator.[1]

The Chairman. Just one last question to the Governor and Mrs. Harriman. You have commented in your testimony and it has been extraordinarily helpful and very current—the most current information we have had about the health, the well-being and the demeanor and attitude of President Andropov.

Do you feel, particularly as a result of your visit and as a result also of the consolidation of power that occurred yesterday in the Kremlin that he is now in a strong enough position in the Soviet

---

[1] See page 88.

Union to be able to deal with effectively and compromise enough, because compromise is necessary on both sides, to reach a mutually acceptable intermediate nuclear force agreement and a START agreement in Geneva?

Is he strong enough personally to be able to give a sense of direction to that team and carry the day if he feels the compromise will reach an agreement that is to the advantage of the Soviet Union and also acceptable to us?

Mrs. HARRIMAN. Senator, with 1 hour and 20 minutes of conversation with somebody and 3 days in that country, speaking with relatively few of their leaders, the best that I could honestly say was that he gave the impression of being a man in total control and absolutely having the authority to do what he wishes.

I think the feeling was that the plenary session which took place this week would be totally controlled by him and the outcome would be for his satisfaction and advantage. So I suggest that he is in control, that he can move forward, back, or stay still as he personally wishes.

Governor HARRIMAN. Could I add this, Mr. Chairman? The fact that he has just been elected President of the Supreme Soviet is an indication that what my wife says is true, and I had the same impression. He is on the job. He knows what he is doing and has the determination to get what he thinks is in the interest that he believes in.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. Ambassador Watson, do you have any comment on that?

Ambassador WATSON. No, thank you.

The CHAIRMAN. All right, fine. I agree with you on that. I think he certainly should be reckoned with, can be reckoned with, and should be dealt with and can speak effectively for the people of the Soviet Union now and for that government, and all the more reason why we should take into account moving toward as early a summit meeting as we possibly can.

I am sure we would like quick results from it, but establishing a better understanding face to face, getting a better gage of each other, I think is terribly important and hopefully can move us away from the real lack of progress we are now making on the most critical issue facing mankind today. It is being debated in Geneva, debated back and forth with very little evidence of solid progress. We must make some dramatic, bold, creative move toward breaking through to a better solution to that problem.

This hearing has been extraordinarily interesting and extremely helpful to this committee. I know every committee member will value the record, even though they were required to be on the floor, will read it thoroughly. We deeply appreciate on behalf of the entire committee the time and the thought, the effort that you have put into this testimony.

This committee would be happy to hear from any of you at any time that you have any thoughts that would help guide us in the responsibility and the charge and challenge that Ambassador Watson outlined in rightfully pointing to the role this committee has effectively had in the past at crucial times in history.

This is a crucial time in history. This committee, in a bipartisan spirit, will measure up to that responsibility and will be better because of your presence here today.

[The following information was referred to on p. 86.]

### COMMENTS ON THE SCOWCROFT COMMISSION REPORT—SUBMITTED BY AMBASSADOR THOMAS J. WATSON, JR.

The Chairman, members and senior consultants of the Scowcroft Commission are serious, dedicated people, many of whom have previously served in the highest national security positions. Both the merits and the drawbacks of the Commission's report flow from the fact that it is a consensus document reflecting the considered, conventional wisdom that has guided our national security policy for some decades.

The immediate problem the Commission was established to deal with was the MX, a missile created to "catch up" with the Soviets in missile size. But as the Committee knows, this is just one more case when we heedlessly allowed mistakes of the past to establish the framework for decision-making, instead of establishing our own framework based on our needs in the current strategic situation.

I will briefly remind you of the way this problem unfolded. The United States decided long ago to move away from the giant Titan missile and to build small, accurate missiles. Not surprisingly the Soviet Union, which has always suffered from a "big is better" fetish, did not follow our lead. Instead of laughing up our sleeves and negotiating an agreement banning multiple warheads to assure that the Soviets would be stuck with white elephants in their silos, our leaders on the advice of "experts" pursued the short-term advantage of MIRVing our small missiles, thus unleashing the Soviets to convert their white elephants into weapons which could theoretically threaten U.S. silo-based missiles.

This theoretical threat became a double-edged sword in American politics. While it gave impetus to "catch-up" emotions, it also introduced the survivability issue which has plagued the MX since it was conceived. For the logic of the survivability argument is inescapable: if silos are vulnerable, it is dumb to put a relatively few, heavily MIRVed missiles in silos—unless you intend to threaten their use at the first sign of trouble, before they can be destroyed.

Since it is widely recognized that such a policy would be dangerous and destabilizing, politicians have in the past steered clear of openly pursuing it. President Carter tried to solve the survivability problem with racetracks in the desert. President Reagan toyed with a number of solutions before coming up with the Scowcroft Commission, which lent its prestige and its considerable powers of argument to justify putting the MX in silos, contrary to logic and despite the dangers. It did not deny the vulnerability of ICBMs but sought to disarm critics by debunking the "window of vulnerability" in a broader sense and admitting that the failure to stop the MIRVing of ICBMs was a mistake.

Congress in its wisdom has decided to give the MX a reprieve. The reason apparently has more to do with the MX as a bargaining chip than any widespread conviction in Congress that U.S. security would be improved by putting our most effective and threatening weapons in such a vulnerable position that they must be kept on hair-trigger alert. Those of us looking on with the sinking feeling that we are marching toward disaster can only hope that this bargaining chip will be cashed in before it takes on a life of its own, as most bargaining chips do.

We have already seen the Soviet Union testing its own answer to the MX. Although it was the U.S. side that insisted, in the SALT II negotiations, on allowing each side one new MIRVed ICBM, the Soviets have subsequently been developing several alternatives and now seem to be zeroing in on their choice. Once they start deploying it, the MX will be not a bargaining chip but the "American response to a dangerous new Soviet weapon." And to the extent the new Soviet weapon is indeed dangerous, we will once again have shot ourselves painfully in the foot.

What about the small, single warhead missile which the Scowcroft Commission recommends as the hope for the future? It certainly looks safer than the MX. But we need to do some hard thinking before rushing down that road. We deliberately left the barn door open for MIRVed missiles too long ago to hope easily to close it now. Going back to single warhead missiles would pose serious problems of negotiations and strategy. We ought to give serious consideration to the Scowcroft Commission's thoughtful presentation on the "window of vulnerability issue": it points out that nuclear security comes from the interaction of ICBMs, bombers and the most survivable element, submarines. Our present ICBM force is a powerful leg of that triad, especially if equipped with modern warheads on all instead of just some of the Minuteman missiles. Whether it needs to be bolstered by a new small missile is worth discussing, but this should not be another decision made without looking down the road at the ultimate consequences.

Much of the attention given the Commission's report has focused on its recommendations on the MX and the new small missile. We should not, however, lose sight of the third important element of its recommendations: the pursuit of arms control as an "essential element in diminishing the risk of nuclear war."

The report also deals at some length with the philosophy of nuclear arms, but not, unfortunately, in a helpful way. To be sure, it acknowledges that the nature of war itself has changed as a result of the new technology, and—in a backhanded way—debunks the concept of prevailing in a nuclear war.

But in some crucial ways, the report falls back on conventional wisdom in discussing the philosophy underlying nuclear weapons. It thus does the country a major disservice.

To be specific, I believe it is dangerous to use "nuclear blackmail" as a catch-all incantation to justify a continuous spiral of building nuclear weapons. And it is misleading to use "deterrence" in a vague way which implies deterrence of nuclear threat, when in fact it is being used to mean the brandishing of nuclear weapons to deter Soviet misbehavior in a broad sense.

It is of course correct, as the report states, that our dilemma is how to avoid mass destruction while containing the thrust of aggressive totalitarianism. I agree that Americans must be prepared to make a sustained effort to "preserve liberty in the face of a challenge by a system that is the antithesis of liberal values." We do have many strengths, and the biggest obstacle is, as the report asserts, confusion and internal divisions that can cause us to lose purpose, hope and resolve.

That is why it is so important for the national security establishment to catch up with the basic common sense of the American people. That common sense is reflected in the widespread support for a nuclear freeze. The freeze movement has some weaknesses. It reflects a "gut feeling" which can be dangerous if allowed to degenerate into pure emotionalism. But it should be encouraged, built on, and guided into constructive channels—not ignored. That is the role our best thinkers should be playing, rather than merely repeating old cliches which appear to narrow political constituencies.

What compounds the confusion, and aggravates the internal divisions that can tear our country apart, is the failure by a powerful minority to recognize a central fact: that at today's levels of nuclear weaponry neither superpower—no matter what its marginal advantages—can successfully use nuclear weapons to blackmail the other. The danger comes from the possibility that the Soviet Union might underestimate our will to defend ourselves. That miscalculation by Moscow is more likely if we rely heavily on suicidal nuclear weapons than if we and our friends show ourselves able and willing to defend ourselves with believable, that is to say non-nuclear weapons.

The sooner we can agree on that basic fact, the sooner our country can begin pulling together on military, political and economic policies that will protect our liberties and our friends while reducing our reliance on nuclear weapons and the risk of nuclear war.

In conclusion, let me turn to an aspect of the Scowcroft Commission report which is less immediately crucial but nevertheless important in the long run.

The Committee has in the past expressed interest in the idea of improving the mechanism for giving the President advice on arms control and other national security issues. I am sure members of the Committee welcomed, as I did, the President's comments, in letters to the Chairman and other Senators and Congressmen, that he saw merit in a bipartisan panel with staggered terms to provide continuity in offering such advice. Those letters, you will recall, were part of the President's effort to win approval of the MX missile. It was disappointing that, once the Congress acted on the MX, the idea of such a panel got lost in the shuffle. Instead he decided merely to extend the life of the Scowcroft Commission. The members of that Commission are competent, bipartisan and highly respected. But they serve at the invitation and pleasure of the President and thus by definition cannot provide continuity.

In fact that Commission seems likely to replace the body which was created by Congress for the same purpose, the General Advisory Committee on Arms Control and Disarmament. Although the membership of that body now normally turns over with each Administration, at least it is subject to Senate confirmation.

If we are to draw any lessons from mistakes of the past which now haunt us, such as the MIRV decision, we should be organizing ourselves to prevent mistakes about to be born. Current candidates, in my view, are ground-launched and sea-launched cruise missiles, which will be impossible to verify once deployment starts; anti-satellite weapons; and ballistic missile defenses. These and other candidates for errors in judgment on a grand scale should be examined by a panel which is knowledgeable, has a broad outlook, and—above all—is independent. The Committee could do posterity a great favor by throwing its full weight behind creation of such a body.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. The hearing is adjourned.

[Whereupon, at 4:16 p.m., the committee adjourned, subject to call of the Chair.]

○